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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this investigation is to describe and 
analyze the alliance between the United States and the 
Philippines utilizing a conceptual framework that suggest 
small power motives for joining, adhering, or withdrawing 
from an alliance: (1) security in relation to the geogra­
phical situation; (2) prestige in the international com­
munity; (3) domestic stability; (4) economic aid and mi­
litary assistance; and (5) ideology.
Through the use of primary and secondary sources, 
this investigation analyzes the alliance in three parts. 
Part I is the preliminary considerations section. It 
includes the introduction, the discussion of the defini­
tions and concepts of alliance and small power, and the 
general background about the Philippines regarding its 
history, economy, politics, geography, and foreign policy. 
Part II describes and analyzes the principal treaties of 
the alliance. Part III presents the problems, prospects, 
and alternatives open to the Philippines with regard to
the alliance; and the conclusions and observations developed 
by the investigation. On the basis of the conceptual frame­
work, the Philippines' motives for joining the alliance were 
based on her need for security, prestige, domestic stabili­
ty, economic aid and military assistance, and because of 
her ideological affinity with the United States. Because 
these factors still play an important role in assessing the 
future security needs of the Philippines, the Philippines 
may find it difficult to scrap the alliance and attempt 
to experiment with other foreign policies like neutrality 
or nonalignment, or alliance with other powers or regional 
associations.
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PART I
BACKGROUND AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
During the unsettled and chaotic period following the 
end of World War II in the Pacific, he Philippines and the 
United States entered into a series of negotiations which 
culminated in the signing of several treaties and agree­
ments, the most important of which are the treaties on 
military bases, mutual defense, military assistance, and 
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. These agree­
ments aye considered to be mutually beneficial to the two 
nations in relation to their respective national objectives, 
For the Philippines, the agreements provide guaranties 
for the protection of its national security and the pre­
servation of its political independence. For the United 
States, the agreements enable that great power to project 
its role as a Pacific power in the pursuit of its policy 
of preventing the dominance of Asia by any single power 
in the world. The treaties also provide protection for 
the United States territory by the establishment of for­
ward bases in the Far East,
As a result of these agreements, the United States 
and the Philippines established what is technically called
in international law and relations as an alliance. It is
2
the purpose of this investigation to identify and describe 
the reasons for that alliance between the United States 
and the Philippines— one a great power and the other a 
small power; the issues and problems that have produced 
stresses and strains in that alliance; and the prospects 
of that alliance in the light of evolving events in the 
external and internal environments of the Philippines.
Part I of this study explores the background and 
general considerations pertinent to this investigation. 
Chapter I is a discussion of the problem to be investigated, 
the importance of the problem, the major questions of the 
investigation, the scope of the investigation, operational 
definitions, the method or technique of the investigation, 
a short review of the significant literature related to 
the investigation, and the organization of the study.
Chapter II is a discussion of the concepts of alliance 
and the small state. Some discussion is devoted to a survey 
of political science literature on the subject of conceptual 
and analytical frameworks which have been utilized in the 
study of alliances.
Chapter III provides the geographic, historical,
economic, and political background of the Philippines*
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-1975;
A STUDY OF A SMALL POWER IN AN ALLIANCE
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In a major policy speech delivered on July 7, 1975, 
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos expressed the desire 
of the Philippine government to "assume control" of all 
American military bases in the Philippines in order to 
"put an end to the practice of extraterritoriality in our 
country in keeping with our dignity as a sovereign Repub­
lic."^ Marcos said this was in keeping with the develop­
ments of the time. In the same speech, Marcos said that 
the Philippines was now ready to enter into negotiations 
with the United States regarding treaties between the two
countries involving mutual defense, military assistance,
2
and military bases. Although Marcos sought full control 
over U.S. military bases in the Philippines, he also said 
that he was not objecting to new arrangements that would 
enable the United States to continue to maintain an effect­
ive presence over the air and sea lanes of the Western 
Pacific in order to protect the national security of the 
United States.
Marcos stated that his position was in full accord
with the aspirations of all Asian peoples, never depending
on foreign troops to fight "our battles", having adopted
a policy that in meeting threats to internal stability
"we have always refused to allow foreign troops to fight
in our territory."^ There was no reason why foreign troops
should remain on Philippine soil after fifty years, Marcos
asserted, but;
. . . having never been known as a worthless 
ally, there is no reason why we should deny 
those facilities which a historical ally might 
or must need in fulfilling its assigned role 
for the maintenance of peace in the region.^
These frank and bold statements on the part of a 
Philippine statesman regarding Philippine-American rela­
tions since U.S. withdrawal from the Asian mainland have 
focused attention on the future of one of the oldest allian­
ces the United States has fashioned in Southeast Asia in 
the aftermath of World War II in the pursuit of its policy 
of containment of Communist expansion in all parts of the 
world. Because the Philippines has historically depended 
for its military security on the United States, the state­
ments of Marcos must be considered in the light of the long 
period of relationship between the two countries, the de­
velopments in the global environment since the end of the 
war in Vietnam, and the changes in the internal politics 
of the Philippines.
There has, indeed, been a reshaping of the direction 
of Philippine foreign policy, peifhaps not away from the 
United States, but more in its psychological need for the 
development of national self-reliance in a world where
accommodation and flexibility in diplomacy have now become 
necessary.
In an earlier speech delivered on May 23, 1975, Mar­
cos outlined the following guidelines for a new foreign 
policy:
First,to intensity, along a broader field, 
our relations with the members of ASEAN;
Second, to pursue more vigorously the es­
tablishment of diplomatic relations with Socia­
list states, in particular with the People's 
Republic of China and with the Soviet Union;
Third, to seek closer identification with 
the Third World with whom we share similar 
problems;
Fourth, to continue our beneficial rela­
tionship with Japan;
Fifth, to support the Arab countries in 
their struggle for a just and enduring peace 
in the Middle East; and
Finally, to find a new basis, compatible 
with the emerging realities in Asia, for a con­
tinuing healthy relationship with the United 
States.^
This new policy has resulted in the negotiation of 
and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations 
with all of the Communist countries of eastern Europe and 
the People's Republic of China. The latest development 
in this sphere was the conclusion of negotiations leading 
to diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Philippines 
on June 2, 1976 at Moscow.
The Philippines strongly supports ASEAN through 
which it seeks greater cooperation on economic matters with 
its members and the creation of a "zone of peace, freedom, 
and neutrality" in Southeast Asia. The Philippines views
the SEATO as having outlived its usefulness and does not
place any reliance on it for its security since it has a 
bilateral treaty of mutual defense with the United States.
In calling for a reexamination of all defense agree­
ments with the United States, Marcos refers to the 1947 
Military Bases Agreement which expires in 1991, the 1947 
Military Assistance Agreement which has been amended, and 
the 1952 Treaty of Mutual Defense,
Marcos is deeply interested in renegotiating the 
military bases agreement. There are two major U.S. bases 
in the Philippines: the Air Force Base at Clark Field, and 
the Naval Base Complex at Subic Bay. Clark Air Base, 52 
miles north of Manila, spreads over 131,000 acres, making 
it greater in size than the combined area of all U.S. air 
bases outside the continental United States. The Subic 
naval base comple:: is situated on 36,000 acres of land and 
encompasses 26,000 acres of water. About fifteen thousand 
U.S. servicemen are stationed at the two bases supplemented 
by 47,000 Filipino employees. In 1974, the budget for 
Clark and Subic was $232 million. The bases represent a 
major investment for the United States, a major payroll 
for the Philippines, and an irritating issue to both coun­
tries.
In announcing the negotiations for a new base agree­
ment, the Philippine Government said that it will be guided 
by these principles:
1. To give added impetus to Philippine reliance;
2. To enhance respect for the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of the Philippines; and
3. To help maintain a balance of power in the region.
From the Philippine point of view, negotiation of a
8new status for the bases involves three main issues: (1)
Filipinization of the bases or elimination of extra-terri­
torial carry-overs; (2) use of portions of the bases for 
commercial purposes and economic development which can be 
on a joint basis; and (3) return of portions of the base 
lands.
There is no question that the bases are important to
Filipinos in terms of providing security to the country,
as well as promoting regional stability and aiding the
local economy. For the United States, the bases constitute
vital links in its defensive system.
The future of these bases is inextricably linked to
the question of what direction Philippine policy may take
in the post-Vietnam era. In a sense, the settlement of the
bases question may also determine the future of the alliance
relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines.
In fact the possibilities that face the Philippines
in case it decides to terminate the alliance are explored
by Salvador P. Lopez, former Philippine ambassador to the UN;
We will have to consider whether a decision to 
abrogate these arrangements might so weaken the 
American military posture in the Western Pacific 
that the new quadrilateral balance of power in 
the region would be seriously disturbed. We will 
also have to ponder the wisdom of joining the 
ranks of the non-aligned at a time when the policy 
of non-alignment is receding before the advancing
principle of detente. Since non-alignment was 
essentially a response to the Cold War, its re­
levance as a foreign policy option must diminish 
as the Cold War thaw continues,
Lopez warns against a radical and precipitate foreign 
policy shift from alliance to non-alignment because 
this might create for the Philippines the very danger of 
conflict which it had sought to prevent by adopting a poli­
cy of non-alignment. He suggests that while it is desirable 
^or the Philippines to forge new links with China and the 
Soviet Union, it must carefully consider under what terms 
and conditions the Philippines can maintain existing ties
and mutually beneficial relationships, including security 
arrangements, with the United States and the West, "The
whole purpose of the exercise, after all," Lopez concludes, 
"is not to substitute one hegemony for another, but to 
broaden our options and to strengthen our hand in interna-
7
tional affairs."
In his own way, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mans­
field agrees that the "winds of change" have swept over 
Asia and that the United States must fashion new policies 
to meet new challenges. In reviewing the Philippine situa­
tion and its desire to renegotiate U.S. security agreements 
with that country, Mansfield concluded in a report to the
10
Senate foreign relations committee on October 14, 1975, that:
In summary, the Philippine republic is 
experiencing a period of growing national 
assertion and economic progress. At the same 
time, its ties with the United States which 
go back three quarters of a century are in 
transition. What is involved in this tran­
sition of principal concern to the United 
States are the vestiges of the previous de­
pendency relationship which, in my judgment, 
no longer accord with the enduring interests 
of either nation. There is a need for a re­
shaping of attitudes and arrangements which 
will reflect the changes that have taken place 
in the Philippines and in the Pacific and the
world. The future of the Philippines is bright
and so, too, can be the outlook for continued 
cooperation and beneficial interchange with 
the United States if the adjustments which 
are now required are made in good faith and 
are managed with sensitivity and understanding 
— on both sides.®
It is anticipated that the negotiations which are 
now going on will be difficult for both the Philippines
and the United States involving as it is an agonizing re­
appraisal of their historic relationship and their agree­
ments creating an alliance partnership between them.
Statement of Purpoée 
It is, therefore, the purpose of this investigation 
to describe and analyze the alliance between the Philippines 
and the United States following a conceptual framework of 
an alliance between a great power and a small power.
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Importance of the Study
Generally, the study of alliances is important because 
more knowledge is needed of its internal operations as well
9
as its function in the community of nations.
In terms of the involvement of small nations in in­
ternational politics, in spite of the traditional theory 
that their influence remains weak in a world of power poli­
tics, one cannot ignore them altogether.
It has also been asserted that "additional investi­
gations of small-power capabilities, determinants, motiva­
tions, and behavioral patterns during the Cold War and the 
era of peaceful coexistence seem useful, even necessary."
Finally, for the writer it is very important to inves­
tigate this subject himself for very personal reasons be­
cause he grew up in an educational system patterned close­
ly after that in the United States, supported the American 
cause without question during World War II, and personally 
experienced hardships because of his loyalty and friendship 
to Americans.
Major Questions of the Study
The principal questions that this investigation un­
dertakes to answer are the following:
First, what were the motivations or reasons of the 
Philippines in joining an alliance with a great power, the 
United States.
Second, what were the benefits and costs to the
12
Philippines as a result of her alliance with the United 
States?
Third, what are the prospects of the alliance con­
sidering the developments in the external and internal 
environments of the Philippines insofar as foreign policy­
making is concerned?
Scope of the Investigation
The period to be covered by this investigation will 
principally include the period after World War II to the 
present. Some past history prior to World War II will also 
be included insofar as they are relevant to the study.
Sources of the Study
Government or public documents will form the core of 
the primary materials of this study. Many documents used 
in this study were classified documents at the time of 
their preparation and were classified, therefore, in varying 
categories as secret, top secret, confidential, or restrict- 
ted. These documents have now been declassified and are 
available to the public for research and other purposes. 
Because of the confidential nature of these documents at 
the time of their preparation, they reveal many insights 
into the policymaking process and are therefore very valuable 
in furnishing background information to the policymaking 
process. Many of these documents include studies prepared 
for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, 
the Central Intelligence Agency, and other U.S. agencies.
One outstanding example of these documents is the so-called
13
Pentagon Papers. Another group of materials have been re­
leased for research in the Foreign Relations of the U.S. 
series of documents published by the U.S. Department of 
State. Other primary materials utilized for this study 
include the speeches and writings of public officials and 
statesmen, texts of treaties and agreements, transcripts 
of congressional hearings, congressional reports and docu­
ments, and department releases. Many books, monographs, 
pamphlets, and newspapers were also consulted as secondary 
sources.
Operational Definitions
The principal terms to be defined in this study are 
alliance and small power. Because there exists a body of 
literature discussing the concepts of alliance and small 
power, a survey was made for purposes of this research of 
a considerable body of writing on alliance and small power. 
The results of this survey of literature on alliance and 
small power are included as a separate chapter of this in­
vestigation.
Method or Technique of Inquiry
This study is concerned with the foreign relations 
of a single state— the Philippines. It is intended as an 
analysis of the participation of a small power in an alliance 
with a great power, in this case, the United States.
It is hoped that by the use of a conceptual frame­
work in the analysis of small power behavior in alignments, 
we can facilitate theorizing about the behavior of a cer-
14
tain category of small states.
We agree with the author of a recent monograph that
the possibility of comparative analysis
depends less on the use of a common framework 
than on the willingness of writers of case 
studies to put their conclusion in the form 
of general hypotheses, using well-known, 
loosely defined variables capable of easy 
translation from one study to the next.-2
Chapter II of this investigation presents and ana­
lyzes a number of conceptual and analytical frameworks 
utilized in a number of investigations relating to the 
subjects of alliance and small power or small state.
Some of these frameworks require elaborate and expensive 
attention to detail and are beyond the capabilities of 
graduate students desiring to do research in this field 
unless they have the support of some foundation or a govern­
ment agency.
However, for purposes of presenting a compact analysis 
of Philippine behavior in its alliance with the United States, 
the following conceptual framework, as suggested by Omer 
De Raeymaeker, is used in this investigation. According 
to De Raeymaeker, small power motives for adhering to or 
possibly withdrawing from alliances may be classified as 
follows
1. Security in relation to the Geographical 
Situation.
The first and most vital motive determining 
a small power's basic strategic choice is the 
quest of survival as an independent and sovereign 
entity. To survive, a small power elite must de-
15
fend its national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Yet the security of a small nation 
depends heavily on variables within the inter­
national system and on its geographic and topo­
graphic location within the system. Much will 
also depend on the small nation's historical 
experience, on its perceptions concerning the 
attitudes of foes and friends alike, on the 
military capabilities of enemies, on its own 
industrial-military potential, on the quality 
of its leaderships, its morale, its political 
cohesion, and similar characteristics.
2. Prestige in the International Community.
A nation's relative rank in the interna­
tional hierarchy of prestige, thus of its es­
timation in the eyes of other countries' deci­
sion makers, is not altogether insignificant.
An alliance or nonalliance policy may enhance 
or diminish a small power's status. Superior 
recognition will accord it wider influence in 
the international community, and by the same 
token the prestige of its ruling elite will 
augment or increase. Prestige is also a kind 
of first defense line of a country's security.
Its erosion may induce other nations to consi­
der pressure or even attack.
3. Domestic Stability.
Domestic stability may be threatened by 
"material and politicaj^burdens and strains 
flowing from alliance" or nonalliance. Whe­
ther small states' decision makers decide to 
join or reject a coalition is very much related 
to their quest for the security of tenure. Some 
governments may stay or fall by their identifi- 
fication with a great power or coalition. Par­
ticularly in democratic nations the government's 
choices may be narrowly limited by pressure from 
the press, public opinion, various interest groups, 
or the legislature.
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4. Economie Aid and Military Assistance.
In the eyes of the ruling elite, even in 
the eyes of the peoples concerned, alliances 
may result favorably in the pooling of resources 
and the material support of allies. As G. Liska 
argues: "On the economic plane, alliance pro­
motes internal stability most commonly when 
pooling of resources and division of roles 
among members enables a regime to stop short 
of mobilizing disaffected groups and interests; 
beyond that, alliances may entail outrigh^^sub­
sidy or other forms of material support.""
But this attraction that a stronger state holds 
for the weaker aware of its trade and economic 
needs is only provisional. "Resentment of eco­
nomic dependence and an opportunely to draw on 
alternative sources and outlets" may set off 
a political reaction.
5. Ideology.
Ideology, which may or may not be tied to 
cultural affinity, is definitely related to the 
elite's guest for both external and internal 
security. For instance, in the West the fear 
of Russian expansion was probably augmented 
by the fear of Communist ideology and totali­
tarian political structure.
It is the view of Omer De Raeymaeker that the move­
ment toward or away from an alliance is a function of 
these five motives, and any assessment of a basic strate­
gic choice involves a comparison of the hypothetical gains 
and losses of either move. Whether interstate or inter­
group conflicts determine a country's position, observes 
De Raeymaeker, depends on their relative intensity.
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Review of the Literature
For a long period of time, political scientists and
specialists in international relations have consistently
forsaken the subject of small states. The pioneering work
in this field is Annette Baker Fox's investigation of the
behavior of five small neutral European states during 
17World War II. Two other works have appeared since then,
18
the first, Robert Rothstein's Alliances and Small Powers
19
and David Vital's The Inequality of States.
Two books published in recent years in Belgium also
systematically explore the behavior of small states in
alliances. The first is Small Powers in Alignment by
Omer De Raeymaeker, Willy Andries, Luc Crollen, Herman De
20
Fraye, and Frans Govaerts. The second book is Luc Crol-
21
len's Portugal, The U.S. and NATO.
Probably the most original and penetrating studies 
ever to be made of the theory of alliance are the works
of George Liska: Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Inter-
an 
24
22 23dependence, Alliances and the Third World. d Imperial
America: The International Politics of Primacy.
With reference to the Philippines, there is an excel­
lent treatment of United States and Philippine relations
by George B. Taylor entitled The Philippines and the United
25
States: Problems of Partnership. Published just recently 
and using a comparative analysis of the foreign policies 
of the Philippines and Thailand is W. Scott Thompson's 
Unequal Partners: Philippine and Thai Relations with the 
United States 1965-75.^^
18
Numerous documents of the U.S. Congress, particularly
hearings on appropriations for the Departments of State nd
Defense were researched for material for this investigation.
However, one vital document merits special attention with
regard to its value to this study. It is the United States
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad; The Republic
of the Philippines, a document containing the transcripts
of hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee
27
on Foreign Relations.
Organization of the Study
The study is organized as follows:
Part I. Background and General Considerations 
Chapter I. Introduction
Chapter II. The Concepts of Alliance and the 
Small State
Chapter III. The Philippines: General Background
Part II. The Framework of the Alliance
Chapter IV. The Agreements on Military Bases 
and Military Assistance 
Chapter V. The Treaty of Mutual Defense 
Chapter VI. The Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty
Part III. Problems and Prospects of the Alliance
Chapter VII. The Troubled Partnership 1946- 
1975
Chapter VIII. The Future of the Alliance 
Chapter IX. Conclusions and Observations
19
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CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPTS OF ALLIANCE AND THE SMALL STATE
Alliance
Alliances are regulators in the equili­
brium mechanism. They are as old as the 
spear and as modern as strategic nuclear wea­
pons, and tribes, city-states, peoples, and 
states have sought various kinds to fulfill 
their respective security needs. Nowadays 
entire continents are entrenched in alliances. 
Yet even the permanent ones seldom last. They 
fail and fall apart; they are successful but 
may experience a disintegrative process. To­
day's ally may be a neutral tomorrow and an 
adversary the day after . . . Omer De Raey­
maeker.
As the above quotation comprehensively states, allian­
ces constitute one of the most ancient political compacts
2
entered into by nations. And when we speak of interna­
tional relations we cannot avoid referring to alliances.^ 
Alliances, therefore, constitute a universal compo­
nent of relations between political units irrespective
4
of time and place. Moreover, it can also be said that
22
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alliance politics lie at the core of a nation’s foreign 
policy so that when one speaks of alliances, he actually 
speaks of foreign policy in general.^ This makes alliance 
policy an integral part of foreign policy.^ This is 
so because alliances enable states to seek the coopera­
tion of other states in order to enhance their ability 
to protect and advance their interests. In a negative
way, an alliance policy becomes a necessity for some
7
states who actually seek to avoid alliances.
Since history relates innumerable alliances between 
the several states, they have always played an important
g
part in international politics. This observation led 
one scholar to theorize that alliances constitute one
9
of the two main threads of modern international history.
The development of defensive alliances and the principle 
of the balance of power is believed to be the reason in 
fact why no great strong empire has ever dominated the 
liberties of the free national states of Europe, nor indeed 
of any part of the world.
So pervasive are alliances in human history that they 
have compelled the conclusion that they stem from the very 
nature of man himself:
24
If individual man is, in truth, a political 
or social animal, and by his very nature craves 
the society of his fellows, it would appear that 
collective man, the state, is a social creature, 
if habitual behavior is any guide. The behavior 
of states from the time when states first made 
their appearance in the world indicates that 
they stand in neeg^of the society and cooperation 
of their fellows.
Alliances may be the most ancient of state practices
12
but they still continue to flourish on the world scene.
And yet even if it is quite ubiquitous on the human scene,
the concept of alliances cannot be treated as a simple 
13one. In spite of the fact that "the most cursory review" 
of the literature "will quickly reveal that writing on 
international alliances and coalitions has been prolific," 
most of this research do not meet the scientific standards 
of explicitness, visibility, and repeatability. So that 
while there are many histories of the workings of allian­
ces, there remains a lack of any workable theory on the
basis of which nations might learn how to operate alliances 
14
better.
Another relatively unworked field is the membership 
of small powers in a l l i a n c e s . I t  is not surprising 
that one writer has suggested that additional investment 
of time and energy in the study of alliance as a component
25
of international politics is clearly warranted. There is 
need for more knowledge of its internal operations as well 
as its function in the community of nations.
In order that the major questions of this investiga­
tion can be formulated and answered, it becomes necessary 
at this stage to define the concepts of alliance and small 
power.
Concept of Alliance. —  It is the ultimate purpose 
of national power to preserve the people of the state in 
their culture and well-being. Because international rela­
tions is not governed by one law court supreme over all
states, each state must finally depend upon its own im-
17
plied and applied capabilities.
National capabilities must also rest on considerations 
of sufficiency of resources whether economic, political or 
military. In a world of growing scarcity of resources, a 
national decisionmaker must determine how he can best allo­
cate national resources in order to attain national goals.
One alternative is to seek the cooperation of other 
states in the attainment of national goals. There are
18several ways by which nations display cooperative behavior:
1. Formal alliance - A cooperative effort in which
26
the rights and duties of each member are codified in a 
treaty.
2. Coalition - A cooperative effort formed for the 
attainment of short-range, issue-specific objectives.
3. Informal alignment - Learned expectations on the 
part of nations as to how much cooperation might be ex­
pected from other nations.
4. Behavioral alignment - Actual efforts of nations 
to coordinate their behaviors in a similar manner with 
respect to common objects
The classical writers of international law have
looked at alliance as a treaty or union between two or
more states for the purpose of defending each other
against an attack in war, or of jointly attacking third
19
states, or for both purposes.
Typically, an alliance involves a commitment among 
two or more states, formalized by a legally binding in­
ternational agreement, to come to one another's aid in
the event of a certain specified action by an outside
20
state or states.
A more detailed definition of the concept of alliance 
in the traditional sense is as follows:
27
Alliance: partnership, or contracted 
agreement between two or more powers in pur­
suit of a given object. In contrast to a 
formal permanent link between states, such 
as a Union or Confederation, an alliance 
has a temporary nature. The contracting 
powers, who forfeit none of their political 
independence in favour of the partnership, 
are termed Allies. The object of an al­
liance is specific; it entails mutual sup­
port in given circumstances for the attain­
ment of given objectives, and not as is the 
case with a union or confederation, the 
joint realization of overall national aims.
The utilization of force is implicit in another
definition which defines alliance as a formal agreement
that.pledges states to cooperate in using their military
resources against a specific state or states and usually
obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or
to consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies)
22the use of force, in specific circumstances.
An alliance can also be understood not only in terms 
of its legal characteristics, but also as a type of inter­
national organization: when it is applied, for example, to 
the organized unity among the permamept members of the
Security Council dedicated in the Charter as the founda-
23tion of universal collective security.
Alliances have also be considered to be "instruments 
of national security," as where it is defined as "a formal
28
agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on
national security issues.
The concept of alliance may also be distinguished
from other forms of international cooperation if the fol­
lowing pivotal features are considered:
a. existence of an enemy or enemies, actual or 
anticipated;
b. contemplation of military engagement and the 
risk of war; and
c . mutuality of interest in either the preserva­
tion of the status quo or aggrandizement in 
regard to territory, population, strategic 
resources, and so forth. 25
Then the alliance may be viewed as a relationship 
between two or more nation-states which is characterized 
by:
a. pairing or collaboration with one another 
for a limited duration regarding a mutually 
perceived problem;
b. aggregation of their capabilities for par­
ticipation in international affairs;
c. pursuit of national interests jointly or 
by parallel courses of action; and
d. probability that assistance will be rendered 
by members to one another.
For the purposes of this investigation, alliances 
will be viewed as "regulators in the equilibrium mechanism." 
The formation of the alliance between the United States
29
and the Philippines was developed for purposes of preser­
ving the balance of power or equilibrium in Asia. At least 
that was the intended purpose. This alliance may be ana­
lyzed in the light of the theoretical literature involving 
the use of the equilibrium model:
The actors on the stage of international politics 
— principally states— are supposed to have the 
natural tendency to consciously or unconsciously 
oppose excessive concentrations of power in one 
nation or group of nations. Under conditions of 
the possible use of force, the increment in the 
coercion capacity of one power unit will lead to 
a more or less proportionate growth of the means 
of coercion of at least one other unit in the sys­
tem. Great disturbances in the equilibrium of 
the system, for instance, through the rise of a 
hegemonial power, will generally lead the other 
actors to augment their coercive capacities and/ 
or to join together for the purpose of contain­
ment. This leads to equilibrium or stalemate, 
situations which may then be provisional or per­
manent, partial or total. Change is not possible. 
Equilibrium may be disturbed and eventually end 
up in a new equilibrium on a different level.
There are two alternatives open to small states in
the movement toward equilibrium which can be best achieved
29by a system of alliances:
1- Alignment:
A small state can decide to ally itself with 
one or more states in order to deter a potential 
aggressor. This can be done on either a bilateral 
or a multilateral basis.
2. Nonalignment:
30
A small state may decide to provide its 
security outside alliance systems. Various 
kinds of nonalliance policies range from neu­
tralization or permanent neutrality to neutralism, 
nonalignment, and noninvolvement.
Although the present world structure appears to be 
bipolar on the strategic and nuclear level, there is a 
movement on the political level toward new power centers. 
In Asia, for example, Japan and the People's Republic of 
China are making their presence felt. Within this struc­
ture it is believed that a strategically-located small 
state seems to have only two alternatives: integration in 
one of the two power blocs, or the risky nonalignment that
hopes for no conflict, or if conflict happens, to hope for
29noninvolvement.
Features of Alliances. —  Most treaties of alliance
contain a fundamental commitment of response in military
contingency. Such contingencies have been identified
either as "aggression" or "armed attack." This feature
of an alliance has been traditionally identified as the
casus foederis :
Casus foederis is the event upon the oc­
currence of which it becomes the duty of one 
of the allies to render the promised assistance 
to the other. Thus, in the case of a defensive
31
alliance, the casus foederis occurs when war 
is declared or commenced against one of the 
allies* Treaties of alliance often define 
precisely the event which shall be the casus 
foederis, and then the latter is less exposed 
to controversy. But on the other hand, there 
have been many alliances concluded without 
such a precise definition, and consequently, 
disputes have arisen later between the parties 
as to the casus foederis.
Not only disputes arising from an interpretation of 
the casus foederis, but alliance treaties, in common with 
all treaties, have also been subjected to questions res­
pecting the original power of the signatories to conclude 
the treaty, the duration and binding effectiveness of the 
pact, scope of the obligations assumed, and the effect of 
the treaty upon other treaties and other parties. One 
particular instance of legal questions involving treaties 
is the exercise of national jurisdiction upon foreign 
troops garrisoned in the territory of the host country.
As will be discussed later on, this question has been one 
of the most irritating subjects between the United States 
and the Philippines as alliance partners. Because alliances 
are constituted by treaties, questions involving alliances 
so constituted have come to be included within the scope 
of international law.^^
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Besides armed aggression or armed attack, contempo­
rary treaties of alliance have identified in advance 
either specifically in the agreement or in broad and 
general terms, the enemy or the victim against whom the 
alliance is organized. Thus "communist expansion" or 
"capitalist imperialism" have been mentioned as the most 
common targets of alliances constructed in the existing 
bipolar cold war.
Another feature of alliances is that they are limited 
in scope —  the treaty area covered by a treaty of alliance 
is never worldwide. The treaty normally mentions the mem­
bers of the alliance, the territories covered, and the
particular geographical area embraced by the alliance
33is either explicitly or impliedly stated.
Treaties of alliance are not only aimed at limited 
purposes of attack or defense in particular geographic 
areas, they are also _ad hoc and decentralized in nature. 
They are described as ad hoc because: (1) the treaties 
are for a short and usually specified duration of time;
(2) they have a narrow policy-range, because most of tliera 
today are either aimed at anti-communism and some at anti­
capitalism; and (3) their agencies and institutions usually
33
function on the basis of a decentralized though coordina­
ting agency.
In sum, the most common features of alliances in­
clude: restricted membership— they are composed of only 
the like-minded states, with common bonds; limited scope 
of activity— usually limited to the military goals of 
attack or defence in defined territory; limited duration 
and effectiveness —  they are organized for a fixed lengtli 
of time, lacking independent and final authority to decide 
or act in any manner and dependent upon the vagaries of 
national politics. They are best described therefore 
as: temporary relationships between two or more states 
that are joined together on an ad hoc basis, through an 
agreement for the achievement of limited military purposes 
like prosecution of war or defense against aggression, po­
tential or actual, all in the name of national interest.
Conceptual Frameworks of Alliances. —  Systematic 
and rigorous review of the literature of alliances has 
been done elsewhere^^ and will therefore not be done in 
this investigation. However, a few attempts at a system­
atic analysis of alliances will be presented in order to 
lay the basis for the conceptual framework that will be
34
utilized in this study.
Five conceptual or analytical frameworks of alliances 
are arbitrarily chosen from the literature of alliances. 
They are:
1. A descriptive model of alliances proposed by 
David Fdwards in his book, International Political Ana­
lysis .
2. Ten dimensions of bilateral relationship as 
drawn, by Dr. William W. Whitson of the Rand Corpora­
tion.
3. A propositional analysis of alliances as surveyed 
by Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sulli­
van in Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances; 
Comparative Studies.
4. A conceptual framework of analysis by Philip M. 
Burgess and David W. Moore from their study "Inter-Nation 
Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions.
5. An operational framework of analysis by Omer De 
Raeymaeker, Willy Andries, Luc Crollen, Herman De Fraye, 
and Frans Govaerts in Small Powers in Alignment.
1. A descriptive model of alliance by David V. Ed­
wards assumes alliance as an outcome of conscious policy­
making. There are five major questions or hypotheses in 
Edwards' m o d e l . 42
First, Edwards asks why and when do nations align?
The basic factors for consideration are: the preceding 
conditions, the perception of the conditions, the believed 
interests of each party to the alliance, the policy and 
action that these factors determine, and finally
the negotiation that results from such actions.
The second question asked by Edwards is: What deter­
mines the nature and form of the alliance? The factors 
that enter into consideration here include the specific 
features of the world situation, the interests of the par­
ties to the alliance, and the way in which the treaty was 
formalized.
Thirdly, Edwards asks: What is the morphology of 
alliance relations? Among the- factors to be considered 
here would be the regular interaction or normal interaction 
that occurs to nations whether or not they are allied, and 
the responsive interaction that is a consequence of the 
alliance.
Fourth, Edwards asks: What is the life cycle of an 
alliance? What determines its development? The factors 
to be considered here include questions involving ex­
pansion and deterioration as major possible stages in the 
life cycle of an alliance.
Fifth, and last, Edwards asks: What determines when
and how alliances will end? Treaties of alliance ter­
minate by expiration, cancellation, military destruction, 
unilateral abrogation, default, and other causes .
36
Below is Edwards' descriptive model for the study of
alliances: Figure 1.
DESCRIPTIVE MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF ALLIANCE
GOVERNMENTAL 
DECISIONMAKING 
(A continual process 
resulting in national 
action by each party)
NATIONAL POLICY/ACTION
NEGOTIATION (1)
f o r m a l i z a t i o n (2) 
(Generally in 
a treaty)
I
INTERACTION 
OF THE ALLIED 
PARTIES (3)
(Both routine 
and in a crisis)
r
I
EXPANSION I DETERIORATION 
OF THE —  —  —  "^OF THE ALLIANCE 
ALLIANCE (4) | (if any)
(if any)
L# I
I
Key Issues for Analysis 
(1)
(2)
(3)
Why and when do nat:i ci s 
decide to seek a H r  a: ice.
What determines the 
nature and form of 
an alliance.'
What is the morphology 
of alliance relations.
TERMINATION (5)
1. Expiration
2. Cancellation
3. Military Destruction
4. Unilateral Abrogation
5. Default
6. (Other forms)
(5)
What is the life cycle 
of an alliance?
What determines its 
development?
What determines when 
and how alliances 
will end?
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2. Dr. William W. Whitson proposes that salient
American interests in a particular country could or
should be expressed in terms of ten relations (expressed
44
as U.S. or joint U.S.-host country strategies.)
1. General Rationale of the Bilateral 
Relationship and US Commitment
2. The Diplomatic (Propaganda or Verbal) 
Elaboration of the Commitment
3. U.S.-Host Country General Purpose Force 
Commitments and Role
4. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Commitment
5. U.S.-Host Country Base Posture
6. U.S.-Host Country Military Assistance 
Strategy
7. U.S.-Host Country Intelligence Collection 
Strategy
8. U.S.-Host Country Trade and Economic 
Assistance Strategy
9. U.S. Approach to Host Country Domestic 
Politics
10. U.S. Approach to Host Country Relations 
with Third Countries
3. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan surveyed theories 
and propositions on international alliances with special 
emphasis on their (1) formation, (2) performance, (3) disin-
38
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tegration, and (4) effects.
The major questions that these authors asked with
respect to theories of alliance formation were the fol- 
46
lowing :
1. What motives lead statesmen to join or avoid 
alliance.
2, Are some states more likely to form alliances 
than other?
3. Can we deduce patterns of alignment from the in­
ternational distribution of power, or does the premise 
that like states will attract each other better inform 
our predictions?
With regard to alliance performance, the authors
47
asked the following questions:
1. How is influence distributed within the alliance?
2. What makes for cohesion among the member states?
3. What factors distinguish effective alliances 
from ineffective ones?
With regard to alliance termination, the following
48questions were raised:
1. Why do some alliances endure while others disin­
tegrate rapidly?
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2. What are the likely consequences of nuclear wea­
pons and their proliferation for alliances?
With regard to the effects of alliances, the fol-
49
lowing questions were posed:
1. Do alliances serve to maintain stability by 
maintaining an equilibrium and by increasing the pre­
dictability of international affairs?
2. Are they a prime cause of war, or are they the 
seeds of more lasting forms of integration?
3. What are the domestic effects of alliance parti­
cipation?
4. Burgess and Moore also developed an inventory 
and appraisal of propositions relating to alliances. 
Their study proposed that the following questions be 
explored in order to establish a conceptual framework
for the investigation of a l l i a n c e s : ^0
a. Why do nations form alliances?
b. What are the characteristic properties of 
different alliances?
c. What are the relationships between the 
characteristics of alliance members, the composition 
of the alliances, and other coalition properties?
40
d. What are the relationships between coalition 
properties and the behavior of the coalition?
e. What are the effects of coalition behavior on the 
coalition itself, on the international system, on the in­
dividual members of the coalition— nations and nonmember 
nations?
The resultant model that Burgess and Moore propose 
identifies nations and alliances as the two major units 
of analysis. Nations are described (1) by national attri­
butes (such as size, level of economic development, socie­
tal cohesion and int egration); (2) by situational and 
contextual factors (e.g., the existence of threats or 
proximity to conflict) that are related to occasions or 
opportunities for joining coalitions or withdrawing from 
them; and (3) by motivational factors (e.g., the desire
to gain rewards or in the form of side payments to defend
V 51
against threats to independent existence).
The model also includes global properties of the 
alliance itself: the integration and concentration of 
alliance decisionmaking authority; the extent of internal 
conflict and tensions; alliance capability; the stability 
and effectiveness of alliances; the intra-alliance distri­
41
bution of costs and rewards, and the scope of member in­
terests covered by the alliance. Finally, the model in­
cludes two behavioral clusters of variables— one for 
the nation and one for the alliance. With respect to 
the nation several different classes of behavior were 
examined: joining and withdrawing from alliances; expand­
ing and contracting the functions of alliances; and the 
level and duration of commitments to alliances. With 
respect with respect to alliance behavior or the collect­
ive behavior of nations in alliances, the propositions 
concern belligerent and restrained behavior; predictable 
versus unpredictable behavior; and the effects of alliance 
behavior on international systems, on the domestic poli­
tical systems of member nations, and on the alliance it­
self
Figure 2 illustrates the model proposed by Burgess 
and Moore as shown on page 40.^^
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Figure 2. Process Model of Inter-Nation Alliances
FIGURE 1. Process Model of Inter-Nation Alliances*
a l l ia n c e
— Attributes
Contextual 1I
Factors r — " '
I Motivational ^  
Factors
Behavior
Environ­
ment
U N IT  OF ANALYSIS
NATION
Attributes
Environ­
ment
Contextual
Factors
Behavior
Motivational 
Factors
® The broken arrows indicate that a nation in an alliance is part of the internal influences of an alliance. The attributes of a nation {e.g., power), 
its motivational factors (e.g., goals), and its behavior (e.g., assuming a dominant role among alliance members) all constitute part of the internal 
influences on alliance behavior. The double-headed arrow suggests that alliance behavior influences the environment, which thereby influences 
the environment of the nation. WTien a nation is the unit of analysis, its environment consists of (1 ) other nations, (2 ) the international sys­
tem, (3 )  the alliance. When an alliance is the unit of analysis, its environment consists of ( I )  the international system, (2 ) nonmeinber nations 
(member nations constituting internal influences), and (3 ) other alliances. In short, for tlie unit being analyzed (whetlier a nation or an alli­
ance ), there are both internal and external factors. Internally, variables are grouped according to tlie attributes and motivational factors tfiat 
describe the unit. ExlemaUy, there are the contextual factors, which refer to the unit's relationship with its environment
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5. Omer De Raeyinaeker proposes what he calls an "un­
pretentious yet operational framework of analysis" of 
alliances based on the assumption that a small power elite 
making decisions about alignment, nonalignment, and de- 
alignment, seeks to maintain or improve its position in 
the international, regional, or domestic level. Theore­
tically, such decisions are made with reference to the 
national interest. Since no abstract criterion exists 
for defining a state's national interest, reference must 
be made to concrete conditions and conflict, and to par­
ticular objectives in matters of security, the status of 
states and regimes in the international community, domes­
tic stability, economic aid and military assistance, and 
ideology. Based on these conditions, the model proposed 
by De Raeymaeker and his associates propose the following 
model which is described in more detail on pages 12-14 of 
this study.
a rta ilr^p o vm r^ iT ra trrvH B  fo ir^ a d h e rtn g  to "o r^ p o s s ib ± y ^ ^ d ^ ± r 
drawing from alliances may be described as follows :
a. Security in Relation to the Geographical 
Situation
b. Prestige in the International Community
44
c. Domestic Stability
d. Economic Aid and Military Assistance
e. Ideology
This framework of analysis is also employed by
55Luc Crollen in his book, Portugal. The U.S. and NATO, 
and in some ways is similar to that employed by Annette 
Baker Fox's pioneering study entitled The Power of Small 
States^^ and also by Donald E. Nuechterlein in his article
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"Small States in Alliances: Iceland, Thailand, Australia."
This analytical framework is used as the basis for 
this study of the military alliance between the United 
States and the Philippines.
The Small Power
Definition of Small Power. —  Like the concept 
of alliance, "small power" is an elusive term. While 
we are forced many times to admit a substantial difference 
in the respective international positions of nations which 
are placed in the categories of small power, medium power, 
and superpower, the difference hardly appears in the scale 
of rank on quantitative factors. Also, when we compare 
the role of small powers as against the middle powers and
45
the superpowers, we find out that the difference is actually, 
in terms of degrees, very minute, and that the small powers 
oftentimes play a disproportionate role compared to their 
attributes of power capability. Even then this observa­
tion does not really entitle us to imagine that the small 
power is a big power in miniature. In the interactions 
or relations between the great powers and the small 
powers, we might look for international behavior charac­
terized by extremes such as perfect domination by the 
great power and complete submission by the small power. 
Between these two extremes, all types of combinations 
between dimension and power become conceivable.^^
Whatever the distinctions between states in interna­
tional politics, the study of the foreign policies of 
small states is considered a neglected aspect of the disci­
pline of international relations.
By foreign policy here we mean the range of external 
actions pursued to achieve certain defined objectives or 
goals of which these may or may not have internal cognizance 
or approval. The essential elements of this foreign poli­
cy include (1) capability, e.g. internal human and material 
resources, organization, political will; (2) purpose;
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(3) means, which will range from statements of position, 
diplomatic negotiations, foreign visits, economic agree­
ments, cultural-technical exchanges, to the threat and 
use of military force. The foreign policy of a state 
will be shaped by internal factors and by the interplay 
between these and external restraints such as the domi- 
nace of a more powerful neighbor, limitations arising 
out of membership of an alliance, and so forth.
There are some difficulties in defining a small 
state on the basis of the preceding considerations.
First, there is a question of size. In this sense, small 
states have been characterized by one or more of the fol­
lowing: (1) small land area, (2) small total population,
(3) small total GNP (other other measure of total produc­
tive capacity, and (4) a low level of military capabili­
ty.^^ Based on the preceding characteristics, small 
states are traditionally depicted as exhibiting the
folowing policy behavior patterns when compared to large 
61states :
(a) low levels of overall participation in world 
affairs;
(b) high levels of activity in intergovernmental 
organizations (IGO's);
47
(c) high levels of support for international 
legal norms ;
(d) avoidance to the use of force as a tech­
nique of statecraft;
(e) avoidance of behavior and policies which 
tend to alienate the more powerful states 
in the system;
(f) a narrow functional and geographic range 
of concern in foreign policy activities;
(g) frequent utilization of moral and norma­
tive positions on international issues.
In an attempt to resolve some of the difficulties 
in defining a small state, Ronald P. Barston suggests four 
possible approaches in defining the term: First, ar­
bitrarily delimiting the category by placing an upper 
limit on, for example, population size; secondly,measuring 
the "objective " elements of state capability and placing 
them on a ranking scale; thirdly, analyzing relative in­
fluence; and fourthly, identifying characteristics and for­
mulating hypotheses on what differentiates small states
62
from other classes of state.
Whatever the quantitative results of ranking the 
size of states, it has been,pointed out by Arnold Wolfers 
in his essay, "Power and Influence: The Means of Foreign 
Policy," that small states can exercise disproportionate
48
power that seems to run counter to traditional power con-
63
cepts in international relations. This has been observed
64
in the following instances:
First, a state may be economically weak, 
have low military strength and be politically 
unstable; but its weakness can be a source 
of bargaining power if a great power per­
ceives the territory of the small state 
to be of strategic importance and is pre­
pared to commit conventional military forces 
to its assistance.
Second, the bargaining power of small 
states involved in a military conflict will 
be increased if there is a clear and overt 
commitment by both great power to opposite 
sides.
Third, a coalition of small states 
which is weakly organized, with disputed 
leadership and whose members have differing 
political systems and ideologies, will have 
a high degree of stress within it over the 
formulation and implementation of common 
objectives, when involved in a military 
conflict.
Fourth, a small state can sometimes 
act with impunity against a great power.
The response of the great power will be 
determined primarily by the type of 
threat, the degree of its active involve­
ment elsewhere, and concern lest any re­
taliatory action might adversely affect 
its relations with other states in the 
region.
Fifth, small states can use interna­
tional organizations to mobilize support 
for their policies by widening the arena 
of debate and criticism.
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Sixth, a small state will be able to resist 
collective non-military sanctions if it 
receives support from border states and 
if the collective sanctions are not uni­
versally or equally applied by members of 
the international organization.
Small states have been able to influence great powers
because of the presence of some factors like a vitally
needed resource, a location dominating some strategic
point of transit, the possibility of allying with the
great power's enemy at a crucial stage in the conflict,
and a disagreement within the threatening great power or
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between it and an ally.
Since the foreign policy of small states can be seen 
as being purely defensive it,therefore, aims at withstand­
ing pressure from the great powers, at safeguarding their
territorial integrity and independence, and at insuring
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the continued adhesion to national values and ideals. A 
small power looks to its security.
Alliances of Small and Great Powers
George Liska looks at alliances as the "institutional 
link between the politics of the balance of power and the 
politics of preponderance or e m p i r e . I n  the first case, 
an'alliance tesults in the increase of a,state's power
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and in the second case it may be viewed as an instrument
to control the ally's use of power even while supplement- 
69
ing it. These considerations can be understood when 
the motives of small and great powers for joining allian­
ces are considered.
The motives of small powers to ally with great powers
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can be those of security, stability and status. On the 
other hand, the principal motives of great powers to en­
ter into "unequal alliances" are: aggregation or addition,
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diversion, and disguise of power and its exercise.
By aggregation, the great power intends to expand or iri-
72
crease its national power by the acquisition of allies.
By diversion, the great power desires to divert small state
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power from alliance with an adversary. By disguise of
power and its exercise, the purpose of the great power is
to insure small power cooperation. The actual purposes
of such an alliance may include hegemonial dominance,
restraint to foster equilibrium and peace, and surveillance
74
to guard against disastrous ventures or surprises.
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Alliances and Balance of Power
There are many writers who hold to the view that
alliances are basic to the operation of a balance of 
75
power system. The creation of alliances is one of the
operating forms of the balance of power s y s t e m . M o r -
genthau suggests that historically, the most important
manifestation of the balance of power is not to be found
in the equilibrium of two isolated nations but in the
relations of one nation or alliance of nations and ano- 
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ther alliance. He thus finds that alliances consti­
tute a necessary function of the balance of power opera­
ting within a multiple-state system, Morgenthau illus-
78
trates this as follows:
Nations A and B, competing with eath other, 
have three choices in order to maintain and 
improve their relative power positions. They 
can increase their own power, they can add to 
their own power the power of other nations, 
or they can withhold the power of other na­
tions from the adversary. When they make the 
first choice, they embark upon an armaments 
race. When they choose the second and third 
alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances.
Morton A. Kapan also recognizes that alliances are
basic to the operation of a balance of power system.
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In Kaplan's view the six rules of the balance of power 
80
system operate to produce fluid alliances that "regu­
late the system and prevent any one power or coalition
81of powers from achieving hegemony."
Alliances provide a means, therefore, for the foreign 
policy-maker in a balance of power situation because:
(1) they enable the leaders to maintain the pluralism 
of the system and to ensure the continued existence of 
its essential actors, albeit at the cost of solidarity;
(2) alliances deter hegemonial ambitions by being flexi­
ble and fluid; (3) alliances are made without regard to 
ideology, cultural affinities, relations among monarchs 
and other elites; and finally (4) each alliance is inde­
pendent of past alliances and alliance patterns since
each is based solely upon present state interest and cur-
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rent threats to the balance of power.
The existence of a balance of power is believed to
have preserved the independence of weak nations. Small
nations have owed their independence either to the balance
of power or to the preponderance of one protecting power
or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialistic am- 
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bitions.
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Resort to alliances in the search for a balance of 
power is not without its risks, however, for both great 
and small powers. Morgenthau warns that an alliance bet­
ween a nuclear power and a nonnuclear power places an 
enormous strain on both. The nonnuclear power risks 
being devastated in a war between two nuclear powers 
which may not concern it; and the nuclear power in turn 
faces the risk of being drawn into a nuclear war to fur­
ther the. interests of its weaker partner.
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CHAPTER III 
THE PHILIPPINES; GENERAL BACKGROUND
Land and People
Scattered over a total of 500,000 square miles of the 
western Pacific Ocean, the Philippine archipelago extends 
about 1,100 miles north to south along the southeastern 
rim of Asia, forming a land chain between the Pacific 
Ocean on the east and the South China Sea on the west.
It lies about 500 miles southeast of continental Asia 
between latitudes 4° and 41' and 21° and 25' North and 
longitudes 115° and 127° East. Within insular Southeast 
Asia, its 7,107 islands, islets and rocks total a land 
area of 115,500 square miles (300,780 square kilometers), 
make the Philippines a medium-sized country, a little 
larger than the British Isles, about two-thirds the size 
of Spain, or New England and New York State put together.'
The land area of the archipelago stretches from 
northernmost Y 'Ami island in the Batan group which is 
51.4 miles from Formosa to Saluag in the south which 
is only 30 miles east of Borneo. Hongkong is only one 
hour and 40 minutes by jet from Manila; Singapore is 
three hours away, and Sydney, 7-1/2 hours by air from
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Manila. Also by air, it is only 17 hours to Europe and 
15 hours to the American West Coast.
The archipelago can be divided into three regions 
or sections: Luzon and its islands; the Visayas, which 
includes Palawan and Mindoro (the central Philippines); 
and Mindanao, including Sulu, often called the Southern 
Philippines. Thirty-seven per cent of the land area is 
in Luzon, 29% in the Visayas, and 34% in Mindanao.
Only 154 islands have areas exceeding 5 square 
miles and 11 of them, with more than 1,000 square miles 
comprise about 95% of the total land area and population. 
The larger islands are mountainous or uplands and the 
more rugged interior of many islands is marked by fold­
ing faulting, and in some cases by recent volcanic acti­
vity because volcanic masses form the cores of most of 
the larger islands.
The entire island group lies within the tropics so 
that the lowland areas have a yearly warm and humid cli­
mate. With only slight variations, the average mean tem­
perature is 80° F. The generally adequate rainfall 
throughout the year varies from place to place because 
of the wind direction and the shielding effects of the 
mountains. The average annual rainfull for the entire 
nation is about 100 inches. Because the Philippines lies 
astride the typhoon belt, an average of 15 of these cyclo­
nic storms affect the Philippines yearly with at least 
heavy rainfall, and 5 to 6 may strike with destructive 
winds and torrential rains. Also the islands are subject 
to destructive earthquakes because of a number of vol­
canoes that still exist.
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Although the Philippines closely resembles the 
mainland of Southeast Asia in terms of physical geomor- 
phic history, climatic regimes, vegetative assemblages, 
and soil characteristics, the position of the Philippines 
on the island arcs of the Pacific has given the archipe­
lago a physiographic composition and a topographic form 
rather unlike most parts of the mainland. In spite of 
its small territory, the Philippine archipelago possesses 
so many varied and unusual characteristics which compli­
cate a more systematic analysis of Philippine geography. 
However, it is suggested that in order to better under­
stand the land and its people, the following concepts 
are suggested: (1) The Philippine is an island world;
(2) This world has its own distinctive combinations of 
man and land; (3) The Philippines is peripheral to the 
Asian mainland; (4) The Philippines displays a particu­
lar, distinctive and significant blending of the Orient 
and the Occident. Because of its basic geographic 
position on the oceanic margins of southeastern Asia,
500 miles off the coast of the South China coast, the 
Philippines have shared in three physical and cultural 
world: the Asian world, the Pacific world, and the occi­
dental world.
Resources. —  Of the total land area, 40% is com- 
merical forest land, 38% is arable farm land, and the 
rest is uncultivatable grasslands, swamps, and marshes. 
Originally, most of the Philippines was well-covered by 
tropical forests. But after 400 years of settlement by
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European man, much of this protective covering has dis­
appeared.
The archipelago is highly mineralized, with exten­
sive proven and potential reserves of metallic as well 
as non-metallic minerals. Chromite and nickel deposits 
are considered as mong the largest in the world. The 
Philippines is also the dominant gold producer in Asia.
The other important metallic minerals are: copper, iron, 
silver, manganese, and coal, gypsum, sulfur, mercury.
The non-metallic minerals include clay, limestone, dolo­
mite, feldspar, marble, silica, and phosphate rock. It 
is believed that there are petroleum deposits and pros­
pecting for petroleum has been going on for some time.
Rich as it is in mineral resources, however, only a 
small portion of the country has been adequately sur­
veyed and actively exploited.
Most of the mined minerals have been exported 
abroad. The Philippines is the world's leading supplier 
of refractory chromite, most of which is shipped to the 
United States. Almost all of the gold also goes to the 
United States. Copper in concentrate form is the most 
valuable mineral export, followed by gold, silver, manga­
nese, pyrites, mercury, sulfur, limestone, and zinc.
Besides its forests, minerals, and agricultural pro­
ducts, the Philippines is also rich in fish resources.
A wide variety of fish like anchovies, sardines, croakers, 
grunts, and other tropical fish abound in Philippine waters.
Demography. —  Like its varied geographic charac-
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teristics, the Filipinos are a people derived from di­
verse ethnic stocks. The early ethnic mixture was made 
up of the Negrito, the proto-Malay, and the Malaysian. 
Later groups such as the Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, 
Indian, Spanish, and American contributed to the ethnic 
stocks. The largest number of Filipinos, however, share 
rather uniformly the Malaysian or Indonesian ethnic ele­
ment .
Christianity is the dominant religion with 80% of 
the population belonging to the Catholic faith, 15% as 
members of the Protestant churches or the Philippine In­
dependent Church, and roughly 5% are Muslims (Moros) con­
centrated mainly in the Sulu archipelago and in southwest- 
tern Mindanao.
In 1975, the population was estimated at 42.8 mil­
lion, the sixteenth largest in the world. 55% of the 
population are below 20 years old and only 3% are above 
65 years of age- The average family has 5.6 members.
The relative density was 123.1 persons per square kilo­
meter in 1970. 80% of all Filipinos live in rural areas.
Life expectancy at birth is 56 years for men and 60 for 
women.
Filipinos speak a total of 70 languages and dia­
lects, each of which is spoken by more than 200 persons 
as a mother tongue. Most of these, however, are dialects 
only, and others are dying languages. The Philippine 
languages belong to the Indonesian family of languages. 
The national language, Pilipino, is based on Tagalog, 
the language of Manila and the nearby provinces. English
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is the main language of instruction, government, and 
business. Literacy is estimated at 85,7%, considered 
the highest in Asia outside of Japan.
History
The history of the Philippines is generally broken 
down into four distinct phases; the pre-Spanish period, 
the Spanish period (1521-1898); the American period 
(1898-1941); and the years since independence (1946- 
present) . ^
The Pre-Spanish Period. —  The Philippines possess 
a pattern of culture that is best described as neither 
typically oriental nor as a regional variant of the two 
chief Asian cultural orientations, Indian and Chinese.
An analysis of Philippine culture, both material culture 
manifesting itself in the landscape and nonmaterial cul­
ture, reveals a wide range of elements derived from pre- 
European island sources, from mainland Asian sources, 
from historical occidental sources, and from contemporary 
worldwide sources.
The earlier settlers of the Philippines, probably 
Negrito in origin, probably walked across parts of the 
broad lowland known as Sundaland or the South China Sea. 
The later arrivals, Proto-Malay, Malay, Indonesian-Malay, 
Sinitic, Chinese, and other ethnic stocks arrived in the 
Philippines by boahs. These groups like the Negrito 
group arrived in the Philippines over the last few thou-
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sand years, not in single migrations, but each group in 
repeated movement patterns and in variable numbers.
Much of what happened during these early years has not 
been recorded. The conclusion is that the record of 
prehistoric movement, regional occupance, ethnic relation­
ships, territorial control, and local settlement history 
for the Philippines, is still vague and incomplete.
The pre-Spanish period did not see the development 
of a political state, but by the time the Spaniards came 
in the sixteenth century, a few hundred islands were per­
manently populated by approximately a half-million people 
from all parts of southern and eastern Asia. This people 
already had commercial contacts with the Chinese, Japanese, 
Hindu, Arab, and Indonesian traders. Islam had penetrated 
Sulu and then spread into Mindanao and as far north as 
Manila Bay.
The Spanish Period. —  The period of Spanish occu­
pation of the Philippines is marked by conversion of the 
natives to Christianity, the political organization of 
settlements to a highly centralized form of governmental 
administration, the galleon trade, attacks by the Dutch, 
British, and Chinese pirates, and the rise of Filipino 
nationalism.
Ferdinand Magellan arrived in the Philippines in 
the course of his voyage around the world on March 16,
1521. After the rest of his crew returned to Spain, a 
number of expeditions were sent to the Philippines. In 
1543, Ruy de Villalobos, who headed one such expedition.
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named the islands, the Philippines, in honor of the then 
King Philip II of Spain. In 1564, Miguel Lopez de Legas- 
pi arrived from Mexico to serve as the first governor 
appointed by the Spanish throne. Upon his arrival in 
the Philippines he made peace with the local leaders and 
established the first Spanish settlement in the present 
city of Cebu. On June 24, 1572, Legaspi moved to Manila 
which he established the capital of the Philippines. In 
succeeding years, the various orders of the Catholic 
Church sent missionaries to the Philippines where they 
converted the natives to Christianity and established 
schools. In time, the power of the friars grew with their 
prestige.
The Philippines was organized as a colony whose rule 
centralized in the person of the king, who governed 
through the Council of the Indies. In the colony, the 
highest representative of the king was the governor who 
was appointed by the king for a specific term. Next to 
the governor was the audiencia, the highest tribunal of 
justice and advisory council to the king. Next to the 
central government in Manila were the provincial gover­
nors known as alcaldes mayores, appointed by the central 
authority. Local administration at the township and 
village levais was entrusted to Filipinos who attained 
office through local elections.
The galleon trade, which lasted for 250 years, was 
carried on for commerce and communication between the 
Philippines and Mexico. For some time it was the main 
occupation and source of income for the Spanish settlers.
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During the period from 1596 to 1640, the Dutch at­
tacked the galleon trade in the course of a dispute over 
the Spice Islands. Also in 1762, the British captured 
Manila but were forced to relinquished control of the 
city under the provisions of a treaty with Spain. Not 
only the Dutch and the British threatened Spanish pos­
session of the Philippines, but the Spaniards also were 
never able to pacify the Moros in southern Mindanao and 
Sulu.
Near the end of the nineteenth century, an indigenous 
revolution also threatened Spanish domination of the archi­
pelago. Led by Filipino intellectuals who had studied in 
Europe, the Filipinos began to demand political and social 
reforms. In the 1890's, armed rebellion broke out. The 
Filipinos, however, did not succeed in their plan to drive 
the Spaniards out of the Philippines. In 1898, war broke 
out between Spain and the United States. This event was 
to determine the future of the Philippines for the next 
century
Whatever the faults of Spain in governing the Phil­
ippines, its administration achieved a number of things. 
Continued occupation of the Philippines from the sixteenth 
century to 1898 allowed Spain to develop the beginnings of 
a centralized government, the conversion of the natives to 
Christianity, the building of a landholding class that 
was to lay the foundations of Filipino nationalism, and 
also the establishment of a system of education.
The American Period. —  Hostilities between Spain
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and the United States broke out over the sinking of the 
U.S. warship Maine in the harbor of Havana, Cuba. Ordots 
were then transmitted to Dewey, who was already in Asiatic 
waters, to attack and destroy Spanish naval units in the 
Philippines. Dewey accomplished his mission and awaited 
further orders.
Meanwhile, Filipino revolutionaries under Aguinaldo 
who were living in exile in Hongkong returned to the Phil­
ippines. Aguinaldo reorganized his forces and on June 12, 
1898, he proclaimed the establishment of the first Republic 
of the Philippines. Although relations between the Fili­
pino leaders and Dewey started on an amicable note, hos­
tilities broke out between Filipino and American soldiers 
on February, 1899. Bitter fighting took place between the 
Filipinos and American forces who were now under orders 
to occupy the Philippines. The capture of Aguinaldo by 
U.S. General Funston led to the cessation of the fighting 
and the United States Government started to organize the 
political administration of the Philippines as a territory 
of the United States.
Progressive self-government was given to the Filipinos 
until they were able to govern themselves, first, as a Com­
monwealth Government, and later as a free Republic of the 
Philippines upon the grant of independence by the United 
States on July 4, 1946. The United States governed the 
Philippines continuously from 1898 until 1946 except for 
a brief period of time when the islands were occupied by 
the Japanese forces during the outbreak of World War II.
The Americans laid the foundations of public education, 
public health, democratic civil government, and a sound
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legal system. However, their failure to effectuate land 
reform, pacify the Moslem minorities in the South, and 
stabilize the national economy, saddled the new Republic 
with massive problems from the start of its independence.
Independence to the Present. —  From 1946 until 
September, 1972, the Philippines enjoyed a liberal demo­
cracy based on a constitution patterned after that of 
the United States. In its early years it was faced by 
tremendous problems of economic rehabilitation as a 
result of the devastation of World War II. Communist- 
inspired outbreaks of rebellion broke out in the late 
1940's and early 1950's. But the movement was crushed 
by innovative tactics introduced by Ramon Magsaysay who 
was then Secretary of National Defense together with the 
assistance of the United States.
Six presidents ware elected in free elections during 
the period from 1945 to 1972. On August 21, 1971, Presi­
dent Marcos ordered the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus, declaring that the nation was threatened by 
communist subversion. This was followed by his declara­
tion of martial law on September 22, 1972 throughout the 
country on the ground that an armed uprising was being 
planned. Since 1972, the country has been under martial 
law and no elections have been held since then.
The Economy^
Philippine economy may be well described as a basi-
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cally agricultural in nature. Its fundamental elements 
of strength are sizable natural resources, room for popu­
lation expansion, increased agricultural production, a 
growing industrial section, and a relatively high level 
of popular education. Since World War II, Philippine 
economy has had to cope with a predominantly agricultural 
economy, constantly recurring trade deficits resulting 
in a shortage of foreign exchange, shortage of invest­
ment capital, limited government revenues, high rates of 
unemployment and underemployment, and inflation.
During the Spanish occupation, Philippine economy 
was essentially colonial and comparatively sluggish.
During most of the American period which was character­
ized by free trade, the nature of commerce was profoundly 
changed: a vigorous capitalism was introduced and a con­
siderable selective expansion took place. However, little 
change actually took place as the United States replaced 
Spain as the Philippines' major trading partner and the 
fact that only semi‘“finished or raw materials were still 
being channeled to the mother country. The relation­
ship during these years and also during the immediate 
post-war years showed a continued subservience to Ameri­
can interest. In spite of attempts by the Philippine 
government to set up heavier industrial projects, the 
bulk of exported produce remains in an unfinished or 
serai-finished form.
Philippine economy also suffered a severe handi­
cap following independence as a result of the destruction 
suffered by the country during World War II. In the
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final report of the United States High Commissioner to 
the Philippines on June 30, 1947, the picture of des­
truction showed that the Philippines "was without ques­
tion the most completely destroyed and dislocated battle­
ground of the war.
Another description of that destruction was more 
explicit;
The transportation system, with its roads, 
bridges, and ferries, its railways, inter­
island vessels, and harbours, had all been 
partially or completely destroyed. Sugar- 
mills were derelict, their light railways 
and embarkation facilities unusable. Mining 
equipment was largely inoperative and the 
system formerly used to transport the raw 
material or the partially treated ore to 
points of shipment were almost completely 
lacking or had been summarily patched up 
and were fairly ineffective. The few light 
industries set up during the Commonwealth 
were equally undermined. Electricity sup­
ply was quite insufficient for more than 
restricted purposes and public transport 
was almost non-existent.5
Because of this devastation suffered by the Phil­
ippines, enormous amounts of assistance in the form of 
war damage payments as well as military and economic 
aid were made necessary and had to come from the United 
States, the former metropolitan power. However, all 
this assistance did not come free. Strings were attached 
to all forms of assistance extended to the Philippines 
during the early years of the Republic. War damage pay­
ments were made contingent upon the signing of the mili­
tary base agreement. Other economic assistance depended
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upon tying Philippine trade to that of the U.S. Thus 
the Philippine Trade Act and its successor, the Laurel- 
Langley Agreement, continued Philippine dependence upon 
U.S. trade. The relationship has changed in recent 
years upon the expiration of the Laurel-Langley Agree­
ment in 1974. Economic and military assistance have 
continued, however.
Government and Politics^
Under the 1935 Constitution, the Philippine Govern­
ment was republican in form, based on the principle of 
separation of.powers. Executive power was vested in a 
President who was elected for a foui-year term and could 
not serve more than 8 years consecutively. Legislative 
power was vested in a. bicameral Congress which consisted 
of a 24-member Senate and a 110-member House of Represen­
tatives. Senators were elected at large for a six-year 
term, one-third being chosen every two years. Members 
of the House of Representatives were elected for a four- 
year term in the same election in which the President 
was -chosen. Judicial power was vested in an eleven-member 
Supreme Court,a Court of Appeals, Courts of First Ins­
tance, justice of the peace courts, and other special 
courts. Supreme Court justices were appointed by the 
President and sit on the court until they are 70 years 
of age.
The Philippines is divided into provinces, chartered 
cities, and municipalities. Administrative authority, 
however, remains highly centralized at Manila.
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Traditionally, there have been two major political 
parties— the Nacionalista and the Liberal Party— the 
latter being actually an offshoot of the first party.
In November 1972, a new Constitution was completed 
by a Constitutional Convention to replace the 1935 Consti­
tution. It was put into effect in January, 1973.
The new Constitution provided for a parliamentary 
form of government, with extensive executive power vested 
in a Prime Minister. The head of state is a Presi­
dent. Both the President and Prime Minister are to be 
elected from the membership of the National Assembly, 
the President for a six-year term. The Prime Minister 
will appoint the Cabinet, dismiss them at his discretion, 
and has powers for initiation of most legislation and 
control over appropriations. The Prime Minister was also 
the Commander-in-Chief, with the power to call out the 
armed forces, suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and 
declare martial law. The other powers of the Prime Minis­
ter included the appointment of general officers in the 
armed forces, ambassadors, and judges. He may also enter 
into treaties, contract for domestic and foreign loans, 
and veto specific items of appropriation or tariff bills. 
He may be removed from office by the National Assembly 
by electing a successor by majority vote of all the mem­
bers.
Legislative power was vested in a unicameral National 
Assembly whose members are to be elected for six-year 
terms. Judicial power was vested in an expanded Supreme 
Court composed of a Chief Justice and 14 associate jus-
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tices.
On September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos 
declared martial law throughout the Philippines, basing 
his action on a provision of the Constitution which 
enables the President to place the Philippines or any 
part thereof under martial law "in cases of invasion, 
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger there­
of, when the public safety requires it. . . ."In his 
proclamation Marcos referred to "a full scale armed 
insurrection and rebellion " in the Philippines insti­
gated and carried out by "an insurrectionary force, 
popularly known as 'the New Peoples' Army.'" In the 
same proclamation, Marcos announced his intention of 
proceeding immediately to implement a reform program, 
the New Society, including proclamation of land reform, 
reorganization of the government, new rules for the con­
duct of civil servants, removal of corrupt and ineffi­
cient public officials, and the breaking up of eriminal 
syndicates.
Since his institution of martial law, Marcos has 
substituted military rule for the democratic republican 
system? adopted the new Constitution approved by the 1972 
Constitutional Convention after incorporating provisions 
for a transitory form of government; abolished Congress 
and suspended the 1973 national election following a re­
ferendum among citizens' assemblies which, in accordance 
with the wishes of the new regime, endorsed the martial 
law government and the extension of Marcos' term of 
office beyond 1973.
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Foreign Relations^
In his inaugural address on May 28, 1946, the first 
President of the Republic of the Philippines, Manuel 
Roxas, stated in clear and unambiguous terms the foreign 
policy of the new republic;
We will maintain . . . friendly and honorable 
relations with all our neighbors and look for­
ward to the day when peace and security will 
be maintained by the collective conscience 
of mankind.
But until that happy dawns upon us, we 
can much more securely repose our fate in 
the understanding and comradeship which exists 
between the Philippines and the United States.
. . . We are fortunate to have as the guaran­
tor of our security the United States of Ameri­
ca, which is today the bulwark and support of 
small nations everywhere in the world.
On July 4, 1946, in ceremonies marking the restora­
tion of Philippine independence, President Roxas left no 
doubt as to the direction of Philippine foreign polcy 
.which he intended to pursue as the first President of the 
Republic:
We are. committed to the cause and the interna­
tional progiam of the United States of America.
. . . Our safest course . . . is in the glisten­
ing wake of America whose sure advance with 
mighty prow breaks for smaller craft the waves 
of fear.9
The most overwhelming fact of Philippine history 
since 1898 has been its relationship with the United 
States so that it is not difficult to conclude that 
the strongest determinant of Philippine foreign policy
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as well as its domestic politics is that historical ex­
perience. This historic relationship produced a nation 
that stands closest to the West of any country in South­
east Asia: a country that was given the longest training 
in democratic self-government of any colony in Southeast 
Asia thereby imposing upon it an "image of the world" 
quite not unlike that of the United States. The dominance 
of the Catholic religion fostered strong opposition to 
the communist ideology upon the elite and widespread 
fear of it upon the masses. The insularity of the islands 
isolated the country for a long time until after its in­
dependence from the political currents of Southeast Asia 
thereby making the presence of American air and naval 
power a credible policy for national defense. Because 
of these elements and the expressed statements of Phil­
ippine statesmen, the foreign policy of the Philippines 
was believed to consist of the following: (1) close ties 
with the United States, (2) adherence to the concept of
regional collective security; (3) support for genuine 
nationalist movements among dependent peoples; (4) culti­
vation of ties with Asian neighbors not in the Communist 
bloc, and (5) loyalty to the principles of the United 
Nations.
This close relationship with the United States du­
ring the early years of independence was characterized 
by a high volume of diplomatic trade, aid and military 
treaties between the two countries. Conditions in the 
Philippines such as wartime devastation which had ruined 
Philippine economy, threats to internal stability by the
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communist-led Hukbalahap organization, and unstable con­
ditions in the external environment dramatized by the 
fall of China to Communism, determined a close relation­
ship that was in fact dominated by the United States.
In effect, the United States did take advantage of these 
conditions to determine the details and official dates 
of political independence, the content of numerous econo­
mic programs which protected American agricultural and 
manufacturing interests through quotas and tariff arrange­
ments. The most outstanding of these agreements which 
protected American interests was the trade agreement 
which provided that American citizens, and corporations 
owned or controlled by such citizens, were entitled to 
the same rights as Filipinos in regard to business invest­
ments in the Philippines. Under the military bases agree­
ments, whose approval was contingent to the passage of 
a law awarding war damages to Philippine citizens as a 
result of war, the United States exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over Philippine citizens, although in con­
trast, agreements with NATO powers and Japan expressly 
exlude the United States from jurisdiction over nationals 
of the host state.
However, in spite of its expressed alignment with 
the United States in its foreign policy, the Philippines 
did not always agree with its former metropolitan power. 
From the very beginning, for example, in its relations 
with Japan, Philippine foreign policy was aimed at 
three basic objectives: first, to make certain that Japan, 
through genuine political and economic reform, will never
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again ne a menace to the Philippines and other countries; 
second, to obtain an early and equitable reparation of 
the damage caused by Japan to the Philippines and other 
countries; and third, to welcome, at a suitable time 
and under proper conditions, a democratic and non-mili­
tarist Japan as a friendly neighbor and to secure its 
cooperation in maintaining the peace and fostering the 
progess of the Pacific area and of the world as a whole. 
These objectives of Philippine foreign policy toward 
Japan caused it to differ sharply with the United States 
when the latter made preparations toward the signing of 
a Japanese Peace Treaty. The Philippines was influenced 
first by its feelings that it has suffered the heaviest 
damage at the hands of the Japanese, second by the geogra­
phical proximity of Japan which meant that a rearmed Japan 
would be dangerous to Philippine security, and thirdly, 
the United States had yet to make itself clear in its 
avowals of providing security for the Philippines.
It was only after the United States had signed a treaty 
of mutual defense with the Philippines in 1951 that the 
Philippines was finally induced to sign the Japanese 
Peacy Treaty which was not ratified by it until 1956 
because of political opposition at home.
Close ties with the United States also did not pre­
vent criticism and demands for renegotiation of the basic 
military agreements between the two countries. Three 
agreements had been entered into between the United 
States and the Philippines in matters of security.
The Military Bases Agreement, signed on March 14, 1947, 
gave the United States the right to keep, for a period
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of ninety-nine years, a number of naval, air, and army 
bases in the Philippines. A military assistance agree­
ment concluded on March 12, 1947 provided for the train­
ing of military forces of the Philippines by a group of 
American military experts known as the Joint United 
States Military Advisory Group. On August 30, 1951, 
the United States and the Philippines signed a bilateral 
treaty of mutual defense.
Over a period of years, these treaties had under­
gone some changes because of demands on the part of the 
Philippines with the consent of the United States,
These changes will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter.
Besides its relations with Japan, the foreign 
relations of the Philippines has also undergone some 
changes. Over a period of twenty years since its inde­
pendence, the Philippine government through successive 
administrations, had refused to entertain any direct 
contact with communist countries. Recently, however 
the Philippines has established diplomatic relations 
with Romania and Yugoslavia in 1972. In 1973, diploma­
tic missions were exchanged with Poland, Hungary, Mongo­
lia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democra­
tic Republic. In September 1973, a Russian mission 
arrived in Manila to discuss oil exploration and a 
trade treaty. On September 20, 1974, Mrs. Imelda Marcos 
visited Peking and a trade treaty between the Philippines 
and the People's Republic of China was concluded during 
that visit.
Since independence, the Philippines has also in-
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creased its contacts with its Asian neighbors. Although 
the Philippines came into conflict with one Asian neighbor, 
Malaysia, Malaysia, over its claims to North Borneo, or 
Sabah, the Philippines tried to lay the basis for Southeast 
Asian regionalism. For example, in 1961, President Carlos 
P. Garcia took the lead in organizing the Association of 
Southeast Asia or ASA with Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines as members. In 1963, President Diosdado Maca- 
pagal took the initiative in the establishment of Maphilindo, 
a much bolder attempt at confederation among the three coun­
tries of Malay origin— Malaysia, the Philippines, and In­
donesia. In 1967, President Ferdinand Marcos supported 
the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
or ASEAN, which brought together the former members of ASA 
and Maphilindo and included Singapore as a new member.
Philippine foreign relations has seen many shifts 
and changes in recent years. With the expiration of the 
Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1955 came the termination of 
the whole system of preferential trade between the United 
States and the Philippines starting in 1974. This also 
meant the end of the parity clause in the Constitution of 
the Philippines which permitted Americans equal rights with 
Filipinos to invest in the Philippines. All in all, the 
termination of the sugar quota, the preferential trade sys­
tem, and the parity clause ended those aspects of U.S.- 
Philippine relationship that were so dominant after Phil­
ippine independence until 1974. This development inclu­
ding the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, 
the emergence of Japan as an Asian power, and the in-
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creasingly peaceful relations between the United States 
and the People's Republic of China, create a new environ­
ment within which Philippine-American alliance relations 
will have to operate. As already mentioned in the in­
troduction of this paper, the Philippines is now in­
terested in re-negotiating its military agreements with 
the United States.
The evolution of Philippine foreign policy has 
moved toward the direction of increasingly independent 
lines during the past three years. It has moved Phil­
ippine diplomacy away from the strongly pro-Western 
course that it had followed during most of the three 
decades after its independence in 1945. This new foreign 
policy has seen a deepening involvement in Southeast 
Asian affairs, a growing sense of identification with 
the Third World, and rapproachment with the Communist 
countries accompanied by an increasingly hardnosed re­
assessment of its traditional "special relations" with 
the United States.
The Philippines has also normalized relations with 
Japan which now competes with the United States for 
trade with the Philippines through the ratification of 
the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, which 
had been negotiated thirteen years before. Attempts to 
deal with the Muslim rebellion in Mindanao and Sulu 
have stimulated Philippine efforts to achieve closer 
relations with the Arab powers of West Asia. Finally, 
in the United Nations, the Philippines has chosen to 
identify itself unequivocally with the Afro-Asian bloc 
of countries.
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CHAPTER III
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ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Svncrisis: The 
Dynamics of Health: An Analytic Series on the Interactions
of Health and Socioeconomic Development. IV: The Philippines. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972); U.S. 
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Philippines, trans. by E. D. Laborde (London: Longmans,
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east Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972); and Keith 
Lightfoot, The Philippines (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
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Seventh and Final Report of the High Commissioner to the 
Philippines, op. cit., pp. 130-135.
PART II
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALLIANCE
The alliance between the United States and the Phil­
ippines is the result of a number of treaties or agree­
ments which were negotiated and concluded over a period 
of years since the end of World War II.
Chapter IV is a discussion of the negotiations that
led to the conclusion of the agreements relating to the 
establishment of U.S. military bases in the territory of 
the Philippines and the giving of military assistance by 
the United States to the Philippines.
Chapter V is a discussion of the negotiations that 
led to the conclusion of the treaty of mutual defense 
between the United States and the Philippines.
Chapter VI is a discussion of the negotiations that
led to the signing of the multilateral treaty called the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
The alliance between the United States and the Phil­
ippines is therefore constituted by bilateral and multi­
lateral treaties. The United States has also made com­
mitments regarding the defense of the Philippines in a 
number of statements made by executive officials of the 
Philippines. These commitments are discussed in Chapter VI,
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CHAPTER IV
THE AGREEMENTS ON MILITARY BASES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE
General Background. —  Theodore Roosevelt, who was 
strongly influenced by the strategic ideas of Mahan, be­
lieved very strongly that the security of the United 
States rested upon the expansion and wise use of naval 
power. Corollary to this theory was the proposition that 
naval power could be utilized to its fullest potential 
through the acquisition and utilization of naval coal­
ing stations strategically located all over the world.
It was, therefore, inevitable that
Virtually every one charged with responsibi­
lity for the direction of American foreign 
policy in Asia at one time or another endorsed 
the idea of an American b^se on or adjacent 
to the mainland of China.
When the Spanish-American war broke out, Theodore 
Roosevelt sent orders to Admiral George Dewey who was 
already in Hongkong to destroy units of the Spanish navy 
in Philippine waters. After Dewey accomplished his mis­
sion, it was a foregone conclusion that the Philippines 
would become a possession of the United States. In the 
words of Tyler Dennet:
For more than thirty years before the Spahish- 
American War there had been among some Ameri­
cans, especially naval authorities, a feeling 
that the United States ought to possess at
90
91
least a naval base in the Far East. At times 
Korean ports had been discussed in that con­
nection, but the acquisition of the Philippines 
definitely transferred all American political 
interests from the Asiatic mainland.
Indeed, it was the influence of the military services
whose role extended into many matters that led to the
acquisition of the Philippines by the United States:
There were, for example, military representa­
tives at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1898 
which settled the Spanish-American War. Indeed, 
even before the delegation left Washington, Mc­
Kinley made it clear that he personally attached 
great importance to the views which Generals 
Merritt and Greene and Admiral Dewey would 
express about the advisability of retaining 
the Philippines and hoped that the delegates 
would pay attention to their recommendations.
At Paris, moreover, one of the strongest pre­
sentations on behalf of keeping all of the 
Philippines was made by Commander (soon to 
be Admiral) Bradford; his testimony according 
to one close observer, had a strong impact 
upon the delegation, even to its anti-expan­
sionist members.
The acquisition of the Philippines meant not only 
access to the markets of the East, making the Philippines 
the "Hongkong, the Kiaochow, the Port Arthur of the United
4
States in the Far East", but it also resulted in the Phil­
ippines becoming one of the bases or outposts which would 
afford protection to the security of the United States. 
This vital interest not only in the security of the 
United States but ultimately also that of the Philippines 
critically influenced the formulation of U.S. foreign 
policies for the Ear East in the first half of the twen-
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tieth century.^ Although the acquisition of the Phil­
ippines marked the entry of the United States into the 
class of "world powers," Samuel Flagg Bemis described
• g
it as a "great national aberration." To Bemis, it was 
the greatest blunder of American diplomacy: it led rapid­
ly to involvement in the politics of Asia and through 
them of Europe, and to a long row of further diplomatic 
blunders. ^
Before Admiral Dewey left Hongkong for his historic 
rendezvous with destiny, he had been in touch with Fili­
pino revolutionaries in exile in that colony. After des­
troying the Spanish naval squadron, Dewey assisted Emilio 
Aguinaldo, the Filipino revolutionary leader, and his 
group to land in the Philippines where they immediately 
organized forces to resume fighting the Spaniards assist­
ed by American arms and ammunition. On June 12, 1898, 
Aguinaldo proclaimed Philippine independence and inaugu­
rated a Republic of the Philippines on January 23, 1899. 
Although no American official made any specific agree­
ment with them that the independence of the Philippines 
would be established upon the expulsion of Spanish for­
ces, the Filipinos honestly believed this to be the case 
and they fought the Spaniards with vigor. In later days, 
some historians : see this as some kind of alliance bet­
ween the two peoples against Spain.
When the Filipinos learned that the Americans in­
tended to occupy the islands permanently, a bitter war
ensued. Unknown to the Fiiipj.p6s the decision to 
seize the islands was already made when the McKinley ad­
ministration had decided to send an army of occupation to
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the Philippines before Dewey attacked the Spanish fleet.
In effect the proposal to seize the Philippines 
was the link between the naval offensive in 
those islands planned first of all as a result 
of military considerations, and the share in 
the Chinese market desired by corporate in­
terests . . . .  When the Administration saw 
the connection and decided to bring it off, 
the plan to strike down Spanish naval power 
in the Pacific grew into a plan to hold the g 
Philippine Islands with ground forces . . . .
Faced by superior forces and isolated internationally, 
fheir only aid being the moral and political support from 
the American anti-imperialist movement, the Filipinos 
lost the war against the Americans.
In the coming years, the strategic considerations 
which played a very important part in the decision to 
seize the Philippines, a decision which was certainly 
alien to American traditions of democracy and liberty, 
was to be subjected to varied views. Theodore Roosevelt 
himself began to have second thoughts about the strate­
gic value of the Philippines. In a letter that he sent 
to William Howard Taft on August 21, 1907, Roosevelt 
expressed the following views that seemed prophetic at 
that time:
The Philippine Islands form our heel of 
Achilles. They are all that makes the present 
situation with Japan dangerous. I think that 
in some way and with some phraseology that 
you think wise you should state to them that 
if they handle themselves wisely in their legis­
lative assembly we shall at the earliest possi­
ble moment give them a nearly complete indepen­
dence. . . . Personally, I should be glad to 
see the Islands made independent, with perhaps
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some kind of international guarantee for the 
preservation of order, or with sortie warning 
on our part that if they did not keep o^ger 
we would have to interfere again. . . .
This did not sound like Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Theodore Roosevelt who saw in 1898 in the Philippines 
a heaven-sent opportunity to establish a strategic posi­
tion that would carry forward American continental west­
ward movement and also strengthen its bargaining position 
in China and Japan.
On July 29, 1905, President Roosevelt further showed 
his concern for the security of the Philippines, by pro­
moting an executive agreement with Japan in the best tra-
12
dition of Realpolitik. On that date, Roosevelt's Secre­
tary of War, William Howard Taft,negotiated a secret agree­
ment with Kororo Katsura, the Japanese Foreign Minister, 
in which the United States recognized recognized Japan's 
"sovereignty over Korea" in exchange for a Japanese dis­
claimer of any aggressive designs on the Philippines. 
Roosevelt entered into this agreement because he sincerely 
believed that the defense of the Philippines against an 
attack by Japan had become seriously compromised because 
of her then increased power. However, as the naval and 
military power of Japan continued to expand, the Philip­
pines became increasing more vulnerable to a Japanese 
attack becoming thereby a hostage which could easily be 
seized in a war with the United States.
Theodore Roosevelt’s anxiety over the Philippines 
was further made manifest in the Root-Takahira executive 
agreement of November 30, 1908, wherein, among other
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things, Japan and the United States agreed to respect the
territorial possessions belonging to each other in the
Pacific r e g i o n . T h e  Root-Takahira understanding, as it
was called, supplemented the earlier Taft=Katsura "agreed
memorandum. To Bemis, it meant that Theodore Roosevelt
had already come to feel that the Philippines 
— for the conquest of which he had been so ardent 
in 1898— were the "Achilles heel" of the United 
States, and that the United States could not fight 
Japan over Manchuria. His executive agreements 
reflect this conviction, the greatest anxiety of 
his foreign policy.15
In 1922, after the end of World War I, in clear recog­
nition of Japan's growing power in the Pacific region, the 
United States worked out in the Washington Naval Conference 
not only limitation of naval armaments but in order to secure 
Japanese approval promised to limit the fortification of 
certain islands including the Philippines.^^
The future of the Philippines was, therefore, more 
or less determined on its strategic and commercial value 
to the United States.
As an attempt to provide for its security, there were 
also several proposals for the neutralization of the Phil­
ippines, concluding in the inclusion of a provision in the 
Philippine Independence Act of 1934 which urged interna­
tional negotiations for the perpetual neutralization of 
the islands after independence.
Under more dramatic circumstances on February 8,
1942, the neutralization of the Philippines was asked by 
Quezon when the fall of the Philippines was imminent in 
the course of World War II, President Quezon made
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the proposal on the basis of two assumptions. First, he 
knew that the United States was committed to grant inde­
pendence to the Philippines by virtue of the provisions 
of the Tydings-McDuffie law. Second, the Japanese invading 
forces had announced publicly its intention to grant inde­
pendence to the Philippines. In his proposal, Quezon sug­
gested a number of steps to be taken. First, he asked 
that the United States immediately grant the Philippines 
complete and absolute independence. Second, following 
the grant of independence, the Philippines should be neu­
tralized at once. Third, all occupying troops, both Ameri­
can and Japanese should be withdrawn by mutual agreement 
with the Philippine government within a reasonable length 
of time. Fourth,neither the United States or Japan should 
maintain military bases in the Philippines. Fifth, the 
Philippine Army should be immediately disbanded and the 
only armed forces to be maintained should be a constabu­
lary of modest size. Sixth, immediately upon granting 
independence the trade relations of the Philippines with 
foreign countries should be a matter to be decided by 
the Philippines and the foreign countries concerned.
Seventh, and last, American and Japanese civilians who 
desire to be withdrawn from the islands, should be allowed 
to do so with their respective troops under mutual and 
proper safeguards.
Quezon was not entirely alone in thinking along these 
lines if the Filipino people were to be spared the further 
ravages of war. In the opinion of the U.S. High Commission­
er to the Philippines Sayre at that time.
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If the premise of President Quezon is 
correct, that American help cannot or 
will not arrive here in time to be 
available, I believe his proposal for 
immediate independence and neutraliza­
tion of the Philiçgines is the sound 
course to follow.
Accompanying Quezon's suggestion to the President 
of the United States proposing independence and neutrali­
zation of the Philippines was a message from Douglas Mc­
Arthur, then commanding Philippine-American forces in the 
Philippines during World War II, analyzing the situation 
as follows:
Since I have no air or sea protection you 
must be prepared at any time on the com­
plete destruction of this command. You 
must determine whether the mission of de­
lay would be better furthered by the tem­
porizing plan of Quezon or by my continued 
battle effort. The temper of the Filipinos 
is one of almost violent resentment against 
the United States. Every one of them ex­
pected help and when it has not been forth­
coming they believe they have been betrayed 
in favor of others. . . .  So far as the mili­
tary angle is concerned, the problem presents 
itself as to whether the plan of President 
Quezon might offer the best possible solutioç^ 
of what is about to be a disastrous debacle.
Unknown to Quezon and McArthur, although the Phil­
ippines had become the point of focal interest following 
the attack at Pearl Harbor, its defense had become once 
more the desperate and losing struggle which had been 
forecast in the planning of earlier years.
Although it was recognized that there was a need 
for facing the "agonizing experience of seeing the doomed 
./FhilippineTgarrison gradually pulled down" Washington
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decided that
Strategically it was of very great importance 
that the Army in the Philippines should pro­
long its resistance to the limit. Politically 
it was still more important that this defense 
be supported as strongly as possible, for nei­
ther the Filipino people nor the rest of the 
Far Eastern world could be expected to have a 
high opinion of the United States if she adopted 
a. policy of "scuttle." On these grounds Stim- 
son and Marshall reacted strongly against any 
defeatist attitude. They argued "that we could 
not give up the Philippines in that way; that 
we must make every effort at whatever risk to 
keep McArthur's line open and that otherwise 
we would paralyze the activities of everybody 
in the Far East."
If the messages of Quezon and McArthur caused some 
shock and consternation to General Marshall and Secretary 
of War Stimson, it was the decision of President Roose­
velt in his message to General McArthur of February 9, 
1942 that:
American troops will continue to keep our flag 
flying in the Philippines so long as there re­
mains any possibility of resistance. I have 
made these decisions in complete understanding 
of your military estimate that accompanied 
President Quezon's message to me. The duty 
and the necessity of resisting Japanese aggres­
sion to the last transcends in importance any 
other obligation now facing us in the Philippines. 22
McArthur was accordingly instructed to organize his de­
fenses and his forces in order to make his resistance as 
effective as circumstances would permit and as prolonged 
as humanly possible. Although President Roosevelt did 
not accede to the wishes of President Quezon, he assured 
Quezon that he was not lacking in understanding or sympa-
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thy with the situation of Quezon and the Commonwealth
Government. In the conclusion of his message, Roosevelt
pledged that:
So long as the flag of the United States 
flies on Filipino soil as a pledge of our 
duty to your people, it will be defended 
by our own men to the death. Whatever 
happens to the present American garrison 
we shall not relax our efforts until the 
forces which we are now marshaling out­
side the Philippine Islands return to 
the Philippines and drive the last rggr 
nant of the invaders from your soil.
Underlying these pledges of support and redemption 
of the islands was the recognition of the strategic im­
portance of the Philippines. Behind this reasoning lies 
the American motivation for the establishment of military 
bases in the islands before its independence and the 
desire for their retention after independence. The ques­
tion of military bases was to occupy a major part of the 
relations between the United States and the Philippines 
both prior to and after independence. Because of this, 
the background to the question will next be explored be­
cause as a result of Quezon's messages for relief of the 
Philippines and his proposal for neutralization during 
World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt pledged that 
the Japanese would be driven from the Philippines and 
that the Filipino people would have their freedom restored 
and their independence established and protected. This
promise of Roosevelt was interpreted to mean that the Uni-
24
ted States desired military bases in the Philippines. 
However, this is getting ahead of our story.
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During Spanish occupation of the Philippines, mili­
tary and naval bases were maintained in the islands. Upon 
the transfer of the Philippines to the United States, 
the United States succeeded to the rights of Spain.
In the Organic Law of the Philippines of July 
1, 1902, it was provided that all property and rights 
which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands 
by the United States under the Treaty of Spain of Decem­
ber 10, 1898, was placed under the control of the govern­
ment of the islands to be administered for the benefit 
of the inhabitants of the islands, except "such land 
or other property as shall be designated by the Presi­
dent of the United States for military and other reser-
25vations of the Government of the United States."
These military bases in the Philippines included 
Fort Santiago and Cuartel de Espana in Manila; Fort Wil­
liam McKinley near Manila; Fort Nichols, the air base 
also located near Manila; Fort Mills on the island of 
Corregidor; Fort Stotsenberg between Manila and Baguio; 
Camp John Hay in Baguio, and Pettit Barracks in Zamboanga. 
The Asiatic squadron of the U.S. Navy maintained naval 
stations in Cavite and at Olongapo at Subic Bay.
U.S. military bases and the problem of Philippine 
security cropped up in the discussions involving the 
grant of Philippine independence. Sometime in 1923, in 
hearings before the 85th Congress, in response to Phil­
ippine petitions for increased autonomy, the then Secre­
tary of War Weeks opposed Philippine independence by 
citing the dangers that would arise from external aggres­
sion, internal dissension, and the lack of Filipino parti-
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cipation in the commerce and industry of the islands, and
2 6
from the the poor financial condition of the government. 
U.S. Admiral Hilary Jones also testified in another hear­
ing that American protection of the Philippines would,
from every naval point of view, be vastly more difficult
27
if the Philippines were independent.
On February 11, 1932, in testifying before the Senate
Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs on S.3377,
the Hawes-Cutting Bill which would grant independence
to the Philippines, Secretary of War Patrick Hurley,
stated emphatically that it did not seem possible "either
in the proximate or distant future, that the Philippine
Islands can successfully undertake the primary and most
essential function of independent government, namely,
28
self-defense." Hurley was of the opinion that under
its present economic conditions, the Philippines was
totally incapable of maintaining a professional force
that could offer any effective resistance to an invading
army. Besides, he added, the Philippines did not have
any industries capable of producing munitions of war,
while the building and maintenance of a fleet was out
29
of the question.
In the same bill that was passed by Congress in 
December, 1932, there were two significant provisions.
One provided that the United States was entitled to 
retain military bases in the islands. The other pro­
vision instructed the U.S. President to enter into nego­
tiations for the neutralization of the Philippines.
In sending back the bill to Congress with his veto. 
President Hoover said:
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Our responsibility to the Philippine 
people is, that in finding a method by which 
we consummate their aspiration we do not pro­
ject them into economic and social chaos, with 
the probability of breakdown in government, 
with its consequences in degeneration of a 
rising liberty which has been so carefully 
nurtured by the United States at a cost of 
thousands of American lives and hundreds of 
millions of money. Our responsibility to the 
American people is that we shall see the fact 
of Philippine separation accomplished without 
endangering ourself in military action hereaf­
ter to maintain internal order or to protect 
the Philippines from encroachment by others, 
and avoid the very dangers of future contro­
versies and seeds of war with other nations.
We have a responsibility to the world that, 
having undertaken to develop and perfect free­
dom for these people, we shall not by our course 
project more chaos in^g a world already sorely 
beset by instability.
Hoover was more specific in his veto message regard­
ing the capability of the Philippines to maintain stable 
government and protect itself:
The income of the Philippine government 
has never in the past been sufficient to meet 
in addition to other expenditures, the cost 
of supporting even the Filipino Scouts, much 
less an army or navy. The United States expends 
to-day upon the native and American military 
forces for the protection and assurance of in­
ternal order and for the maintenance of the 
minimum requirements of external defense a sum 
amounting to approximately 28 per cent of the 
entire revenues of the Philippine government.
If the naval expenditures of the United States 
in the Philippine Islands are included, this 
figure is increased to 36 per cent; and it 
must be remarked that both figures relate to 
the expenses of the forces actually in the
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Islands and do not include the very pertinent 
potential protection afforded by the entire 
military and naval powers of the United States.
It can scarcely be expected that the Philippine 
Islands will be able to increase their revenues 
by 36 or even 28 per cent to provide the force 
necessary for maintaining internal order and 
the minimum of external defense, even were no 
internal economic degeneration expected. They 
could only do so at a sacrifice of a large pa^^ 
of their educational and public improvements.
While Hoover was reluctant to allow the Philippines 
to be independent because of its weakness, former Presi­
dent Roosevelt felt that the "complete severance of the 
Philippines . . not merely desirable but necessary.
Roosevelt persisted in believing that the Philippines 
was still "our heel of Achilles" if the United States was 
attacked by a foreign power. From a military standpoint,
the Philippines continued to be a source of weakness to
33
the United States.
Notwithstanding Hoover's veto. Congress passed the
Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. It was not acceptable, however,
to the Philippine Legislature because a provision for
military, naval, and other reservations to be retained
by the United States was considered as inconsistent with
true independence, violated the national dignity, and
34
subject to misunderstanding.
During the term of President Franklin Delano Roose­
velt, a compromise was reached with the leading Filipino 
statesman, Manuel Quezon. The compromise which Roosevelt 
described in a message to Congress requested that the 
portion of the law authorizing the United States to re­
tain an option on military and naval bases be changed.
32
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Roosevelt desired that the U.S. should not retain per­
manent military bases on the islands and that arrange­
ments for naval bases be concluded on terms mutually
35
satisfactory to the United States and the Philippines.
In the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, therefore, the 
law specifically eliminated the provision for the reten­
tion of army bases after independence and the President 
of the United States was authorize to negotiate for the 
retention of naval bases. In the same law, the President 
was requested, at the earliest practicable date, to enter 
into negotiations with foreign powers with a view to 
the conclusion of a treaty for the perpetual neutraliza­
tion of the Philippines after Philippine independence 
had been achieved. The effect of this provision was 
the removal of U.S. army forces and the relinquishment 
of army reservations which comprised a total of some
300,000 acres of land before World War II. The most 
significant result of this provision was its effect on 
the course of future Philippine-American relations in 
the field of military security.
Before World War II, the total number of troops 
in the Philippines never numbered more than 10,000 men. A 
number of ships and some naval forces were also stationed 
in the Philippines during the same p>eriod. The total 
number of forces staioned in the Philippines before the 
outbreak of World War II was never considered sufficient 
for the defense of Philippine territory. Although the 
United States prepared the Philippines for political in­
dependence, it paradoxically did not adequately prepare 
the islands to provide for its economic and military
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security.
During the early period of the pacification campaign 
following the decision of the United States to occupy the 
Philippines in 1898, the United States Army stationed 
large contingents of troops in the islands. After the 
period of military government was over, following the 
capture of Filipino General Emilio Aguinaldo and the col­
lapse of the resistance movement against the United States, 
the number of American troops rarely numbered more than
10,000 men, more than half of which were native troops 
called the Philippine Scouts.
The American and Filipino soldiers formed what was 
then known as the Philippine Department of the United 
States Army. It was usually commanded by an officer 
with the rank of Major General. Seven military garrisons 
were established, most of them in Manila or its environs.
The United States Navy also maintained an Asiatic 
Squadron which was based in naval stations in Cavite 
and at Olongapo at Subic Bay. The naval shore activi­
ties required the services of less than five thousand 
men. . . .
Although some part of the Asiatic fleet was cons­
tantly in Manila waters, its activities were normally 
concentrated along the China coast. Just before the 
outbreak of World War II in the Pacific, the fleet nor­
mally consisted of a heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, 
a dozen destroyers and about the same number of small 
submarines, a few naval airplanes together with auxiliary 
vessels and some gunboats n Chinese coastal waters and 
rivers. In 1939, the force was reinforced by an aircraft
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carrier, a number of long range bombers, and a number of 
large, modern submarines. The main United States naval 
base was at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, about 5,000 miles away 
from the Philippines.
Although a number of Philippine Scout and Philippine 
Constabulary officers were trained at West Point and 
Annapolis during the period of American occupation of 
the Philippines, the Filipinos, prior to 1905, were not 
required or allowed to prepare themselves for the pro­
tection of their country by having full responsibility 
or even sharing in the responsibility for organizing, 
equipping, financing, and controlling large military 
forces. The only experience the Philippines ever had 
in this direction was the organizing and training of a 
division of the Philippine National Guard during World 
War I. That experience was too brief, however, to be 
of significant or enduring military value to the Fili­
pinos.
Just before the outbreak of hostilities in 1941, 
the Philippine Commonwealth Government secured the ser­
vices of General Douglas McArthur as military adviser 
to the Commonwealth as well as chief of a Philippine 
military mission of United States Army officers. The 
principal duty of McArthur and his staff was to prepare 
the Filipinos for the task of defending their country. 
There was very little time, however, because the Japanese 
launched their attacks in 1941 and in a short time over­
ran American and Filipino positions. The story of that 
valiant defense is a matter of historical record. It 
also showed how weak the country was in matters of defense.
107
It was also observed that although the United States 
did prepare the country for political independence, its 
preparations for the economic stability and military se­
curity of the people were woefully inadequate.
Establishment of Military Bases.— in accordance
with the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Fi­
lipino people adopted a Constitution in 1934. Among its 
provisions was an ordinance which recognized the right 
of the United States to expropriate property for public 
uses, to maintain military and armed forces in the Phil­
ippines, and, upon order of the President of the United 
States, to call into the service of such armed forces 
all military forces organized by the Commonwealth Govern­
ment of the Philippines. The Constitution also conferred 
the right to intervene pn the United States in internal 
affairs of the Philippines for the preservation of its 
government, the protection of life, property, and indivi­
dual liberty, and for the discharge of governmental obli­
gations.
During the desperate days of World War II, when 
President Quezon, as mentioned earlier, tried to have 
his country neutralized. President Franklin Roosevelt 
pledged that the Japanese would be driven from the Phil­
ippines, the restoration of freedom to the Philippines, 
and the establishment and protection of their indepen­
dence.
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It was the feeling of Commonwealth Vice President 
Sergio Osmena that the promise of American protection 
of Philippine independence meant the establishment of 
U.S. military bases in the Philippines, a situation not 
contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Act which set the 
date of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946. Upon 
receipt of Roosevelt's message, Osmena asked Quezon if 
he favored American bases in Philippine territory. Que­
zon replied that with the lessons of World War II, 
there was no way of "escaping the necessity of accepting 
the b a s e s . O s m e n a  realized then that future indepen­
dence for the Philippines was now linked to the security
37of the United States. When he eventually succeeded 
Quezon as President on the latter's death, Osmena adopted 
a grand view of United States-Philippine relations.
Osmena was convinced that America should be allowed to 
retain military bases in the Philippines not only because 
they were vital to Philippine liberty and development, 
but also because they gave the United States the oppor­
tunity of preventing any enemy from approaching her 
Western shores.
Following the occupation of the Philippines by Japan 
in the course of World War II, Japanese Prime Minister 
Hideki Tojo delivered a message to the 91st session of 
the Japanese Imperial Diet dated January 27, 1943, where­
in he mentioned the intention of the Japanese Imperial 
Government to grant political independence to the Phil­
ippines. In order to counter-act the propaganda effect 
of Tojo's message, Roosevelt sent a message to the U.S.
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Congress requesting authority to advance the date of in­
dependence and to negotiate with the Philippine Government 
for the establishment of military bases in the Philippines 
for their mutual defense after the grant of independence.
In response to Roosevelt's message. Senator Tydings 
proposed a resolution to be introduced in the Senate 
which would advance the date of the grant of independence 
to the Philippines coincident with ousting the Japanese 
from the Philippines. Upon learning of Tydings' intention, 
Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes sent a memoran­
dum to Roosevelt in which he stated that:
President Quezon desires that the United States 
rather than (or in addition to) an international 
body provide for the military security of the 
Philippines. He rests this policy on your 
statement of December 28,1941, ". . . that 
their freedom will be redeemed and their 
independence established and protected."
To further this purpose he wishes the United 
States to establish naval and air bases in 
the Islands. If this policy is followed, 
our military authorities may prefer to 
arrange for the bases prior to independence.
Upon reading Ickes' letter. Secretary of State Cor­
dell Hull made known his own views to Roosevelt in a memo­
randum dated September 8, 1943, as follows:
. . . The Tydings-McDuffie Act already con­
tains authority for the retention of naval 
reservations and fueling stations in the 
Philippines after complete independence is 
granted. It is understood, however, that 
the Commonwealth authorities new feel that 
not only an adequate naval force should be 
maintained in the Islands but that a formi­
dable air force will also be required. It 
is most likely that the entire question of
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defense for the Philippines will be reviewed 
when Congress next gives consideration to 
Philippine affairs. There will probably be 
an insistent demand from Filipino leaders for 
protective measures of a much broader character 
than was contemplated when the Tydings-McDuffie 
Act was passed. This is a subject concerning 
which the appropriate officials of the War and 
Navy Departments are in a better position to 
make recommendations, based on experience and 
expert knowledge, than are officials of the 
Department of State. Nevertheless, it can be 
said that the principle of maintaining naval 
facilities in the Philippines after independence 
is granted is already recognized in the Tydings- 
McDuffie Act and that what remains to be done 
is to decide in what form and to what extent 
these facilities and other security measures 
will be maintained after the Philippines be­
comes independent.
As he promised. Senator Tydings introduced on Sep­
tember 24, 1943, Senate Joint Resolution 81 which would 
grant immediate independence to the Philippines. In con­
nection with this resolution, a memorandum was prepared 
by Assistant Secretary of State Long stating the views 
of the Department of State with regard to the establish­
ment of bases in the Philippines as follows;
The military operations planned for the 
defeat of Japan contemplate the use of the 
Philippines as air and naval bases for the 
prosecution of the war against Japan. If 
the Philippines were granted their immediate 
independence, the United States Government 
would have to deal with that Government as 
an entirely independent concern. It is pos­
sible that members of the Government now 
present in the United States would reappear 
in the Philippine Islands to assume control 
of that part of the Islands freed from Japanese 
domination. The theory of dealing with that
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Government as an independent Government would 
raise difficulties because we would no longer 
have the right to exercise the authority we 
have under the present arrangement with the 
Philippine Commonwealth. It is even possible 
that members to be added to the Government 
there might take the position that they had 
contributed very heavily to the war and desire 
to be at peace and might assume a policy of 
neutrality. In that case it would be neces­
sary for the United States to take steps 
which in effect would make war against the 
Philippines in order to use those areas for 
military and naval bases for use in the opera­
tions against Japan.40
These views, of course, were unknown to the leader 
of the Philippine Government-in-exile in the United 
States. The United States Government was, in effect, 
ready to go to war against the Philippines in order to 
have access to military bases in that country in the 
prosecution of the war effort against Japan. This pro­
bably accounts for Quezon's action during a meeting held 
at his apartment in Washington, D.C., on October 6, 1943, 
to discuss Tydings' resolution, where a number of Ameri­
can officials were in attendance. During this meeting, 
Quezon took Undersecretary of Interior Abe Portas aside 
and suggested to him that Portas recommend that Roosevelt 
transmit a message to the U.S. Congress requesting pro­
vision for negotiations to insure the security of the 
Philippines. Quezon, however, intimated that in Roose­
velt's message it would not be wise to make any special 
mention of the word "bases.
On November 3, 1943, Tydings introducted Senate Reso- 
tion 93, which declared the policy of the Congress with
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respect to the Philippines. As passed by Congress, it 
declared, first of all, that it was the policy of the 
Congress that the United States shall drive the treach­
erous invading Japanese from the Philippines, restore 
as quickly as possible the orderly and free democratic 
process of government to the Filipino people, and. there­
upon establish the complete independence of the Phil­
ippine Islands as a separate and self-governing nation. 
Secondly, after negotiation with the President of the 
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the President of the 
Filipino Republic, the President of the United States was 
authorized by such means as he finds appropriate to with­
hold or to acquire and to retain such bases, necessary 
appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident there­
to in accition to any provided for by the Act of March 24, 
1934, as he may deem necessary for the full and mutual 
protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United 
States. Finally, the President of the United States was 
authorized after consultation with the President of the 
Commonwealty of the Philippines to advance the date of 
the independence of the Philippines prior to July 4, 1946. 
In the same resolution, the Congress of the United States 
pledged the resources of the United States, both of men 
and materials, to redeem the Philippines from Japan and 
to speed the day of ultimate and complete independence 
of the people of the Philippine Islands.
Philippine Vice-President Sergio Osmena appeared be­
fore the House Committee on Insular Affairs to urge ap­
proval. Upon approval of the resolution, President Roose-
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velt issued the following statement;
On the problem of bases, the present 
Organic Act permitted acquisition only of 
naval bases and fueling stations, a situa­
tion wholly inadequate to meet the condi­
tions of modern warfare. The measure ap­
proved today will permit the acquisition 
of air and land bases in addition to naval 
bases and fueling stations.
I have been informed that this action 
is most welcome to Commonwealth authorities 
and that they will gladly cooperate in the 
establishment and maintenance of bases both 
to the restored Commonwealth and as an inde­
pendent nation. By this we shall have an 
outstanding example of cooperation designed 
to prevent a recurrence of aggression and 
to ensure the peaceful use of great oceans 
by those in pursuit of peaceful ends.42
On June 30, 1944, President OsmeSa stated that
the enactment of Senate Joint Resolution 93 was a long
step toward the real freedom and independence of the
Philippines and its survival as a free and Christian
nation. He also mentioned that the provision for
naval and air bases was not only for the benefit of the
United States but was for the mutual protection of both
43
the United States and the Philippines
Later on, in a press interview, when asked whether 
he favored that the United States should maintain army 
and navy bases in the Philippines, he replied, "Absolute­
ly, all the time."
In another press interview on December 5, 1944, 
after American liberation forces had landed on the island 
of Leyte, Osmena stated that while the Philippines de-
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sired independence as rapidly as the military situation 
permitted, it was willing to grant the United States 
whatever naval and military bases the latter needed 
for military security. It was Osmena's view that the 
existence of U.S. bases in the Philippines would guaran­
tee the protection of the young republic from further 
oriental or other aggression in that part of the world.
At this time it is clear that OsmeKa's views on U.S. 
bases in the Philippines had changed radically as a 
direct result of his war-time experiences; now he felt 
the necessity for the existence of bases in the Philippines. 
Subsequently, on May 14, 1945, Osmena was called to Wash­
ington where he signed an agreement with President Truman 
permitting the United States to have military and naval 
bases in the islands. The agreement stated that
pending development of the detail plan, the 
United States will retain all sites which 
were held by the U.S. Army as military re­
servations on 7 December 1941 and by the 
U.S. Navy except at Cavite and will be ac­
corded rights to sites in the localities 
shown on the attached Appendix.
The United States also had the option to acquire "now" 
or in the future new sites if they were required.
In his Memoirs, Truman later stated that this agree­
ment was concluded because
The Philippines are a vital strategic center 
in the Pacific, and we were anxious than a 
a military agreement be concluded in order 
that we might in the future continue to pro­
tect them against outside attack. The Fili­
pinos themselves were equally anxious to 
have this protection, because without
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it the republic we were helping to establish
might sometime find itself h e l p l e s s . 46
The position of Osmeffa was endorsed by the Congress
of the Philippines which enacted enacted House Joint
Resolution No. 4 wherein the President of the Philippines
was authorized to negotiate with the President of the
United States on the establishment of military bases.
The Philippine President was further instructed that in
the course of the negotiations, he should insure the
territorial integrity of the Philippines, the mutual
protection of the Philippines and the United States,
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and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.
Following the restoration of civil government in 
the Philippines, steps were taken by the United States 
Government to negotiate with the Philippines for the
acquisition of military and naval bases in the islands.
48In a memorandum prepared by Frank P. Lockhart,
Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs of the Depart­
ment of State, addressed to the Secretary of State, dated 
April 18, 1945, the following points were raised: (1) the 
legal basis of the right of the United States to maintain 
military and other reservations and armed forces in the 
Philippines by virtue of the provisions of the Tydings- 
McDuff ie Act; (2) the authorization conferred upon the 
President of the United States by the provisions of the 
Senate Joint Resolution 93, approved June 23, 1944, to 
negotiate with the Philippine Commonwealth President to 
withhold,acquire, or retain military and naval bases as 
he finds necessary in the Philippines; (3) that no in­
formation was possessed by the State Department as to the
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extent or location of the bases which might be desired
by the Army or Navy; (4) that no negotiations had been 
conducted on the subject between Army and Navy authori­
ties of the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth 
Government nor between any other officials of the Govern­
ments of the United States and the Philippines; and 
finally (5) that the question of procedure should be 
determined at that time whether it would be better to 
start preliminary and exploratory negotiations or +-o 
wait until the Philippines had become independent.
The Departments of the Navy and War subsequently 
submitted communications to the State Department in res­
ponse to the memorandum of Lockhart. In his memorandum 
of April 30, 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 
indicated that the Navy Department was desirous that ne­
gotiations be started immediately with the Philippine 
Government in order to obtain rights and to establish 
bases in certain areas in the Philippines. Forrestal 
mentioned that among the rights to the bases were: the 
right to use harbors, to construct shore facilities, in­
cluding airfields and seaplane ramps, and other measures 
as strategy might require. He also mentioned the areas 
in the Philippines in which the navy was interested:
Tutu Bay (Jolo), Tawi Tawi, Balabac Island, Leyte-Samar 
(Leyte Gulf area), Guimaras Strait— Iloilo Strait area, 
Mactan Island, Coron Bay, Subic Bay, Sarangani Island, 
Sorsogon, San Miguel Bay, Polillo, Aparri, and Puerto 
Princesa. Forrestal also recommended the following:
(1) that engineering studies be conducted at these places 
as soon as practicable in order to select those sites
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most suitable for use in conditions likely to exist after 
World War II; (2) that perpetual rights in all of the 
areas listed above be retained because changing conditions 
subsequent to the conclusion of the war would require 
changes in dispositions for the defense of the Philippines; 
and (3) that any agreements entered into with the Phil­
ippine Government concerning the above areas should leave
49the way open for future negotiations for other sites.
On May 11, 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson 
submitted the views of the War Department regarding mili­
tary bases in the Philippines. Stimson felt that for 
the full and mutual protection of the Philippines aftrr 
the grant of independence, the closest cooperation of 
the Filipinos with U.S. military forces would be required. 
On the basis of that cooperation, U.S. military responsi­
bilities would be limited only to those which were beyond 
the capabilities of the Philippines. Predicting that the 
Filipinos would probably be unable to provide substantial 
air and naval forces as well as ground forces for its 
defense, Stimson recommended that the U.S should be pre­
pared to meet requirements for air and naval forces, and, 
initially to provide nearly all ground forces.^®
Stimson also submitted a detailed plan. The basis 
for the U.S. Army military security system consisted of 
major air centers in Central Luzon and Northern Mindanao 
with rings of outlying fighter fields. In addition, 
there would be staging and mounting bases, with ground 
garrison installations to protect air bases, harbor 
entrances, and other critical points. Eventually, it 
was contemplated that the Filipinos would take over a
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large proportion of the ground responsibilities as the 
military effectiveness of their forces increased. When 
this happened, in accordance with a process of constant 
screening of U.S. base sites, some bases would be re­
leased to the Philippines as they become surplus to 
the needs of the United States. Also, as they gained 
effectiveness, the Filipino forces would be accorded 
increasing participation in the use of certain United 
States bases. Stimson also recommended that in addition 
to sites that had already been specified, certain others 
would need to be designated and acquired in the future 
by the United States. These included sites necessitated 
by changes in the art of war, sites of historical signi­
ficance, sites developed for operations during World War 
II, and U.S. military cemeteries.
Finally, Stimson recommended t h a t i ^ l
1. The necessary agreements should be concluded on 
principles relating to freedom of movement, communication, 
and operation of U.S. military bases in the area.
2. Firm agreement should be reached on the basic 
principle of cooperation of United States and Filipino 
forces as well as integration of their military plans.
3. No nation other than the United States or the 
Philippines should be permitted to establish or make 
use of any bases in the Philippines without the prior 
agreement of both the United States and the Philippines.
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On May 14, 1945, therefore, following the sub­
mission of the preceding memoranda by the Secretaries of 
War and the Navy , a meeting was held in Washington,
D.C., attended by the following persons: President Harry 
S. Truman, Stimson, Forrestal, Senator Tydings, Fleet Ad­
miral William D. Leahy, Vice Admiral Richard S. Edwards, 
Acting Joseph C. Grew, all of the United States, and 
Philippine President Sergio Osmena. During this meeting 
Osmen’a was given a document entitled "Preliminary State­
ment of General Principles Pertaining to the United 
States Military and Naval Base System in the Philippines 
To Be Used as a Basis for Detailed Discussions and Staff 
Studies."52 After reading this document, already men­
tioned in an earlier part of this chapter. President Os­
mena said that he was in accord with the proposals.
Both Truman and Osmena then signed the document which 
is included in this study as Appendix "A." The document 
listed 24 areas in the Philippines where the United States 
proposed to establish bases.
After the signing of this agreement. Secretary of 
State James F . Byrnes asked U.S. Secretary of the Navy 
James Forrestal whether the Navy Department was ready to 
enter into preliminary or final negotiations on the ques­
tion of Philippine bases. Byrnes also sent a similar 
letter to the War Department on September 4, 1945. In 
his letter to the War Department, Byrnes also mentioned 
that Judge Francisco Delgado, a special representative 
of President OsmeFia in the United States, had been di­
rected to inquire whether the United States Government 
was in a position to undertake negotiations looking to
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the drawing up of a definitive agreement on the subject 
of American military and naval bases to be retained by 
the United States in the Philippines after its indepen­
dence. Judge Delgado, according to Byrnes, had informed 
the State Department that the agreement might include 
such matters as the exact bases desired, the extent of 
the areas affected, and the nature of the installations 
required. Furthermore, Byrnes informed the War and Navy 
Departments of the legal basis for the negotiations; 
first, that the President of the United States had autho­
rity to proceed with negotiations for the retention of 
American bases in the Philippines after independence; 
second, the Philippine Congress had also authorized the 
President of the Philippines to proceed with negotiations 
with the United States for the retention of American 
bases in the Philippines.53
The Departments of War and the Navy replied on 
October 10, 1945, that they were not yet ready to enter 
into negotiations into the question of military bases. 
Both departments said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
would not be in a position to recommend definitive 
requirements for specific base sites and other military 
rights which had to be finally negotiated with the 
Philippine government until the completion of on-the- 
site surveys then in progress and a detailed study of 
the survey results. Both departments informed the Secre­
tary of State that orders had already been sent in order 
to expedite the completion of the surveys and studies 
as well as the submission of an integrated report. In 
the meantime, the two departments were of the opinion
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that the agreement of May 14, 1945 between Truman and 
Osmena adequately safeguarded U.S. military interests 
during the interim p e r i o d .
In the meantime, following the landing of American 
forces in the Philippines, Secretary Forrestal stated 
on May 16, 1945, that the United States would continue 
to bear responsibility for the security of the Philippines. 
To be able to perform that task, Forrestal pointed out 
that the United States would need bases and strategic 
areas supporting the bases. He also mentioned that ne­
gotiations were then underway to accomplish that purpose. 
Earlier, on May 7, 1945, the New York Times reported that 
Forrestal was negotiating for strategic bases in the 
Philippines.
President OsmeWa also announced in the wake of 
American operations to re-occupy the Philippines, that 
the United States would be granted military bases in the 
Philippines with the full support of the Filipino people 
when the Philippines became independent. In the same 
report of the New York Times of May 25, 1945, Osmena 
stated that while he was ready to go to the people, he 
did not think that would be necessary. He emphatically 
pointed out that the Filipino people recognized the ne­
cessity of American protection and welcomed them to the 
country. He also mentioned that details for the military 
bases were being worked out between the United States 
and the Philippines and that, for the protection of the 
bases, Filipinos would supply the ground troops.
The day after Osmena's statement. Senator Millard 
Tydings, who had accompanied Osmeft'a back to the Phil-
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ippines, stated in a press conference that the question 
of maintaining U.S naval and air bases in the Philippines 
after the war presented no practical difficulties. He 
pointed out, however, that there seemed to be an anomaly 
of one nation's maintaining military installations on 
the territory of another while not exercising jurisdic­
tion over that host country's foreign affairs. Because 
the Philippines would be unable for some time to main­
tain a large navy or air force, its security contribution 
would be expected to be ground troops. Tydings also ob­
served that the Filipinos realize what a good friend the 
United States was to them during war and would therefore 
be prepared to give the U.S. what she needed since world
security was no longer national and that no nation alone
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could keep aggression in check.
Not everyone, however, was happy about the situation.
On July 4, 1945, U.S. Admiral Kincaid stated that the 
American naval station in Manila Bay had become outdated 
and was not likely to represent any large part of America's 
post-war military establishment. Furthermore, he observed 
that while some bases would be retained in the Philippines, 
Manila itself was considered not suited to modern opera­
tions because it was not logical to put a large naval base 
in the center of a capital city.^^
Besides the State, Navy, and War Departments, the 
U S Congress was also interested in the question of naval 
and military bases. Contrary to what Congress felt to be 
a popular conception that the subject of Pacific bases 
was exclusively a matter of foreign policy and military 
necessity and hence a question to be determined only by
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the executive branch of the government, the U.S. Congress 
believed that national security is the primary concern of 
Congress. The popular conception, to Congress, overlooks 
the constitutional authority and responsibility of Congress 
to the people, including those in uniform, to legislate 
for the defense of the United States, and to guarantee 
the best possible use of the money which is levied in the 
form of taxes. In the pursuit of this duty, the Subcom­
mittee on Pacific Bases of the House Committee on Naval 
Affairs of the 79th Congress, by virtue of House Resolution 
154, a resolution for an investigation to determine whe­
ther the war effort is being carried forward efficiently, 
expeditiously, and economically,conducted an inspection 
tour of Pacific bases from July 14 to August 2, 1945. 
Following this tour, they submitted a report entitled 
"A Study of Pacific Bases" to the Chairman of the House 
Committee on Naval Affairs on August 6, 1945. The mem­
bers of the subcommittee recommended, among other things,
(1) that the United States should be given specific and 
substantial rights to the sites where American bases have 
been constructed on island territories of Allied nations;
(2) that the United States must not permit its Pacific 
bases to lapse back into a state of unpreparedness; (3) 
that United States strategy of defense in the Pacific 
should revolve around a center line running north of 
the Equator through the Hawaiian Islands, Micronesia, 
and the Philippines; (4) that the Philippines was
one of the bases that appear to possess the greatest 
advantages as a main fleet base, as well as a secondary
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base; (5) that the Philippines should be considered as one 
place where air bases should be established. The subcom­
mittee report pointed out the primary and secondary missions 
of the United States in the Pacific relative to the bases 
there. The primary mission was to occupy, maintain, and 
defend such bases in the Pacific area as were required to 
insure the superiority of the United States on the sea, on 
the land, and in the air in order to protect the continental 
United States and its possessions against any probable ene­
my. The secondary mission was to occupy the minimum number 
of bases in the Pacific area,needed to carry out the
measures required to prevent aggression in the Pacific 
and to assist in maintaining world peace.
The subcommittee justified its recommendation for the
retention of Pacific bases on the following grounds; (1) the 
loss of American lives in taking the bases; (2) the expen­
diture of vast sums of American money in establishing and 
equipping the bases; (3) the great dependence of the world 
upon the United States for maintaining peace in the Pacific 
and the world; and (4) the apparent preference of the na­
tives of these islands for the United States Government.
The subcommittee also cited the strategic importance 
of the Philippines in their report
Located squarely between the Orient and 
the western limits of the Occident, the Phil­
ippines have been called the watch dog of the 
Orient. Unless they control the Philippines 
the Japanese cannot reach the rich southland 
and attain the tin and rubber of Malaya, the 
quinine and oil of the Netherlands East Indies, 
or the tungsten of Burma. Through the Phil­
ippines, the United States forces can reach 
China and Japan.
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Following their inspection of possible sites in the 
Philippines for post-war military and naval facilities, 
the subcommittee recommended the following to be most 
suitable: Cavite Harbor, Subic Bay, Coron Bay, Puerto 
Princesa, Tawi-Tawi, Iloilo, Mactan Island, and Samar- 
Leyte.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Uniteri otates 
had a very great interest at this point of time in the 
establishment of military bases in the Philippines. There 
was also to some extent some receptivity on the part of 
the Philippines toward the establishment of such bases 
on its territory.
The passage by the Philippine Congress of Joint Reso­
lution No. 4, authorizing the President of the Philippines 
to enter into negotiations with the U.S. Government for 
military bases, and Joint Resolution 93 of the U.S. Congress, 
likewise authorizing the President of the United States to 
do the same thing, set the stage for negotiations leading 
to the establishment of military bases by the U.S. in the 
Philippines.
Preliminary Negotiations for the Bases
On October 2, 1945, while in the United States, Presi­
dent Osmena made the observation that American commitments 
to protect Philippine independence as promised by the U.S. 
and to establish air and naval bases for mutual security 
involved not only the bases themselves but effective com­
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munications and a "peaceful and prospering hinterland." 
Sergio Osmena, however, failed in his bid for election as 
President of the new Republic of the Philippines. He 
was defeated by Manual Roxas who had stayed behind in 
the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation and had 
served in the puppet government set up by the Japanese. 
Roxas, like Osmena, however, also favored the establish­
ment of U S. military bases in the Philippines.
On May 2, 1946, Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
sent a telegram to Roxas, congratulating the latter on 
his election and inviting him to visit Washington. At 
this point of time, there seemed to be no great difficul­
ties standing in the way of concluding a military bases
agreement between the United States and the Philippines,
In the meantime, in anticipation of the proclama­
tion of the independence of the Philippines on July 4, 
1946, Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed President 
Truman on May 8, 1946 that the U.S. State Department 
was preparing drafts of instruments to be entered into
by the United States and the Philippines. These draft
treaties were: a treaty of friendship, commerce, and na­
vigation, an executive agreement relating to trade, a 
treaty of general relations, a consular convention, an 
extradition treaty, an income tax treaty or convention, 
an estate tax treaty or convention, and a military bases 
agreement. In the same communication Acheson informed 
Truman that he intended to hand these drafts to Paul V. 
McNutt, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, upon 
his arrival in Washington for transmission to Philippine 
President-elect Manuel Roxas. Acheson also suggested to
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Truman that it would be desirable to conclude on July 4,
1946, the military bases agreement since it would not 
require ratification by the United States Senate as 
congressional authorization had already been given to 
the President in Joint Resolution No. 93, approved on 
July 29, 1944. Finally, Acheson mentioned that the ques­
tion of concluding a military assistance agreement with 
the Philippines was still being studied by the State De­
partment.
On May 10, 1946, Roxas arrived in Washington and 
called at the Department of State accompanied by Paul 
V. McNutt, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines.
Roxas met with Secretary of State Acheson and Mr. John 
Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs. During their conversation, Roxas mentioned 
that he would be glad to look the draft treaties over 
and to take them with him upon his return to Manila.
He expressed confidence that the draft treaties would 
be acceptable to the Philippine Government, and if there 
were any revisions, the State Department would receive 
them within a week after his return to Manila.
Before formal negotiations could take place, how­
ever, some internal problems relating to the draft treaty 
on military bases had to be ironed out between the State
Department on the one hand the the War and Navy Depart­
ments on the other. Three basic issues had to be adjust­
ed by these three departments; (1) the resolution of the ques­
tion of the joint use of the bases by the Philippines
and the United States; (2) the reduction in the number 
and size of the bases; and (3) the question of jurisdic-
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tion over American military and civilian personnel out­
side the bases.
On the question of the joint use of the bases, it 
was agreed that the draft treaty should contain a pro­
vision which would permit the armed forces of the Phil­
ippines to serve on United States bases, and vice versa, 
whenever the armed forces o:Ç both countries agree that 
such would be beneficial. However, there remained the 
problem of whether the bases should be made available 
to the UN Security Council with the consent of the Phil­
ippines alone or with the consent of the Philippines 
and the United States. The War Department preferred 
the second alternative, but it was anticipated that the 
first alternative would be acceptable.
The question of a possible reduction in the num­
ber of bases retained by the United States which numbered 
71 at that time and in their size —  one base covered 
150,000 acres —  was referred to General McArthur for 
his opinion.
The question of jurisdiction was difficult to re­
solve. It was generally agreed that the United States 
should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses 
committed by American military or civilian personnel 
within the bases. The War and Navy Departments also 
wanted U.S. jurisdiction over offenses committed by 
such personnel outside the bases on the grounds that 
it was justified by international practice and that it 
was essential to their military program and position in 
the islands. President Roxas had indicated that he was 
opposed to U.S. jurisdiction over offenses committed out­
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side the bases in time of peace. The State Department 
was of the opinion that the U.S, Government should not 
force the Philippines to grant the U.S. such extensive 
jurisdiction in time of peace. It recommended that 
the U.S. exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offen­
ses committed by American military or civilian personnel 
in the Islands in time of war or national emergency and 
according at other times exclusive jurisdiction over all 
offenses committed by such personnel within the bases.
The State Department urged approval of this recommenda­
tion because the draft program would involve some 50,000 
American personnel and would run for 99 years and that 
Philippine courts have functioned to the satisfaction 
of American authorities, military as well as civilian.
To approve the proposal of the Navy and War Departments, 
observed the State Department, would result in the follow­
ing: (1) a feeling by the Filipino people and other 
friendly Far Eastern peoples that extraterritoriality 
was being revived by the United States; (2) it would 
create popular opposition to the bases agreement in the 
Philippines,making approval of the agreement difficult 
in the Philippine Congress; and (3) the United States 
would stand to lose some of its good will among Far 
Eastern peoples without attaining any corresponding ad­
vantages to the United States.
The State Department eventually proved correct in 
its assessment of the situation as the question of U.S. 
jurisdiction proved to be a thorny issue not only in the 
negotiations but in the relationships between the two 
countries for a long time after the treaty was in force.
130
Subsequently, the War and Navy Departments sub­
mitted a redraft of Article XIV on jurisdiction which 
provided for concurrent jurisdiction which might result 
in cases of double jeopardy and which should be avoided 
whenever practicable. The redraft also contemplated 
the creation of United States civil courts in the places 
in which the offenses would be tried, in effect giving 
the United States primary jurisdiction over all offenses 
committed by members of U S. armed forces and civilian 
personnel outside the bases. The State Department 
thought that the paragraph as redrafted by the Army and 
Navy Departments was a poor rewording of Article IV of 
the British Bases Agreement, which to the State Depart­
ment had proved unsatisfactory in practice and was in 
fact going to be revised.
On June 14, 1946, a draft military base agreement 
was transmitted to the U.S. High Commissioner at Manila 
with a letter requesting him to discuss the draft with 
Roxas and to report to the State Department the result 
of the negotiations.
The first draft which was submitted by the repre­
sentatives of the U.S. Government to Philippine represen­
tatives in informal negotiations provided .in Article XIV 
for the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by the U.S. 
Government over all offenses committed by American mili­
tary and civilian personnel, both within and without the 
bases.
The Philippine Government, in turn, submitted a re­
draft of the draft agreement of May 14, 1946, a provision
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which followed exactly Article IV of the British Base 
Agreement with the United States. The Army and Navy 
Departments objected to the Philippine redraft because 
it did not grant jurisdiction that was considered to 
be wide enough for the United States Government. The 
State Department also objected because (1) the British 
Base Agreement had not worked well in practice and was 
going to be revised; (2) contained language found to be 
ambiguous; (3) contemplated the creation of civil courts 
by the U.S. which has not been done and will not be done; 
and (4) provided concurrent jurisdiction which should be 
avoided whenever possible.
The Legal Adviser's Office of the Department of State 
in order to expedite the progress of the informal dis­
cussions, prepared a draft provision which stated that 
in time of war or national emergency the U.S. Government 
should have exclusive jurisdiction over American military 
and civilian personnel, both within and without the bases; 
at all other times, the U.S. Government should have juris­
diction only over offenses committed within the bases, and 
such jurisdiction should be exclusive. Prepared as a 
working paper and a basis for discussion, it was acceptable 
in principle to the Philippine Government and to the State 
Department. It was, however, rejected by the representa­
tives of the War and Navy Departments. In spite of the 
objections of both departments, the final redraft was 
nevertheless included in the first draft agreement to 
be presented to the Philippine Government as the basis 
for formal negotiations which were due to start very soon.
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The Formal Negotiations for the Military Bases
Agreement. —  The record does not show exactly when the for­
mal negotiations for the military bases agreement started. 
Although the Americans were anxious to conclude the mili­
tary base agreement on July 4, 1946, this was not possi­
ble. During this period when communications were ex­
changed between the U.S. Department of State and the of­
fice of the President of the Philippines, no mention was 
made about an agreement setting up a military alliance 
between the two countries. At that time, it was believed 
that the military bases agreement and the military assis­
tance agreement would suffice for providing security to 
the new nation. Steps were also being undertaken in order 
to rehabilitate the shattered economy and trade of the 
country.
The United States was not being completely generous 
to her ward by making preparations for concluding a mili­
tary bases agreement in order to fulfill previous commit­
ments to provide security for the Philippines. The estab­
lishment of military bases in the Philippines was part 
of an overall military strategy on the part of the United 
States. Carl Kaysen indicates that American military 
strategy in the past has been shaped by three chief goals 
all interrelated: (1) The first was to deter and defend 
against a direct attack on the United States. (2) The se­
cond was to deter and defend against both a direct attack 
on Western Europe and the use of the threat of military 
force, including the threat of attack on the United States, 
as a weapon in the indirect conquest by political means
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of some or all of Western Europe. (3) The third, was 
to oppose expansion of communist power in any part of 
the world, especially when it took the form of a take­
over by communists, with overt or covert assistance from
the Soviet Union, of the government of a previously non-
•  ^  ^  ^ 62 communist state.
In order to carry out the third goal, that is, to 
deter the Soviet Union from its aggressive designs, the 
United States adopted a policy of containment which had 
the following features: (1) To confront the Soviet Union 
by establishing a powerful military force that included 
an air force second to none, a powerful navy, and large 
numbers of ground troops, together with increased appro­
priations for research in nuclear and other sophisticated 
weaponry. (2) To surround Soviet territory with a string 
of military bases and embark on a policy of military 
alliances. (3) To strengthen the defense capabilities of 
its allies by military assistance grants. (4) To adopt 
a policy of economic assistance in order to buy time for
its allies, especially those that had been ravaged by 
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war.
In Asia, U.S. policy had always been towards the 
maintenance of a balance of power. As stated by Hans 
Morgenthau,
. . . underlying the confusions, reversals of 
policy and moralistic generalities of our Asia­
tic policy since McKinley, one can detect a 
consistency that reflects, however vaguely, 
the permanent interest of the United States 
in Asia. And this interest is ag.ain the main­
tenance of the balance of power.
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The foregoing considerations are also found, more 
or less, in perhaps one of the clearly expressed state­
ments about the major national objectives of the United 
States as stated in the "Joint Board Estimate of United 
States Over-all Production Requirements" of September 11,
1941 as follows
. . . preservation of the territorial, economic 
and ideological integrity of the United States 
and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; 
prevention of the disruption of the British Em­
pire; prevention of the further extension of 
Japanese territorial domination; eventual es­
tablishment in Europe and Asia of balances of 
power which will most nearly ensure political 
stablity in those regions and the future secu­
rity of the United States; and, so far as prac­
ticable, the establishment of regimes favorable 
to economic freedom and individual liberty.
The search for some kind of equilibrium in Asia 
after World War dominated American strategic thinking 
in their plans for the Philippines. First, of all, it 
was believed that the American strategists fully expected 
the United States to retain their position of supremacy 
in the Pacific. Therefore, it was assumed that American 
power, having been vastly extended to the western limits of 
the ocean, could or should be retrenched after the 
war. On this basis, it was decided that the islands that 
the American forces had occupied and thereafter estab­
lished strategic bases, could or should be retrenched 
after the war.
Although the United States had promised political 
independence to the Philippines before World War II and 
this determination had not changed in the course of World War
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II, MacArthur's declaration, "I shall return," indicated
that the United States planned to reestablish America's
position in the islands before they gained independence.
Once the Philippines gained its independence,
. . .  it was expected that the Philippines 
would remain closely tied to the United 
States, especially in terms of its security 
and military needs. What was visualized, 
then, was first to drive the Japanese out 
and then to proceed toward Philippine in­
dependence, to be coupled with some arrange­
ment for retention of American streaigth so 
as to prevent instability and resurgence of 
Japanese imperial ambitions.
On the world scene, the political and military con­
ditions constituted by the crudely aggressive designs 
and policies of the Soviet Union, the political instabi­
lity, economic weakness, and military vulnerability of 
European and Asiatic countries which demanded the policy 
of containment of Communism, helped shaped U.S. policies 
of strategy which included the establishment of military 
bases. At least seven functions have been determined for 
the presence of U.S. military bases abroad and these 
are: (1) direct and explicit strategic nuclear deterrence;
(2) indirect and implicit deterrence; (3) alliance cohe­
sion; (4) local defense; (5) military display and demon­
stration; (5) intervention; and (7) control over the 
resources and dimensions of c o n f l i c t C o n s i d e r e d  as 
specialized instruments of national power supporting the 
general strategies of defense and deterrence, the military 
mission of American armed forces stationed in foreign 
countries in the event of conflict, as part of the total
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military arsenal are: to punish the enemy, to limit his 
capacity to damage the United States and its allies, and 
to deny him territorial gains. In the absence of con­
flict, the primary purpose of U.S. armed forces is to 
prevent warfare from occurring. One study made the fol­
lowing observations about U.S. overseas bases:
1. The presence of American forces in unstable 
areas serves as a deterrent to overt Commu­
nist military expansion and provides a 
basis for counteraction against other methods 
of Communist expansion. At the same time 
the forward presence of U S. forces can be 
made to serve U.S. policy by helping organize 
local resistance to communism by means of 
military assistance and advice and by active 
participation in technical, economic, and 
social assistance programs.
2. Forward presence of U.S. forces provides 
means for pre-positioning supplies and 
equipment for use in general and limited 
wars at the same time that they provide 
immediate military resources for preventing 
crises or containing crises once they have 
developed.
3. American bases and forces overseas may pro- 
vice security for supply lines and to cover 
movement and employment of reinforcements 
in the event of war while providing secure 
communications outlets to ensure adequate 
facilities for central direction of appro­
priate military response based on adequate 
intelligence.
4. The dispersal of retaliatory forces in bases 
overseas enhances U S. second strike capabi­
lity in the event of nuclear war, forcing a 
dissipation of the enemy's strategic strike.
At the same time forces disposed on the peri­
meter of the Communist block may resist Com­
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munist absorption of peripheral territories 
while providing a nucleus for build-up of 
counter-offensive forces moved from the United 
States.
The advantages which can accrue to U.S. policy 
through the presence of U S. forces overseas have been 
classified as of two kinds: (1) those which are direct­
ly related to the immediate and constant threat to the 
position of the United States and of the Free World;
(2) those which contribute directly or indirectly to
69the long-range goals of U.S. policy.
The direct military advantages include: (1) The 
presence of American forces may help focus resistance 
to communism in Areas where there is conflict. (2) U.S. 
forces can encourage self-help through the building up 
of indigenous military forces capable of taking the major 
share of responsibility for the defense of the country.
(3) U.S. forces can provide reliable intelligence about 
the nature of a crisis and the direction of its develop­
ment in an unstable area and communications secure in the 
hands of U.S. forces can keep the United States informed 
of the situation as well as serve as the channel for com­
municating orders for counteraction to fit the require­
ments of U.S. policy. (4) U.S. forces abroad can help 
control and maintain the efficient use of weapons, espe­
cially nuclear weapons positioned overseas. (5) U.S. 
forces abroad can promote tactical mobility capability
by accumulating stocks of transport equipment and main-
7 ntain them for employment in active operations.
The second group of advantages which contribute to
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the long-range goals of U.S. policy include: (1) The pre­
sence of overseas American forces may provide assistance 
to international security organizations, like the United 
Nations, for dealing with threats to the peace without 
direct U.S. intervention. By fostering the growth of 
such international security organizations, U.S. interest 
is protected. (2) There are also civic advantages to 
the U.S. presence abroad by integrating military effort 
with other political and economic measures to give a 
convincing and effective rebuttal to Communist arguments 
that they are the only ones that can help the oppressed 
and destitude. (3) American military power deployed over­
seas, by responding to calls for humanitarian assistance 
can create goodwill for the U.S. (4) U.S. forces abroad 
have the opportunity to set an example of the role of 
responsible self-government at the same time that they 
are teaching the use of weapons and tactics for the 
defense against the Communists. (5) American forces 
abroad can contribute to the general welfare of the 
people they are trying to defend. (6) U.S. forces over­
seas can furnish local technical assistance by furnish­
ing training to the local population in techniques and 
methods which will contribute to the progress of the 
area
The United States had clear stakes toward the re­
tention of its military bases in the Philippines. For 
the Philippines, the issues were perhaps as clear as 
they were for the United States.
The level of involvement of a country in various
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international issue areas is generally the expression 
of its orientation toward the rest of the world. K. J, 
Holsti defines this orientation as a "state's general 
attitudes and commitments toward the external environ­
ment, its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its 
domestic and external objectives and aspirations."
In dealing with its international environment, the state 
may decide on (1) a policy of isolation, or (2) non- 
alignment, and (3) coalition-making and alliance cons­
truction.
The decision that a state makes in terms of its 
foreign policy rest mainly on (1) its perceptions of 
its national interests, (2) domestic conditions or 
constraints, (3) perceptions of threats or violence in 
the international environment, and (4) the assessment 
of its elites as to what the foreign policy of the 
state should be.
In the formulation of state policies, the most com­
mon objectives of states have been survival, the search for 
security, a desire for influence, the preservation or 
promotion of economic welfare, the protection and advance­
ment of a particular ideology, and the quest for power.
The over-riding consideration is self-preservation:
Because territory is an inherent part of a 
state, self-preservation means defending its 
control over territory; and, because indepen­
dence is of the essence of the state, self- 
preservation also means fighting for indepen­
dent status. This explains why the basic ob­
jective of the foreign policy of all states 
is the preservation of territorial integrity 
and political independence.
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Small states no less than large states are concerned 
with the protection of their national security. Con­
sidering the desperate status of the Philippines fol­
lowing the destruction and devastation of war, it seemed 
inevitable that the maintenance of a close relationship 
with the United States was desired by the Philippines il it 
was to recover from the effects of war.
Recognizing the condition of weakness of the Phil­
ippines, Manuel Roxas declared in a speech on 
the direction of Philippine foreign policy:
Our entire foreign policy . . . firmly
based on our special relationship with the 
United States. . . .  We must remember, 
however great our pride in our independence that 
we are a small nation, presently poor and 
defenseless. In a world far from stabilized, 
no small nation today is without its special 
ties with a greater or stronger power. Do we 
prefer to establish special ties with China, 
with Russia, or with France? I do not think 
so. History has made our decision for us 
and for this we must be fervently thankful. We 
have the privilege, for which every other 
nation in the world would pay in billions, 
or have a special position in relation to 
the United States. That position is our 
greatest asset today. It is an asset which 
we cannot buy for any amount of money. It 
lends us prestige, strength, security,and 
economic support.73
Roxas was more specific why he desired a closer
relationship with the United States:
The United States is one of the world's 
greatest powers, perhaps the greatest.
The Philippines is a small, war-devasta­
ted nation. Our total'national income 
is less than that of the city of San
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Francisco. The United States treats us as 
with an equal and deals with us as with an 
equal. But we are not really equal. How 
could we be?
The time was very favorable for the conclusion of 
a military bases agreement between the United States 
and the Philippines. The legal basis for the authority 
of representatives of both government to engage in the 
negotiations had already been granted by the legislative 
bodies of both countries- The draft agreement had been 
prepared and was ready for discussion.
Plans had been made by the United States to con­
clude the agreement on July 4, 1946, the date on which 
the Philippines was going to be proclaimed independent 
by the United States. On July 3, 1946, therefore, U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a telegram to U.S- 
High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt wherein he instructed 
McNutt to propose to Philippine authorities that the 
base agreement be signed on July 4, 1946. He also in­
formed McNutt that the State Department was negotiating 
revision of the British Base Agreement. McNutt was 
therefore instructed to say to Philippine President 
Roxas that the United States hopes that he will be pre­
pared to accept in the draft agreement whatever provision 
regarding jurisdiction may be involved between the U.S. 
and Great Britain. Acheson told McNutt that the Depart­
ments of State, War and Navy attached importance to the 
signing of the base agreement on July 4, 1946. However, 
the hopes of the United States were not to be realized. 
Philippine independence was proclaimed as scheduled. A
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treaty of general relations and a trade treaty were signed. 
But the military bases agreement which the United States 
had hoped to conclude on that day was not signed.
On July 6, 1945, the New York Times reported that 
Navy Secretary Forrestal was in the Philippines inspecting 
U.S. naval bases and facilities. The report did not men­
tion anything about the base agreement negotiations.
On July 26, 1946, U.S. Ambassador Paul McNutt informed 
Acheson that he was following up the status of some pend­
ing treaties and conventions between the United States and 
the Philippines. McNutt informed Acheson that President 
Roxas was planning to appoint a congressional committee 
to take part in the negotiations on military bases. He 
also stated in the same communication that the Filipinos 
were making a study of the provisions of the agreement 
and should be able to participate in the negotiations in 
a short time.
Eventually it was announced that the members of the 
Philippine negotiating panel were appointed by President 
Roxas. The panel, which was headed by no less than Vice- 
President Elpidio Quirino, concurrently Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, included Secretary of National Defense Ruperto 
Kangleon, Secretary of Justice Roman Ozaeta, members of 
the General Staff of the Philippine Army, Liberal Senators 
Vicente Francisco, Proceso Sebastian, Salipada Pendatun, 
and Nacionalista Senator Tomas Cabili. McNutt headed the 
American panel which was made up mostly of military officers.
Roxas later had high praise for the members of the 
Philippine panel when he said:
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This Government has been fortunate in its 
negotiators. Vice President Quirino, in his 
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was 
in complete charge of the negotiations and con­
ducted them with a skill which did him great 
honor in this most difficult and technical 
arrangement. He was ably and brilliantly 
assisted by a committee appointed by me which 
consisted of the best minds which could be 
brought to bear upon this subject. They all 
participated wholeheartedly in the negotia­
tion and contributed in major measure to its
success.75
Sometime between July and August, negotiations bet­
ween the United States and the Philippines over the 
military bases agreement began. A report dated August 
11, 1946, from U.S. Ambassador McNutt to the Secretary 
of State stated that the question of jurisdiction cons­
tituted a principal obstacle toward the prompt completion 
of the base and military assistance agreements. in lieu 
of a formal treaty, McNutt suggested that jurisdiction 
over all persons should rest with the Philippine Govern­
ment.
Another report from McNutt dated September 5, 1946, 
informed the Secretary of State that President Roxas, re­
acting to press reports about a deadlock on the base 
negotiations, branded such reports as untrue and asked 
the press to refrain from publishing information which 
was vital to the Philippines, the dissemination of which 
might work to the disadvantage of the Philippines. Roxas' 
press statement also said that the negotiations were pro­
ceeding routinely but that "intimate details" should not 
be disclosed since they involved the mutual security of 
the Philippines and the U.S. Roxas also requested
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Philippine negotiators to refrain from commenting to the 
press on the progress or any detail of the negotiations.
The negotiations appeared to move smoothly with the 
report of McNutt to the Secretary of State on September 7, 
1946, that the negotiators had agreed on a substitution 
for article XIV on jurisdiction. In the same report,
McNutt stated that the unsettled questions involved some 
changes in the use of some Army bases and that Roxas was 
very anxious to present the treaty for ratification by 
the Senate before.'the end of its session on September 18. 
Roxas, therefore/ wantëd immediate approval of the changes 
reported to date.
Roxas, however, was not able to present the base 
agreement to the Philippine Senate for its ratification 
during its regular session because there was not enough 
time for adequate consideration by the Senate and also 
because of unfavorable conditions obtaining in the legis­
lative body. At that time. President Roxas was working 
for the approval of a constitutional amendment that would 
give Americans equal rights with the Philippine citizens 
in the exploitation of their natural resources. Roxas 
promised to deliver a major address to the nation after 
adjournment to review base negotiations in order to coun­
teract a hostile press and then to call a special session 
to consider the base agreement and other unfinished domes­
tic legislation.
A more optimistic report was made by Howard C. Peter­
sen, U.S. Assistant Secretary.of War on September 19, 1946, 
when he said that agreements between the United States and 
the Philippines concerning American naval and military bases
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in the Philippines would be concluded shortly. Petersen 
said that while in Manila he had conferred on the base 
question with President Roxas and Ambassador Paul V. NcNutt. 
Petersen praised the manner in which Roxas was was hand­
ling the problem. He also added that the Filipinos realize 
that the bases were a matter of mutual interest and that 
they were as keen as Americans to have the bases in their 
country
Local press reports in the Philippines again reported 
a breaking off of military base negotiations on September 
25, 1946, although no reason was given why. Roxas was to 
issue a press release stating that the suspension of the 
negotiations was due to the pressure of essential domes­
tic problems.
The decision of Roxas not to submit the base agree­
ment was disappointing to the Departments of War, Navy, 
and State. The State Department was particularly interest­
ed in the reasons of those who opposed the base agreement. 
McNutt informed the State Department that Roxas' struggle 
to have the parity amendment approved was the strongest 
test of his leadership. Roxas was, therefore, not en­
thusiastic about submitting the base agreement during the 
special session. On September 30, 1946, it appeared that 
the principal problems that, remained to be resolved in­
volved (1) the retention of the McKinley-Nichols Field 
Area, and (2) U.S. jurisdiction over temporary bases in 
urban areas. McNutt said that he felt that objection 
(1) had validity because the bases were located in the 
midst of large centers of population, but that would mean 
the abandonment of installations that were constructed
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at great cost by the United States.
These were not the only obstacles toward concluding 
the base agreement. A press release on October 16, 1945, 
clarified the Philippine objections to the draft base 
agreement. A report by the New York Times said that 
(1) the Filipinos insist that there should be no bases 
in Manila; (2) that they will discuss only first-line 
bases, deferring consideration of auxiliary bases and 
reservations; (3) that no extra-territorial rights will 
be granted outside military bases; and (4) that American 
contractors working on bases should be subject to Phil­
ippine tax laws.
The reaction by the U.S. Government to the objections 
of the Philippine panel startled the Filipinos; the 
United States would withdraw all U.S. armed forces from 
the Philippines. The United States felt that the prob­
lems presented in connection with the negotiations for 
a base agreement with the Philippine Government had re­
sulted in a reconsideration of the strategic and poli­
tical importance of the bases in the Philippines. The 
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Dwight Eisenhower, 
said that he recognized that the military importance of 
of the Philippines was of lesser weight in the national 
interest of the United States than the future good rela­
tions of the two nations and that the long term conti­
nuance of U.S. army forces in the Philippines would be 
of little value unless their retention was the result 
of an expressed desire of the Philippine Government 
The Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, also noted
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that the removal of U.S. forces from the Manila area 
to another place would require the construction of ex­
pensive facilities and that the War Department could 
ill afford that expense at that time or in the future. 
Patterson also said that U.S. commitments in other 
areas were of predominant importance.
Meanwhile there were press reports about the bad 
behavior of American troops. These reports about the 
"brash, ill-mannered, slovenly" behavior of American 
troops may have influenced the desire of the Filipinos 
to ask that the bases be moved out of centers of popu­
lation in order to avoid friction between the natives 
and the soldiers assigned to the bases.
The Filipino people were assured at one time by 
one member of the Filipino negotiators that the national 
interest was being protected by their representatives 
in the discussions and that the Americans were sympathe­
tic and understanding.
In a State of the Nation address during the joint 
session of the Philippine Congress on January 27, 1947, 
President Roxas again sought to reassure his people 
that despite press reports to the contrary, the United 
States was perfectly willing to withdraw all military 
forces from the Philippines unless the Filipinos desired 
to have them in their territory. Roxas told the Congress 
that
America recognized her basic commitment to 
underwrite the security of the Philippines, 
in accordance with our wishes. When I ad­
vised the American Government that the Phil­
ippine Congress by unanimous resolution (on
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28 July 1945) had agreed to the establishment 
of American bases here and that the Filipino 
people desired the retention of these bases, 
it was decided to carry out the original prog­
ram
Roxas pointed out to the Congress that the Philippines
must take advantage of every opportunity to guarantee her
own military security by saying that"
The establishment of these bases, not for ag­
gression but for defense, will guarantee our 
own safety and advance the cause of world 
peace and security, which is the aim of the 
United Nations.®^
Congress was also brought up to date on the status 
of the negotiations by Roxas:
The exact location of the bases and other 
military establishments to be maintained here 
by the United States has been engaging the at­
tention of the officials of both governments.
I am able to report to you, that the United 
States Government has shown every disposition 
to consider our wishes in this matter. It 
has in no instance been arbitrary, capricious 
or unreasonable in the location of the base 
site.Bl
Although the position of Roxas was that the American 
Government did not put pressure on the Philippines by 
offering to withdraw its troops from the Philippines 
and its rejection by the Philippines, one news story 
call the American offer as strengthening the American 
position.
As for the behavior of the American troops, Roxas 
said that
Our relations with the United States Army today 
are satisfactory. The Army and all its person-
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nel are assisting us in every possible way. With 
few isolated and probably inevitable exceptions, 
the American troops are conducting themselves in 
a manner that reflects credit and honor upon the 
United States Government. The same, of course, 
also holds true for the United States N a w  through 
the splendid cooperation of Admiral G o o d . 82
In the same speech, Roxas expected that the base agreement 
would be signed within a short time and that he would then 
report upon it to the Congress. Immediately following 
the conclusion of the base agreement, Roxas informed the 
Philippine Congress that he would seek an agreement with 
American authorities on a broad military assistance prog­
ram. The projected agreement would provide the follow­
ing
1. The United States will send a military mission 
to advise the Philippine Army and Navy in their 
organization and training.
2. The United States Army will provide Philippine 
forces with assistance and cooperation during 
the next five years.
3. The United States Navy will turn over to the 
Philippines 84 ships for off-shore patrol 
some of which will be avâilable for use as 
lighthouse tenders and customs and immigra­
tion patrol boats.
It was reported by the New York Times on February 4, 
1947, that the draft of the military bases agreement had 
been completed. Another story on March 3, 1947, stated 
that a highly-placed, well-informed Philippine official 
had announced that the signing of the military bases agree­
ment was "imminent". On March 14, 1947, the United States 
and the Philippines concluded the Military Bases Agreement
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of 1947 in the festive atmosphere of a farewell party for 
Ambassador Paul V. McNutt. McNutt signed for the United 
States and Roxas signed for the Philippines. The treaty 
entered into force on March 26, 1947.
At the signing of the agreement, Acting Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson emphasized the amicable relations bet­
ween the two states thus:
President Roxas has informed this govern­
ment that the Philippine Congress and the Fili­
pino people desire the maintenance of the United 
States bases in the Philippines The present 
agreement was accordingly concluded. In the ne­
gotiation, the parties have been constantly 
guided by the principle of respect for each 
other's sovereignty, by the mutuality of in­
terest, by regard for their equality of status 
as members of the United Nations and by the 
commitment of both nations to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations . . . The 
present agreement will contribute to interna­
tional security and peace in the Pacific and 
will supplement and support such future arrange­
ments for world peace as may be reached under 
the Security Council of the United N a t i o n s
In his own statement. President Roxas considered 
the signing of the agreement "a truly historic occasion."
It was his feeling that the agreement for 99 years would 
strengthen Philippine national defense and assure its 
security. He recalled the historical background of the 
agreement and was pleased that on some questions the 
Philippines was able to maintain its position. Roxas 
pointed out that the Philippines desired that no operating 
bases should be established in or near a major center of 
population and the United States acceded to this r e q u e s t . 85
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Roxas also stated that he was pleased with the per­
formance of the Philippine negotiators, especially that 
of Vice President Elpidio Quirino, who was also serving 
as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Many years later 
on Quirino furnished some insight on how the negotiations 
were conducted for the benefit of the Philippines in his 
Memoirs :
Roxas and I had a private understanding. In 
dealing with this ticklish question ^^jurisdiction/
I was to hold firm while he remained the picture 
of sweet amenability to Mr. McNutt. Often the U.S. 
Ambassador would run to Roxas to complain that I 
was gumming up the works, or I was getting inacces­
sible to what could appear as the smooth imperial 
approach. Roxas would telephone ever so often, 
after a grievance session with the ambassador to 
warn not to mind too much his gestures of seeming 
surrender. We were quite a team.
It was also reported by a Filipino newspaperman that when
U.S.. Ambassador McNutt delivered the desire of the U.S. 
Government to withdraw American forces in the Philippines 
unless Quirino yielded to the American position that 
bases be retained around the metropolitan Manila area,
Quirino did not give ground.
In a way this was the first major test of Filipino diplo­
macy in meeting foreign negotiators across the table and 
they were not found wanting. First, while the Americans 
wanted to get the agreement signed as quickly as possible, 
the Filipinos were able to delay the conclusion of the 
agreement until they had negotiated with the Americans 
over the issues that they wanted to present. Second, 
the Filipinos were at least able to modify American de-
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mands on a number of points: they succeeded in reducing 
the number of bases from 70 to 23; they succeeded in 
removing American bases from metropolitan areas; they 
were able to compromise on the question of jurisdiction 
and in later years were able to successfuly revise the 
original provisions similar to those of NATO jurisdiction 
provisions; while they were not able to tax American con­
tractors working on base construction projects, in later 
years they were able to work out more suitable provisions 
not only relating to taxation but also to customs regula­
tions.
Although the treaty itself did not formalize any 
alliance relationship, it was held that the establishment 
and maintenance of military bases in the Philippines by 
the United States were agreed upon to secure the military 
defense of the two countries. In his message to the 
Senate transmitting the agreement for its ratification, 
Roxas mentioned that the signing of the agreement was a 
logical development of a policy which had been historically 
followed and supported by the Filipino people. In the same 
message, Roxas said that the Americans felt themselves to 
be committed to protect Philippine independence, they were 
moved by historic associations and Philippine loyalty to 
the war cause, they desired the promotion of democracy 
and freedom in that part of the world, and they nurtured 
a desire to advance the cause of world peace, security 
and freedom which American champions today. In asking 
the Senate to ratify the treaty, Roxas said that he was 
asking them to assume the greatest responsibility they 
had ever been asked by anyone because it involved the most
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vital factors facing the nation, those of preservation
and security. The Senate complied swiftly and on March 26, 
1947, nine days after the submission of the treaty, rati­
fied it with an 18-0 vote, three senators being listed as 
absent. Although the vote resulted in ratification, there 
were some rumblings in the Senate. Among the objections 
were voiced were the following: the ninety-year arrange­
ment was too long; the base agreement was not submitted to 
the Senate prior to approval; the bases were an encroach­
ment to Philippine sovereignty; an invitation to atomic 
attack; too numerous; and a usurpation of Philippine juris­
dictional rights.
In assessing the effect of the military bases agree­
ment, the following analysis was made in 1959:
The bases agreement left a mixed heritage 
for the future. United States maintenance of 
bases precluded extensive Philippine budgetary 
outlays for military defense and helped to con­
centrate Philippine efforts and finance on do­
mestic economic reconstruction and rehabilita­
tion. But the bases led to increased Philippine 
dependence on United States military power and 
sharpened the dilemma of Philippine foreign 
policy. Moreover, the matter of bases was not 
finalized. Questions of jurisdiction, of sov­
ereignty and of boundaries were to rise again 
and to plague American and Philippine negotia­
tors in a climate less friendly and with more 
publicity than during the era of good feeling 
in 1947. The uniqueness of past Philippine- 
American relations that shaped foreign policy 
in the Roxas Administration made for precedent 
in military, as well as economic, arrangements 
but precedence, which granted immediate strength 
to the Republic, was also to constitute a source 
of future strain.88
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For the Filipinos, the military bases agreement repre­
sented the Philippine link between national and international 
security. Despite the necessity of Philippine dependence 
on American military bases and assistance, the Filipinos, 
especially its President, Roxas, emphasized the equality 
of the partnersnip and the retention of Philippine initia­
tive in mutual negotiations. At least, for Roxas, the con­
clusion of the bases agreement met two fundamental ob­
jectives of Philippine-American defense arrangements: (1) to 
secure Philippine security and sovereignty; and (2) to aid 
in strenghtening collective security in the western Pacific 
area. This was revealed by Roxas in a speech he delivered 
on October 12, 1946:
It is my considered judgment that by retaining 
our military ties with the United States, we 
are serving first of all the interests of the 
Philippines. . . .  I have only one basic and 
guiding rule for our foreign policy as well as 
for our domestic policy - and that is the en­
during interests of the Filipino people. There 
is no other consideration which has any weight 
in my mind.^^
Military Assistance. —  The second link in the 
military relations between the United States and the 
Philippines was the military assistance agreement that 
was concluded between the two countries on March 12,1947, 
which provided that it became effectivë on «îuly 4,
1946» for a period of five years and renewable periodically 
upon Philippine request. Even prior to Philippine accep­
tance of the agreement, the U.S, Congress voted the sum 
of $19,750,00 for the fiscal year 1947 to carry out the
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obligations under the act.
Philippine reaction to U.S. military assistance was 
not very enthusiastic. When Roxas requested authority 
from the Philippine Congress on July 31, 1946, to enter 
into an agreement with the United States to implement 
provisions of the military assistance Act, the House 
approved the request by a vote of only seven votes above 
the necessary simple majority and by the required majority 
in the Senate.
It was reported that Philippine Senator Carlos P. 
Garcia (later becoming President of the Philippines after 
the death of Ramon Magsaysay) voiced the following opinion 
when he voted for military assistance:
What I am afraid of, frankly speaking, is 
the possibility of our army becoming a simple 
appendage to that of the United States since 
the authority that they will exercise as assis­
tants, advisers and technical men might turn
out to be a way of getting control over even
the internal organization and functions of the 
Philippine Army. . . .  So in voting for this 
bill, I wish to be assured as much as possible 
that no such consequences will result from our 
acceptance of this military assistance.90
According to the terms of the agreement, military 
equipment and some 83 ships for the Philippine offshore 
patrol were provided by the United States, although title
to the equipment was retained by the United States. The
agreement made an integrated plan for the training of 
Philippine armed forces with the advice of American mili­
tary forces, called the JUSMAG, or Joint U.S. Military 
Advisory Group.
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To Roxas, the military assistance agreement which 
enabled the transfer of military equipment and the utili­
zation of U.S. personnel to train Philippine troops, was 
a "boon beyond price." Roxas emphasized that under the 
terms of the agreement, the Philippines was to receive 
much and granted nothing in return. There were two as­
pects of the military assistance program that Roxas 
said justified it: (1) it provided aid against external 
aggression; and (2) it maintained the internal security 
of the Philippines.
The military assistance furnished by the United 
States to the Philippines since 1946 may be summarized 
as follows:
During the postwar period, from 1946 to 1948, the 
Philippines received some $72.6 million in military 
assistance in the form of grants.
Following the Marshall Plan period, from 1949 to 1952, 
as a result of the Korean War, U.S. military assistance 
increased to some $80.2 million distributed as follows: 
$19.6 million in Military Assistance Program grants,
$1.5 million worth of stocks from the U.S. Armed Forces, 
and $59.1 in other grants.
From 1953 to 1961, during the period of the Mutual 
Security Act, U.S. military assistance to the Philippines 
took an upturn, rising sharply to $218.2 million in the 
form of grants which also included $204 million under the 
MAP, and some $14.2 million in the transfer of excess 
stocks from the U.S. Armed forces.
During the next four years, U.S. military assistance
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further increased, to some $130 million, with a peak of 
$42.3 million in 1957, all in the form of grants.
After receiving some $25.8 million in grants under 
the U.S. military assistance program, the Philippines re­
ceived a record low figure of only $17.1 million in 1971.
Military assistance, however, increased to $19.3 mil­
lion in 1972 Such assistance almost doubled in 1973 with 
some $37.7 million in grants, which included a $15.7 
million grant under the MAP, $4.9 million in the transfer 
of excess stocks, and $17.1 million in other grants.
During the period of thirty years since 1946, mili­
tary assistance to the Philippines by the United States 
had the following objectives: (1) encourage and assist 
great Philippine efforts to develop capabilities for ex­
ternal and especially for internal defense; (2) help main­
tain the United States-Republic of the Philippines defense 
partnership in Southeast Asia; (3) accelerate Philippine 
economic development through training in the use and main­
tenance of equipment which has both military and civilian 
uses; (4) promote the regional alliance system through 
supporting a Philippine capability to deploy limited for­
ces within SEATO for mutual defense tasks; and (5) encourage 
effort toward greater self-sustaining cpabilities within
the Philippine Armed Forces which, hopefully, will even-
(
tually permit total elimination of the need for U.S. assis­
tance.^^
Total U.S. military assistance to the Philippines 
during the period from 1970-1972 was $60.2 million and 
it increased by about 100 per cent during the next three
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year period, 1973-1975, to $118.7 million, which are 
the years after the institution of martial law in the 
Philippines.
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CHAPTER V
THE TREATY OF MUTUAL DEFENSE
The signing of the treaties on military bases and 
military assistance did not seem to satisfy many Filipinos, 
especially those who belonged to the opposition party. 
Milton Meyer writes that during the Quirino Administra­
tion, Filipino leaders questioned both the extent of U.
S. military aid and the intent of its military protection. 
The Filipinos were afraid of the geographic expansion of 
international communism, especially in China. The Fili­
pinos also resented the American policy of giving priori­
ty to the military build-up of Japan in the U.S. effort 
to contain communism in Asia.
On March 3, 1949, Congressman Hermenegildo Atienza 
called for the negotiation of new treaties with the U.S. 
that would include U.S. guaranties toward protection of 
Philippine security. Atienza believed that the U.S. was 
unwilling to defend the Philippines in case of war.
On April 4, 1949, senatorial candidate Claro M. Recto 
attacked U.S. neglect of the Philippines because of its 
Europe first policy. Recto approved the Philippine policy 
of close ties with the United States in military matters, 
however, he suggested that the Filipinos should consider 
their geographic location so that they should also look to
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their Asian neighbors because of loosening American ties.
On February 10, 1950, minority Senator Camilo Osias 
expressed a desire to know how far the U.S. would go to­
ward the defense of the Philippines. Criticizing the 
military equipment turned over by the United States to 
the Philippines as "deteriorated, battle-worn, insufficient, 
and inadequate even to cope successfuly with internal or­
der," Osias was for revising the 99-year military bases 
agreement.
On March 3, 1950, Secretary of National Defense 
Ruperto Kangleon told a joint session of the House Committee 
of National Defense and Foreign Affairs that the United 
States had failed to furnish adequate military assistance 
by providing only $70 million out of an expected amount 
of $226 million.
The American response to Filipino criticism of U.S. 
military aid and assurances of providing security to the 
Philippines was the signing of an agreement on March 11,
1950 which extended the Military Assistance Agreement of 
1947 for three more years. On April 18, 1951, U.S. Presi­
dent Harry S. Truman declared that the United States would 
"act accordingly" in case the Philippines became the ob­
ject of an armed attack by another power. Truman made 
it clear that;
The whole world knows that the United States 
recognizes that an armed attack on the Phil­
ippines would be looked upon by the United 
States as dangerous to its own safety and 
that it would act accordingly.^
This did not reassure Senator Recto. In a commence­
ment address before the graduates of the University of the
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Philippines, Recto said:
If America really believes that war is in­
evitable, then let her give us in Asia a reso­
lute leadership we can trust. Let her give us 
the same unconditional pledges and guarantees 
and the same actual evidence of a spirit of 
equality and common fate that she has given to 
her kinsmen and allies in the Atlantic communi­
ty; and we shall have justification for the 
risk of war and incentive to make common cause.2
"Otherwise," Recto advised his countrymen, "we must 
restrain our enthusiasms, dissemble our sympathies, mo­
derate our words and actions, and in fulfillment of the 
prime duty of self-preservation, make no enemies where we
3
can make no friends, and hold our peace . . . . "
If America was really sincere in her promises to de­
fend the Philippines, Recto desired at least the establish­
ment of an alliance between the U,S. and the Philippines 
through a formal treaty of an alliance with a guarantee 
of an automatic declaration of war in case the Philippines 
was attacked by an outside power. The memory of World War 
IÎ was very strong in the mind of Recto as he asked for 
U.S. declarations to defend the Philippines; in the course 
of that war the United States had pursued a Europe first 
policy, thereby abandoning the Philippines to a cruel fate 
at the hands of the Japanese invaders.
At the time that these criticisms were being levelled 
against the United States, Quirino who succeeded Roxas 
as president of the Philippines, was conducting a search 
toward the establishment of some form of regional coopera­
tion in Southeast Asia. The reasons for this "quest for 
non-Communist Asian unity" are not difficult to find. The
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Filipinos had a genuine desire to create a third force 
in Asia that would counterbalance the dominant forces of 
Russia and the United States. They also desired to acquire 
leadership and prestige in Asian affairs. Also, the Fili­
pinos were sensitive to charges upon their independence 
that they were only puppets of the United States; by pur­
suing the concept of union among the Pacific peoples they 
wished to show their initiative in international affairs. 
Although there were variations in Quirino's proposals 
for a. Pacific union regarding its military or non-military 
nature, its geographical membership, and the participation 
or non-participation of the United States, his quest for 
non-Communist unity was his administration's most dis­
tinctive foreign policy. Quirino had to adjust to external 
opposition and domestic criticism his plans for Asian unity. 
The chronology of events regarding this venture of the 
Filipinos into the field of international affairs is as 
follows.
In January, 1949, during the New Delhi Conference on 
Indonesia, Carlos Romulo of the Philippines proposed the 
establishment of a small permanent secretariat in New Delhi 
or Manila in order to create continuing machinery for the 
implementation of proposals adopted during the conference. 
Romulo was then acting in accordance with instructions 
from Quirino who wanted this organization in order to give 
small Asian countries an opportunity for self-determina­
tion, to promote mutual interests of Asian countries with­
in the framework of the United Nations without creating 
dissension between the east or west or feelings of racial 
animosity.
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No such organization came out of the conference, but 
efore the conference closed, Romulo again presented the 
merits of his proposal on January 23, 1949, the final 
plenary session:
We have demonstrated here the new strength 
and unity of Asia. Out of this Conference a new 
political factor of great weight and significance 
has come into being. Nations comprising more 
than 50 per cent of the world's population, in­
habiting a geographic area extending half way 
around the globe and constituting a full one- 
third of the membership of the United Nations 
have got together on the basis of common in­
terests and in pursuit of common aims. That 
is a massive political fact from any standpoint, 
and it must count heavily in the future consi­
deration of any problem or the foundation of 
any policy affecting the peace, freedom and 
prosperity of mankind.^
The Philippine proposal in early 1949 conceived the 
organization to be anti-Communist, nonmilitary, and poli­
tical and its membership to include non-self-governing 
as well as independent peoples.
After the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, Quirino advocated on March 21, 1949, a 
Pacific treaty organization closely patterned after the 
NATO, under U.S. leadership, to fight communism in the 
Far East. Again this proposal met with opposition at 
home and derived no support from the United States al­
though Quirino himself visited the United States sometime 
in August, 1949 to drum up support for his Pacific Union 
idea.
The most tangible expression of Quirino's interest 
in a Pacific regional grouping was the holding of a
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conference in Baguio on May 26, 1950. Six of eight na­
tions invited attended the conference; Australia, Pakis­
tan, India, Ceylon, Thailand, and Indonesia. Burma and 
New Zealand were invited but did not attend. The Chinese 
Nationalist government was not invited according to Quiri-' 
no because it desired military aid against communism. Do­
mestic opposition expressed in the words of Recto who 
had warned against any commitments to the Chinese Nationa­
lists that "President Quirino is playing with fire and not 
he but the whole nation will be burned," must have influenced 
that decision. The work of the conference was summarized 
by Meyer as follows:
The conference steered clear of issues of 
military cooperation and anti-Communist gestures.
It appointed economic, social, and cultural sub­
committees. It adopted a single resolution in 
the final plenary session on May 30, 1950, which 
recommended that participating governments take 
common measures to promote commercial and finan­
cial interests apd unite.their efforts to facili­
tate cultural progress and social well-being.
The resolution recommended no political measure, 
and it established no continuing machinery.^
Another observer concluded that the "Baguio Conference 
of 1950 may be best described as a small, first step to­
ward regional cooperation." ^
Throughout this period when the Philippines was try­
ing to exercise leadership in the organization of a regional 
organization, the United States was sympathetic but .lade it 
clear that it was not ready to commit itself in the defense 
of all of Southeast Asia. But then came the negotiations 
for the Japanese peace treaty and the United States would 
take the lead in promoting, not a regional alliance yet
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the undertaking of specific commitments to defend the Phil­
ippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Because the Filipi­
nos desired stronger American commitments to defend the 
Philippines and the establishment of a regional alliance 
under the leadership of the United States, it should be 
thought that they would be easily receptive to the idea 
of a Japanese peace treaty under the initiative of the 
United States. They were not.
Filipino attitudes toward Japan after World War II were 
conditioned by two major considerations. First, the Fi­
lipinos had suffered terrible destruction and damage at 
the hands of the Japanese during World War II and could 
henceforth feel that Japanese aggression had left "its 
permanent scars in our soul as a nation." Second, be­
cause of its geographic location, the Filipinos feared a 
resurgence of Japanese militarism. It is therefore un­
derstandable chat Philippine foreign policy objectives 
included as early as November, 1949, the declaration of 
"early and material recognition of our just claims against 
Japan, and an unequivocal position against Japan's resur­
gence in the future as a dominant power capable once more 
of threatening the peace in this part of the world."
The Filipinos wanted nothing less than the payment of "just" 
reparations by Japan and adequate security guarantees to 
prevent any possible revival of Japanese militarism.
Because of its demand for reparations, the Filipinos 
were not readily amenable toward the conclusion of any 
peace treaty with Japan until its claims were honored by 
the United States. Believing that Japan could not or was 
not in a position to pay reparations to the Pacific nations.
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John Foster Dulles, who was given the mission of negotiating 
a peace treaty with Japan, ruled out the possibility of 
payment of reparations by Japan on economic grounds.
Dulles further pointed out the inability and disinclina­
tion of Japan to maintain military forces and that U.S. 
troops would remain in Japan under the proposed United 
States-Japanese treaty of mutual defense. Dulles' strongest 
argument was the offer of the United States to conclude 
a treaty of mutual defense with the Philippines, offering 
them a measure of guaranteed support in case of any armed 
attack "pending the development of a more comprehensive 
system of regional security in the Pacific area." The 
end result of this security arrangement contemplated by 
Dulles, as part of the peace treaty settlement, was the 
establishment of a "rudimentary security system comprising 
a series of bilateral and trilateral pacts linking Japan 
with the United States and the United States with Australia, 
New Zealand, and the Philippines, the principal military 
powers on the far side of the Pacific." It was very im­
portant to Dulles that Japan become a bulwark against the 
new tide of despotism which threatened Asia. Japan would 
be incorporated within the security system of the free na­
tions as well as simultaneously make it a peaceful member 
of the system.
The opposition of the Filipinos to the early drafts 
of the Japanese peace treaty stressed reparations and se­
curity. So intense was their opposition that a long 
series of talks were held in Manila between the United 
States and the Philippines on the issues of reparations 
and security. Finally agreement was reached on August 10,
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1951, on the following points: (1) a strong Japan was 
needed in the "basic defense" against communism, parti­
cularly in Southeast Asia and the Far East; (2) any aggres­
sion against the Philippines from any source would be re­
cognized as a threat against the United States; and (3) 
Filipino claims for reparations would be recognized.
This accord and other assurances by the United States 
to safeguard the security of the Philippines through a 
bilateral treaty of mutual defense enabled the United 
States to persuade the Philippines to sign the Japanese 
Treaty. The mood of the Philippines at San Francisco 
during the peace conference, however, was still one of 
bitterness and disappointment. Its representative. Se­
cretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo recalled 
that his country had "borne a disproportionately heavy
n
share of destruction and suffering at the hands of Japan."
Out of a population of eighteen million we lost 
more than a million lives. Beyond the loss of 
lives, our people endured moral trauma so deep 
that final healing is yet to come. After four 
years of brutal occupation and unremitting re­
sistance to the aggressor our national economy 
was totally razed to the ground. The estimate 
that the Philippines was the most devastated 
country in Asia in proportion to area and popu­
lation has never been challenged.®
Romulo then mentioned the three basic objectives of the 
postwar foreign policy of the Philippines towards Japan:
(1) to make certain that Japan, through genuine political 
and economic reform, will never again be a menace to the 
Philippines and other countries; (2) to obtain an early 
and equitable reparation of the damage caused by Japan 
to the Philippines and other countries; and (3) to welcome
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at a suitable time and under proper conditions, a democra­
tic and non-militarist Japan as a friendly neighbor and to 
secure its cooperation in maintaining the peace and fos­
tering the progress of the Pacific area and of the world 
as a whole. On the basis of this policy, Romulo felt 
that the peace treaty with Japan had some defects. First 
of all, Romulo pointed out that "it is straining human 
credulity to believe that Japan, within a brief period 
of six years, has been completely and permanently trans­
formed from the aggressive, feudal, militarist police 
state which it has been for centuries into a practicing 
and thorough-going democracy." Romulo, however, pointed 
out that since the treaty contemplated the entry of Japan 
into collective security arrangements to which the Phil­
ippines would be party, the Philippines was able to accept 
the security provisions of the treaty. Secondly, Romulo 
pointed out that the Philippine Government was not satis­
fied with the provisions on reparations in the treaty:
The Philippine Government cannot accept the 
theory that the payment of a due amount of repa­
rations from Japan is an act of vindictiveness.
The principle of indeminification for damage wil­
fully caused can no more be renounced in the rela­
tions between States than it can be relinquished 
in the relations between individuals.9
Romulo felt that Japan had the capacity to pay reparations 
because of its rapid industrial recovery and therefore 
believed that the Philippines was at least entitled to 
the right to have a free hand in negotiating with Japan 
for the payment of reparations. Despite his objections 
to the treaty, Romulo trusted that the treatywould help 
stabilize the situation in Asia.
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The signing of the treaty of mutual defense between 
the United States and the Philippines was directly related 
to the signing of the Japanese peace treaty. Actually, 
the instructions of Dulles had empowered him to negotiate 
a broad regional security pact. During his travels in 
Southeast Asia, Dulles found, however, that while Australia 
and New Zealand were willing to ally themselves with the 
United States, they refused to enter into a pact that 
would include Japan. Australia was also not willing to 
join any pact that would include the Philippines because 
of the internal disturbances then occurring in the latter 
country. The negotiations of John Foster Dulles with 
these countries finally resulted in the following ar­
rangement: (1) a bilateral United States-Japan security 
agreement providing for the continued presence of American 
forces in Japan at the invitation of the Japanese Govern­
ment; (2) a bilateral United States-Philippine security 
agreement incorporating previous agreements and placing 
obligations on a mutual basis; and (3) a tripartite agree­
ment involving the United States, Australia, and New Zea­
land (the ANZUS Pact) assuring the latter two countries 
of American support in the event of external aggression.
This was a considerable turn-about on the part of the 
United States which felt that in 1949 when Quirino proposed 
a Pacific Union that the time was not ripe for an Asian 
alliance despite "serious dangers." And although he had 
very strong reservations about signing a peace treaty 
with Japan, Quirino had to accede to the strong pressure 
exerted upon him by the U.S. Government and John Foster Dulles 
to sign a treaty of mutual defense with the United States-
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At the signing of the treaty, President Truman pointed
to the historic relationship between the United States and 
the Philippines by saying that the treaty was a "natural 
development springing from the long association of our 
countries and our common sacrifices for freedom. ' 10
President Quirino also recognized the historic reasons 
for the signing of the treaty and recalled that it was at 
Washington, D.C. (where the treaty was signed) that he 
had proposed the conclusion of a Pacific security pact 
under the initiative of the United States. H
Secretary,of State Acheson called the treaty the 
"natural outgrowth of the relationship of over half a cen­
tury between the Philippines and the United States." He 
recalled the other commitments between the United States 
and the Philippines which led to the mutual defense treaty
such as the Trade Agreement of 1945, the Philippine Reha­
bilitation Act of 1946, the Military Bases Agreement of 
1947, and the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947.
Acheson emphasized that the treaty served to tell the 
rest of the world that the Philippines and the United 
States stood together in the Pacific.
Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Romulo sum­
marized the historic event as follows:
By the terms of this treaty, the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines have assumed
the solemn obligation to assist each other in 
case of armed attack against either or both of 
them from any source whatever. This obligation 
covers any act of aggression, whether proceeding 
from a new source or arising from a repetition 
of aggression. The moral imperatives underlying
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this treaty go much deeper than any formal 
pledge. They are rooted in our shared ex­
perience and ideals and they are nourished 
by our common hope of the future. Beyond 
the letter of these commitments, therefore, 
the warmest sentiments of mutual regard 
and united purpose stand behind the signa­
tures that have been affixed to this Treaty 
of Mutual Defense.
The United States Senate ratified the Treaty and the 
Philippine Senate did the same thing. However, there 
were some criticisms of the treaty in the Philippine 
Senate. Senator Recto said that the termination provi­
sion benefited the United States and that there were no 
iron-clad guarantees in the treaty. Senator Jose Locsin 
called the treaty a product of the "incompetence of the 
administration." Other senators praised the treaty; one 
senator expressing the hope that the treaty would serve 
as the foundation for the formation of a Pacific system 
of defense.
During the exchange of ratifications on August 27, 
1952, Quirino characterized the treaty of mutual defense 
as the fulfillment of Philippine domestic and foreign 
policy objectives —  to secure political stability, econo­
mic security, and external security. He also foresaw a 
more comprehensive Pacific pact in the future. Quirino 
did not see the materialization of a Pacific pact in the 
course of his administration, but Milton Meyer called 
the treaty of mutual defense significant, being the first 
long-range military program initiated by the Philippine 
Government in the postwar world. In the space of a few 
short years, the Philippines would sign a collective secu 
treaty with the United States and other countries. Again, 
initiative would lie with the United States.
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CHAPTER VI
THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY
Three perceptions dominated U.S. strategic policy­
making during the period from 1950 to 1954. First, the 
U.S. recognized clearly the growing importance of Asia 
to world politics. Second, the U.S. viewed the world­
wide communist threat in monolithic terms. Third, the 
U.S. felt that the attempt by Ho Chi Minh's communist 
forces to evict the French from Indochina was part of a 
worldwide aggressive intent of communism to dominate the 
international environment. These perceptions led,
among other things, to the establishment of the Southeast 
Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
A report of the National Security Council called NSC 
48/1, dated December 23, 1949, identified Russia as the
principal source of the communist threat in Asia. It also
2
described the importance of Asia to the U.S. as follows:
In the first place, denial of USSR control over 
Asia might prevent the acquisition by the So­
viets of elements of power which might in time 
add significantly to the Russian war-making po­
tential. Secondly, to the degree that Asian in­
digenous forces develop opposition to the expan­
sion of USSR influence, they would assist the 
U.S. in containing Soviet control and influence
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in the area, possibly reducing the drain on the 
United States economy. The indigenous forces 
of Asia, including manpower reserves, would also 
be a valuable asset, if available for the support 
of the United States in the event of war. Third­
ly, Asia is a sources of numerous raw materials 
princially tin and natural rubber, which are of 
strategic importance to the United States . . . .
NSC 48/1 concluded that U.S. basic security objectives with 
respect to Asia were the following: ^
a. Development of the nations and peoples 
of Asia on a stable and self-sustaining basis 
in conformity with the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations Charter.
b. Gradual reduction and eventual elimina­
tion of the preponderant power and influence
of the USSR in Asia to such an degree that the 
Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening 
from that area the security of the United States 
or its friends and that the Soviet Union would 
encounter serious obstacles should it attempt 
to threaten the peace, national independence, 
and stability of the Asiatic nations.
c. Prevention of power relationships in 
Asia which would enable any other nation or 
alliance to threaten the security of the United 
States from that area, or the peace, national 
independence and stability of the Asiatic na­
tions .
In pursuit of the foregoing objectives, the National 
Security Council recommended, among other things, that the 
United States should pursue a policy toward Asia containing 
the following components:^
a. The United States should make known its 
sympathy with the efforts of Asian leaders to 
form regional associations with non-Communist 
states of the various Asian areas, and if in 
due course associations eventuate, the United
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States should be prepared, if invited, to assist 
such associations to fulfill their purposes un­
der conditions which would be to our interest.
The NSC also suggested that certain principles should 
guide the United States with regard to the formation of 
Asian regional organizations as follows: ^
(1) Any association formed must be the re­
result of a genuine desire on the part of the 
participating nations to cooperate for mutual 
benefit in solving the political economic, so­
cial and cultural problems of the area.
(2) The United States must not take such an 
active part in the early stages of the formation 
of such an association that it will be subject to 
the charge of using the Asiatic nations to further 
United States ambitions.
(3) The association, if it is to be a cons­
tructive force, must operate on the basis of mu­
tual aid and self-help in all fields so that a 
true partnership may exist based on equal rights 
and equal obligations.
(4) United States participation in any stage 
of the development of such an association should
be with a view to accomplishing our basic objectives 
in Asia and to assuring that any association formed 
will be in accord with Chapter VJII of the Charter 
of the United Nations dealing with regional arrange­
ments.
Subsequent to these policy formulations came the de­
velopment of the "domino principle" which would be a deter­
mining factor in future U.S. policies concerning Southeast 
Asia. The first explicit statement of the "domino princi­
ple" was made in NSC 64 which was adopted as policy on 
February 27, 1950 by the Truman Administration: ^
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It is important to United States security 
interests that all practicable measures be taken 
to prevent further communist expansion in South­
east Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast 
Asia and is under immediate threat.
The neighboring countries of Thailand and 
Burma could be expected to fall under Communist 
domination if Indochina were controlled by a Com­
munist-dominated government. The balance of South­
east Asia would then be in grave hazard.
Later on in NSC 124/2 of June, 19 52, the "domino prin­
ciple" in its purest form was written into the "General Con­
siderations" section. It linked the loss of any single 
state of Southeast Asia to the stability of Europe and the
7
security of the United States.
The U.S. Congress itself was also receptive to the
idea of the formation of a collective security organization,
In the "Findings and Declaration of Policy of the Mutual
0
Defense Assistance Act of 1949," it is declared that:
The Congress hereby expresses itself as fa­
voring the creation by the free countries and free 
peoples of the Far East of a joint organization, 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, 
to establish a program of self-help and mutual 
cooperation designed to develop their economic 
and social well-being, to safeguard basic rights 
and liberties and to protect their security and 
independence.
From 1949 through 1953, the National Security Council 
expected a broader regional defense pact to be initiated by 
the countries of Southeast Asia. In testimony before the 
U.S. Congress, Secretary Acheson emphasized that the ini­
tiative should come from Southeast Asian nations in the 
organization of a regional organization. He also mentioned
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that ;
The President of the Philippines has been going 
forward to accomplish this. We have stated to 
him, and publicly, that we are most sympathetic 
to this activity on his part, but it is most im­
portant that it should be a spontaneous Asian 
action.9
As mentioned earlier in this study. President Quirino's 
attempt toward regional cooperation resulted in the Baguio 
Conference of 1950 and the promise by President Truman that 
the United States would help the Philippines to remain 
"free and self-reliant, and to watch with sympathetic in­
terest the efforts of the non-Communist Asian nations to 
unite for political security.^®
Actually the United States, in spite of later state­
ments to the contrary, was not ready to set up a regional 
organization in Southeast Asia. It was felt that the de­
veloping nations of that region did not constitute suitable 
material for such a type of association.^^
But later events were to change the thinking of the 
leaders of the United States First, there was the out­
break of the war in South Korea. Second, conditions deterio­
rated in Indochina. Third, China fell to the hands of the 
Communist armies of Mao Tse Tung. Then it would be stated 
for the historical record that the United States had always 
been ready toward working out collective security agree­
ments with the nations of the Pacific area.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its report 
on Executive K on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty on January 25, 1955 included a background of the 
treaty. The background statement said that at the time
187
the negotiations were begun in 1950 leading to the Japanese 
security treaty and to the series of separate security pacts 
in the Pacific area, it was hoped that a rather broad type 
of collective arrangement for security might be worked out. 
This goal was not realized because of hostilities in Indo­
china. However, the defense treaties with Japan, the Phil­
ippines, and Australia and New Zealand were entered into
pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective
1 9system of regional security in the Pacific area.
During the hearings on the Korean Defense Treaty, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed the opinion 
that a multilateral agreement for the Pacific, similar to 
the NATO treay would be desirable. Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, however, pointed out that substantial cul­
tural, political, and geographic differences existed among 
the Pacific countries which distinguished this area from 
Europe and constituted serious obstacles to achieving the 
desired development at an early date.
The Philippines was not overlooked during all these 
attempts at formulating a policy for Southeast Asia. The 
Korean war brought the realization to the United States 
of the importance of the military bases in that country. 
Accordingly, additional aid was authorized to that country 
by the U.S. Government.
On April 10, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in pre­
paring for the eventual fall of Indochina, recommended that 
the Philippines should be changed from a position of support 
to b,ecome a front-line base in the defense of the Western 
Hemisphere.
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Action to organize a regional association in South­
east Asia might be said to have began when President Eisen­
hower advocated "united action for Southeast Asia" in a 
speech he delivered on April 16, 1953. This was followed 
by a statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 
March, 1954, that "united action" was needed in the area 
to meet the Communist threat. On April 13, 1954, ano­
ther statement was issued, after a meeting with Prime Minis­
ter Eden of Great Britain, that England and America were 
ready "to take part, with the other countries principally 
concerned, in an examination of the possibility of estab­
lishing a collective defense, within the framework of the 
Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, secu­
rity and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific."13 
On August 13, 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 
United States expressed the opinion that U.S. policy in 
the Far East should be directed toward achieving the fol­
lowing objectives:
a. Development of the purpose and capability 
of the non-Communist countries of the Far East to 
act collectively and effectively in opposing the 
threat of aggressive Communism.
b. Eventual establishment of a comprehensive 
regional security arrangement among the non-Commu- 
nist countries of the Far East, with which the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and possibly 
France, would be associated.
c. Reduction of the power and influence of 
the USSR in the Far East, initially through the 
containment and reduction of the relative power 
of Communist China, and ultimately the detachment 
of China from the area of Soviet Communist control.
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In the accomplishment of these objectives, the JCS re­
commended, among others, that the U.S. foster a system of 
treaties which would lead eventually to a comprehensive 
and cohesive security arrangement in the Far East Area.
They also said that the United States was publicly committed 
to the sponsoring and support of a collective security ar­
rangement for Southeast Asia even before the collapse of 
the French effort in Indochina, but they had serious mis­
givings concerning the military provisions of such a pact 
lest they imply commitments which the United States would 
not be able to meet. The failure to meet the expectations 
of the signatories in the matter of military aid, the JCS 
felt, could result in the alienation of friendly governments 
rather than the acquisition of new allies.
With regard to the projected Southeast Asian defense 
treaty, the JCS recommended the following
a. The clear purpose of the treaty should be 
to form a collective security arrangement to deter 
and, if possible, prevent any furthe extension of 
Communist control, by whatever means, within the 
general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest 
Pacific.
b. The initial membership should be limited 
to those nations willing to join in the type of 
organization which can be effective in accomplish­
ing the purpose set forth in _a above.
c. The treaty should provide for the future 
accession of other powers having interests in the 
Far East which may subsequently desire to join.
(It is considered that the pact should ultimately 
include Japan, Korea, and possibly Nationalist 
China.)
d. There should be no built-in power of veto.
The treaty provisions should permit concerted action
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by a lesser number than the total of the signa­
tory nations in the event that the political or 
territorial integrity of any signatory is threat­
ened by Communist aggression in any form.
e. Careful consideration should be given to 
the practicability and desirability of providing 
voting machinery in the governing council which 
would preclude the possibility that, at some time 
in the future when the membership is expanded,
a bloc of "neutrals" or a British Commonwealth 
bloc, could exercise a controlling voice.
f. The treaty should establish the moral jus­
tification and provide the political framework 
and necessary machinery within which and by which 
any act of overt Communist aggression could be
met by prompt military counteraction, not excluding 
military action against the real source of aggression.
g. The treaty should specifically provide that 
any further extension of Communist control through 
infiltration or subversion, or through any other 
direct means, should as in the case of overt ag­
gression, by met by prompt and appropriate counter­
action.
h. It should be made clear in the preliminary 
negotiations and in the provisions of the treaty 
itself that no commitment by the United States to 
support the raising, equipping, and maintenance of 
indigenous forces and/or to deploy United Forces 
in such strengths as to provide for an effective 
defense of all of the national territory of each 
signatory is implied or intended. Military aid 
by the United States to the Southeast Asian coun­
tries who are members of the pact should be limited 
to that necessary to permit the countries concerned, 
to raise, equip, and maintain military forces as 
necessary to insure internal stability, to contri­
bute toward a reasonably effective opposition to 
any attempted invasion, and to instill national 
conf idence.
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i. It should be made equally clear that the
treaty would not commit the United States to a 
large scale program of economic aid to the signa­
tory countries in lieu of military aid since, in 
the final analysis, funds for economic aid must 
come from the total amount of money available for 
the national security programs of the United States.
The position of the United States toward the estab­
lishment of a regional collective security organization 
in the foregoing is thus made clear by the foregoing 
machinery set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs.
In the Philippines, the initial response to the 
"united action" plea by the United States was reserved 
and lukewarm. President Ramon Magsaysay expressed his 
support toward establishing an alliance, if this were done, 
in a statement on April 19, 1954. However, he qualified 
his support on the basis of a declaration by the United 
States that it would respond automatically in case of an 
attack on the Philippines. In a policy statement. Presi­
dent Magsaysay declared on April 18, 1954, that while the 
Philippines would support a regional defense organization, 
it would only do so if the following conditions were met:
First, that the right of Asian peoples to self- 
determination is respected; and second, that the 
Philippines be given a clear and unequivocal gua­
rantee of United States help in case of attack un-
1 7der our Mutual Defense Act.
It was Magsaysay's view that the Philippines was in 
accord with plans for united action against external Com­
munist aggression, but it was not prepared to contribute 
militarily to it. He favored strongly the move to ask the 
United States for stronger military commitments. He also
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opposed the use of Filipino troops in the Indochina conflict. 
He also wanted the establishment of a council to implement 
matters of mutual concern arising from the bilateral treaty 
of mutual defense with the United States. On May 25, 1954, 
Magsaysay got what he wanted; a Joint United States-Phil- 
ippine defense council was established.
Although the Philippines felt slighted during the 
five power military conference in Washington in June, 1953, 
it received strong assurances of U.S. support for its 
security. On September 4, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles 
said:
I wish to state in the most emphatic terms that 
the United States will honor fully its commit­
ments under the Mutual Defense Treaty. If the 
Philippines were attacked, the United States 
would act immediately. . . . The President of 
the United States has ordered the Seventh Fleet 
to protect Formosa from invasion by Communist 
aggressors. In the case of the Philippines, no
specific orders are required? our forces would
automatically react.
This statement of Mr. Dulles was criticized by Phil­
ippine Senator Recto who pointed out that nowhere in the
treaty of mutual defense between the Philippines and the
United States was the United States coir'Tiitted to automatic 
reaction if the Philippines were attacked. Recto, therefore, 
desired revision of the treaty to incorporate Dulles' inter­
pretation that the U.S. was committed to automatic reaction 
in case of attack on the Philippines. Accordingly, in a 
joint communique dated September 7, the U.S. pledge of au­
tomatic reaction was mentioned. The U.S. also agreed to 
Philippine proposals for strengthening her armed forces.
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Before the start of the formal negotiations for the multi, 
lateral defense treaty, the Philippines had the following 
objectives in mind: (1) it would seek an alliance pat­
terned after NATO; (2) it would ask the signatories to 
the treaty to support the rights and freedoms of all 
peoples in Southeast Asia and agree to take steps to assure 
progress of all nations toward self-rule and independence;
(3) it would urge the members to work jointly for economic 
and social development; and (4) it would insist that the 
treaty area include all the territorial limits of the sig­
natory countries in Southeast Asia and also of the non-mem­
ber states that might later join the organization.
During the conference in Manila in September, 1954, 
the Philippines backed down on its proposal for a Nato- 
type alliance and agreed to the establishment of a modified 
ANZUS-type alliance. The final treaty as approved was 
seen by President Magsaysay as beneficial to the Philippines.
The military provisions of the Treaty consti­
tute the armor designed to protect the area against 
aggression. The provisions on economic development 
and self-determination formulated in accordance with 
the principles enshrined in the Pacific Charter, are 
the heart and soul that give the Treaty life and 
meaning for the peoples of Asia. 20
As signed on September 8, 1954, the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty, along with the Pacific Charter, 
had two important paragraphs in Article IV. The first one 
stated that the member states would deal with armed attack 
in accordance with their constitutional processes. In the 
second one, the members would consult immediately on measures 
which should be taken in dealing with subversion.
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In a recent study on the role of SEATO in U.S. foreign 
policy,
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
also known as the Manila Pact, signed on September 
8 , 1954, is the founding document of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The treaty was 
designed primarily as a tool to prevent armed Com­
munist aggression in Southeast Asia. It commits 
its eight original signatories (Australia, France,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, the United King­
dom, the Philippines, and the United States) to 
act if a party to the treaty or a protocol state 
is subject to armed attack; however, it does not 
specify what action is required, leaving that 
choice to the individual member states. When a 
party to the treaty or a protocol state is the 
victim of some other form of threat (such as sub­
version or insurgency), SEATO members are obligated 
only to consult immediately. The treaty also 
calls for cooperation in the promotion of econo­
mic development and social wellbeing among the 
member states.
For the Philippines, the treaty was considered a 
forward step in the development of a more comprehensive 
collective system of security in the region as earlier 
advocated by the Philippines.
During the ratification of the treaty by the Philippine 
Senate, Senator Recto abstained from voting and said:
The treaty is too much and at the same 
time too little. Too much in the sense that 
under its terms we accept commitments to back 
the provisions of the treaty when we do not have 
the necessary power to back it, and too little 
in the sense that it affords very scant pro­
tection to the Philippines as far as external
defense is concerned.22
Other Commitments of the United States to the Phil-
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ippines.—  Besides the formal treaties relating to military 
bases, mutual defense, military assistance on a bilateral 
basis, and the multilateral treaty setting up the SEATO, 
there are other evidences of American commitments to defend 
the Philippines. These other statements of U.S. commitments 
are mentioned here, even though the legal interpretation 
of these statements is that they are subject to the concept 
of constitutional procedures that determine U.S. action in 
coming to the defense of the Philippines. The listing is 
not meant to be a complete record of the commitments ex­
pressed by the United States. It is meant to illustrate 
the scope of that commitment of the U.S. to come to the 
defense of the Philippines.
Sometime in January, 1950, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson said:
The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryu- 
kyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, 
our defensive relations with the Philippines 
are contained in agreements between us. Those 
agreements are being loyally carried out and 
will be loyally carried. Both peoples have 
learned by bitter experience the vital con­
nections between our mutual defense require­
ments. We are in no doubt about that, and it 
is hardly necessary for me to say an attack 
on the Philippines could not and would not be 
tolerated by the United States. ^3
Because of the presence of U.S. forces in the Phil­
ippines, Secretary of State Dulles mentioned this point in 
a note to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines 
as follows:
Under our Mutual Defense Treaty and related 
actions, there have resulted air and naval dis-
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positions of the United States in the Philippines, 
such that an armed attack on the Philippines could 
not but be also an attack upon the military forces 
of the United States. As between our nations, it 
is no legal fiction to say that an attack on one 
is an attack on both. It is a reality that an 
attack on the Philippines is an attack on the 
United States.
A joint communique issued on the occasion of the vi­
sit of Philippine President Garcia to President Eisenhower 
on June 16, 1958, stated that;
President Eisenhower made clear that in 
accordance with these existing alliances and 
the deployments and dispositions thereunder, 
any armed attack against the Philippines would 
involve an att:.;ck against United States forces 
stationed there and against the United States 
and would be instantly r e p e l l e d . ^5
On October 12, 1959, U.S. Ambassador Charles E. Boh- 
len to the Philippines and Philippine Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs Felixberto M. Serrano concluded a memorandum of 
agreement which included more or less the same commitments 
made by Dulles and included in the joint communique issued 
on the occasion of the state visit of President Garcia to 
the United States.
On October 6, 1954, another joint communique issued 
on the occasion of the visit of.President Diosdado Macapa- 
gal to President Lyndon Johnson also included a statement 
that an armed attack against the Philippines would be re­
garded as an attack against the United States forces sta­
tioned there and against the United States and would be 
instantly repelled. Both presidents also agreed that the 
relationship between their respective countries was a 
dynamic and flexible association with a long history
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of past achievement and a heavy stake in a common future.
On September 15, 1966, a joint communique on talks 
between President Marcos and President Johnson contained 
the following paragraph:
The two Presidents pledged themselves to 
strengthen the unity of the two countries in 
meeting any threat to their security. In this 
regard, they noted the continuing importance 
of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Phil­
ippines and the United States in maintaining 
the security of both countries. President 
Johnson reiterated to President Marcos the 
policy of the United States regarding mutual 
defense as stated by him and by past U.S. Ad­
ministrations to the Philippine Government 
since 1954
On September 16, 1966, an exchange of notes between 
U.S. Secretary of State Rusk and Philippine Foreign Secre­
tary Ramos reaffirmed the policies expressed in the 1959 
Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement. After making re­
ference to the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 and the 
Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement of October 12, 1959, 
Secretary Rusk in his note took occasion "to reaffirm the 
policy of the United States regarding mutual defense ex­
pressed in the 1959 Memorandum. 28
The U.S. State Department believes that the Philippines 
attaches great importance to presidential and other state­
ments to the effect that any armed attack against the Phil­
ippines would be regarded as an attack against United States 
forces stationed there and against the United States and 
would be instantly repelled. However, the Philippine Govern­
ment has continued periodically to seek a change in the 
Mutual Defense Treaty that in their view would make its im-
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response more automatic.
In the opinion of then Undersecretary of State
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach during his testimony to the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings
investigating U.S. commitments to foreign powers on
August 15, 1957, none of these commitments made by the
United States to the Philippines incur automatic res- 
.29ponse;
Let me emphasize the constitutional qua­
lity of these commitments. By their nature, 
they set only the boundaries within which the 
United States will act. They cannot and do 
not spell out the precise action which the 
United States would take in a variety of con­
tingencies. That is left for futher decision 
by the President and the Congress.
In short, none of these incur automatic 
response. But they do make clear our pledge 
to take actions we regard as appropriate in 
the light of all the circumstances— our view 
that we are not indifferent to the actions 
of others which disturb the peace of the 
world and threaten the security of the United 
States.
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PART III
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE
Part III is an overall discussion of the problems 
and prospects of the alliance, with especial reference 
to the Philippines. Chapter VIII explores some of the 
critical problems that have induced strains and stresses 
in the relationship and some of the steps undertaken by 
the Philippines and the United States in order to main­
tain friendly and harmonious relations between themselves. 
Chapter IX investigates some of the factors that may in­
fluence the future of the alliance and the alternatives 
or options available to the Philippines for the pro­
tection of its security besides the alliance relationship 
with the United States. Chapter X attempts to provide 
conclusions arising from a study of an alliance between 
a great power and a small power by utilizing a conceptual 
framework suggested by some students of the concept of 
alliance.
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CHAPTER VII 
THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP 1946-1975
The years between 1947 and 1975, which was a period 
of growing up for the Philippines, and for the United 
States a period of coping with its increased responsibi­
lities and interests in a postwar world, were years of 
uneasy and troubled partnership between two nations that 
had stood shoulder to shoulder together in the battles 
of World War II. For the Philippines, these were years 
when the nation started to depend heavily upon the United 
States to rehabilitate its shattered economy and sustain 
its political independence and gradually learn to develop 
its self-reliance when it discovered that the United 
States had to meet increasing demands upon its time and 
resources from other nations in order to protect its own 
national security. For the United States, having lived 
up to its promises to grant political sovereignty to the 
Philippines and to assist to some extent in its rehabili­
tation, its attention was drawn to several theaters where 
its interests were threatened by a rising tide of Commu­
nism both in Europe and then in Asia.
It is not intended to present a comprehensive analysis 
of the relationship between the United States and the 
Philippines in this chapter. Since such relationship has
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already been determined by agreements between these two 
countries, this chapter will describe and analyze the 
developments which occured by reason of these agreements: 
the agreements on military bases and military assistance, 
the mutual defense treaty, and the SEATO treaty.
The Military Bases Agreement of 1947
From the standpoint of the military alliance rela­
tionship, the 1947 military bases agreement is the most 
important instrument compared to the other agreements.
Since 1947, U.S. interest in the Philippines has been 
determined solely by the stationing of its troops in 
military bases in the Philippines including the cons­
truction of facilities in the bases to facilitate the 
setting up of its military posture in the Southeast 
Asia region. Although the U.S. has expressed considerable 
commercial interest in the Philippines, such interest has 
not lived up to Philippine expectations despite Phil­
ippine amenability to a rewording of its Constitution in 
order to confer equal rights to Americans in the develop­
ment and exploitation of its natural resources. U.S. 
interest in the Philippines has been justified in connection 
with hearings in congressional appropriation committees 
on the basis of the presence of American troops and equip­
ment in military bases in the Philippines. Such interest 
has always been connected with the Philippines being a 
part of the U.S. defensive strategy.
The general objectives of the United States in its
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relations with the Philippines were set forth by the 
U.S. State Department sometime in 1969:
Help encourage the development of self­
sustained economic growth and a general economic 
modernization that will make improving standards 
of living available to people of all clases.
Assist Filipino efforts toward increased 
agricultural productivity and rural develop­
ment.
Lay the groundwork for U.S.-Philippine 
bilateral economic relations after 1974 when 
the Laurel-Langley Agreement terminates.
Help the Government of the Philippines 
increase its capability for improvement of 
law and order.
Implement understandings reached 
with the Government of the Philippines aimed 
at reducing irritants rising out of our main­
tenance of U.S. military bases essential to 
our strategic posture in East Asia.^
As a result of the Military Bases agreement and two
other subsidiary treaties signed between the United States
and the Philippines in 1947, the United States was given
the right to maintain 23 bases and reservations in the
Philippines for a period of 99 years after independence.
Many of these bases date back to colonial times. Clark
Air Base in Pampanga Province, 82 kilometers (52 miles)
north of Manila used to be a fort for horse cavalry.
Subic Naval Base, located in Zambales Province on the
China Sea coast northwest of Manila, is the United States
Navy's largest support base in the Pacific. It is. almost
50 miles northwest of Manila and was originally the site
of a Spanish naval station. Turned over to the United
States following the Spanish-American War of 1898, Subic
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Naval Base has remained under U.S. control except for a 
brief period during World War II when the Japanese occu­
pied the base. There were several other bases that were 
set up for the Allied counter-offensive against Japan 
during World War II, while still others are navigational 
stations for the American air-defense network set up all 
over the Western Pacific during the Cold War.
Of the 23 original U.S. bases and reservations found 
in the Philippines, only seven military reservations re­
main today (1975), the rest having been turned over to 
the Philippines.
Located about 100 miles north of Clark Air Base 
in mountainous country near the city of Baguio, is John 
Hay Air Base. This base has a radio station which pro­
vides high frequency circuits in support of airlift opera­
tions and air traffic control. John Hay Air base also 
has other circuits which support a weather research faci­
lity and the Voice of America transmitted. It is also 
widely used for conferences by A-1 services in the west­
ern Pacific and as a rest and recreation facility for 
approximately 2,500 people per month during the height 
of the Vietnam war.
Fifteen miles north of Clark Base is a communications 
site. Camp O'Donnell, which is shared by the Air Force, 
the Navy, and a regional relay facility of the U.S. State 
Department. As part of the overall communications net of 
the Department of State, it relays messages from posts in 
Southeast Asia on through to other posts around the world.
Besides these bases, there are four other small re­
servations, strung along the west coast of Luzon Island, and
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contain radio transmitting and receiving stations and air- 
navigational aids.
Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base are the two major 
U.S. bases operating in the Philippines. Clark Air Base, 
the center of logistical and combat support for the opera­
tions of the US air forces in the Southeast Asian region, 
has facilities which allow the launching of large-scale 
aircraft and tactical air operations. With a total area 
of 202 square miles —  a little larger than the city of 
New Orleans, Louisiana —  most of which is used as a bomb­
ing and gunnery range and a training area in jungle warfare, 
only eight per cent of the total base area is used for 
the base proper purposes. The headquarters of the U.S.
13th Air Force and its various staff units which provide 
the command control, administrative and logistics support 
for the U.S. air forces in Thailand, Taiwan, and the Phil­
ippines, Clark Air Base also serves as base for three 
USAF units: the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, the 374th Tac­
tical Airlift Wing, and the 3rd Combat Support Group.
The broad responsibilities of the 13th Air Force include 
the maintenance of assigned forces at a level of readiness 
to insure successful completion of directed military opera­
tions; to support and advance the national policies and 
interests of the United States; and to represent the Com­
mander- in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, in the interdepart­
mental and interservice activities in the 13th Air Force 
Area of responsibility. Because the Philippines is a ma­
jor communications hub for both north-south and east-west 
military communications for the western pacific, the Air 
Force is the principal operator of defense communications
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systems facilities in the Philippines. The Air Force is 
also the operator of certain tactical communications faci­
lities which are non-DCS. As of July 1, 1965, a total 
value of $218,515,000 of construction has been completed 
at Clark Air Base, Mactan Air Base, and Wallace Air Station.
A total amount of $10,536,000 as of the same date was 
under construction. These figures are cited only to show 
the considerable investment the U.S. has in the air bases.
Also for the fiscal year 1968, for example, the foreign exchange 
expenditures at the Air Force bases in the Philippines 
reached a total of $48,927,747. In 1969, the correspond­
ing amount was $49,976,604.
The U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay has the primary mis­
sion to provide logistic support primarily to 7th Fleet 
units, and also to locally assigned vessels and activities, 
transient naval vessels, aircraft and other naval activi­
ties in the Philippines. Composed of eight major commands 
and 40 smaller units and detachments, and providing alto­
gether support services to the 70,000 men, 90 ships, and 
550 aircraft of the 7th Fleet, Subic is the biggest U.S. 
naval installation in Asia. It is 56 square miles in 
area and controls some 40 square miles of water. The 
total base complex include the Subic Naval Station, a 
Naval Air Station at Cubi Point, a ship repair facility, 
a supply depot, a naval magazine, a Marine barracks and 
amphibious training camp, and a naval hospital. The Naval 
Communications Station at San Miguel provides communica­
tions for the command, operational control and administra­
tion of the naval establishment, as well as operation and
210
maintenance of certain facilities of the Defense Communications 
System. It is one of the U.S. principal communications 
stations worldwide and is essential to the 7th Fleet when 
operating in the southern part of its area. The total 
U.S. capital investment at the Subic Bay/Cubi Point com­
plex including the communications facilities at San Miguel 
was set at $214.6 million as of June 30, 1969. Also, in 
1969 the total operating cost of all U.S. naval bases in 
the Philippines reached a total of $89,000,000. During 
fiscal year 1969, the total salaries of Filipinos at the 
Air Forces bases totaled $16,410,792. At the naval bases, 
it reached the total figure of $27,581,668. In 1969, the 
total defense presence of the United States in the Philip­
pines was 28,000 military personnel, 1,400 U.S. civilians, 
and 22,000 dependents. The combined base-related U.S. 
foreign exchange expenditures in the Philippines at that 
time contributed about 6 per cent of the Philippine gross 
national product. Comparable figures for 1975, are not 
complete but as of September 1, 1975, there were 6,233 U.S. 
military personnel at Subic Naval Base, 343 civilian, and 
10,633 Filipino civilians who were paid out of appropriated 
funds. 243 U.S. civilians and 3,940 Filipinos were paid out 
of non-appropriated funds. A total number of 11,000 Fili­
pinos were also employed as domestics, stevedores, and con­
tract employees. All in all there were a total of 6,233 
U.S. military personnel, 586 U.S. civilians, and 25,573 
Filipinos employed at the U.S. naval base at Subic alone.
The U.S. Air Force had a total of 9,500 military personnnel 
on December 31, 1974.
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During the years since the signing of the Military 
Bases Agreement in 1947, a number of disputes and misunder­
standings arose between the United States and the Philip­
pines over a number of issues which included the follow­
ing: (1) title to the bases, (2) criminal jurisdiction 
over U.S. military personnel, (3) exploitation of natural 
resources within the bases by Filipinos, (4) shortening 
of the period of use of bases, (5) prior consultation 
with the Philippine Government before the stationing of 
long-range missiles on the bases or the use of the bases 
for combat operations outside the scope of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty or SEATO, (6) standards to govern conditions 
of employment for Filipinos employed on the bases, and 
(7) customs procedures.
The discussion involving the revisions that were 
made in the original 1947 agreement has been done in more 
detail elsewhere. It will be the purpose of this inves­
tigation to summarize the subsequent modifications to 
the 1947 agreement in order to show how the Philippines 
sought to protect its interests in the face of the demands 
of a great power ally.
On July 15, 1953, President Eisenhower made the ini­
tial move toward revision of the 1947 agreement when he re­
quested in a letter to President Quirino about the pros­
pect of increasing the number of active bases in the Phil- 
as well as developing the bases that were already opera­
ting. The conditions at this time in the external environ­
ment may well be understood in reading the Pentagon Papers. 
This was then the period when the United States was seeking 
to formulate a policy toward Vietnam, then torn in conflict.
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Apparently not much was done by President Quirino, although 
he did mention to President Eisenhower that he was sharing 
Eisenhower's desire to reach an agreement on the questions 
concerning the military bases. Quirino, however, also men­
tioned that he was interested in other matters that "remain 
unclarified or unresolved" with the purpose of removing any 
possible misunderstanding with regard to them. When Mag­
saysay became President, he mentioned in his first State 
of the Union Messsage of January 25, 1954, that:
It is clearly in the national interest that we 
meet with the representatives of the United States 
Government to settle pending legal questions so 
that the bases we have granted to that country 
can be immediately developed and fully activated.^
Magsaysay forthwith appointed a panel of negotiators to 
discuss issues with the United States involving (1) sovereign­
ty over the bases, (2) expansion of some bases, and (3) cla­
rification of jurisdiction over the bases.^ On March 16,
1954, U.S. Attorney General Brownell released a legal opi­
nion wherein he stated that the United States retained 
title to the land area comprising the bases included in 
the 1947 agreement, as well as other areas not listed in 
the agreement. The Philippines' panel rejected the Ameri­
can claim and Magsaysay postponed the t&lks. It took two 
years, during which Magsaysay resorted to secret diploma­
tic negotiations, before formal talks resumed. It was 
during the intervening period, on September 4, 1954, that 
Secretary of State Dulles stated that the United States 
"will honor fully its commitments under the mutual defense 
treaty?' with the Philippines.
On July 3, 1956, in a joint communique. President Magsay-
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say and Vice-President Nixon issued a statement that:
The United States has, since the independence of 
the Philippines, always acknowledged the sovereign­
ty of the Philippines over such bases; and express­
ly reaffirms full recognition of such Philippine 
sovereignty over the bases. Furthermore, the 
United States will transfer and turn over to the 
Philippines all title papers and title claims 
held by the United States to all land areas used 
either in the past or present as military bases, 
except those areas which may now or will be used 
by the United States for its diplomatic and consu­
lar establishments.4
Another announcement in late July said that talks on the 
revision of the bases agreement would resume again. And 
so on May 25, 1956, the Philippines announced that the 
discussions would cover: (1) jurisdiction within the bases;
(2) delimination and expansion of the bases; (3) taxes, 
tariffs, and other economic laws of the Philippines that 
should be applied to the bases; and (4) ownership and 
sovereignty over the bases. The bases negotiations, how­
ever, were suspended again because members of the U.S. 
panel had to depart for the United States because of ur­
gent business there. One cause of the failure of the ne­
gotiations was believed to be too much publicity about 
the discussions.
Almost two years passed before something was done 
to resume the talks on the bases. While the United States 
did not make any overtures to resume negotiations, it did 
indicate its concern by appointing Charles E. Bohlen, a top 
American diplomat, to oe Ambassador to the Philippines. 
Within a year after his appointment, Bohlen signed two 
agreements: (1) one agreement relinquished control over
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the Manila Air Station; and (2) the other established a 
Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board.
The purpose of the Philippine-United States Mutual 
Defense Board was to provide continuing inter-governmental 
machinery for direct liaison and consultation between 
appropriate Philippine and United States authorities on 
military matters of mutual concern so as to develop and 
improve, through continuing military cooperation, the 
common defense between the two countries. The members 
of the Board were as follows: For the Philippines: (a) 
Co-Chairman of the Board: The Chief of Staff, the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines, or a Flag or General Officer 
designated by him; (b) Members of the Board: Chief, 
Philippine Constabulary; Commanding General, Philippine 
Army; Commanding General, Philippine Air Force; and Flag 
Officer in Command, Philippine Navy; for the United States: 
(a) Co-Chairman.of the Board: The United States Military 
Representative of the Council, or a Flag or General Offi­
cer designated by him; (b) Members of the Board: The senior 
United States Service representative of the Army, Navy 
and Air Force on duty in the Philippines and, if not al­
ready represented, the Chief, Joint United States Military 
Advisory Group. The Board and its members were to be 
assisted by such staff, military or civilian, as they con­
sider appropriate. 5
Subsequently, other agreements were reached between 
Ambassador Bohlen and Philippine Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs Felixberto Serrano. The first, a memorandum of 
agreement dated August 4, 1959, announced the relinqush-
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ment by the United States of seventeen base areas with a 
total area of 117,075 hectares. This memorandum of agree­
ment took effect on December 22, 1955.
On October 12, 1959, a second memorandum of agree­
ment contained the following: (1) the operational use of 
bases will be the subject of prior consultations with 
the Government of the Philippines in case of military com­
bat operations; (2) establishment by the United States of 
long-range missiles on the bases will be the subject also 
of prior consultations with the Philippine Government;
(3) the duration of the bases agreement is reduced from 
90 years to 25 years, with a proviso for renewal at the 
expiration of the 25 year period or earlier termination 
by mutual agreement, with the 25 year period beginning 
on the date of signature; and (4) the United States re­
affirmed its policy with regard to armed attack on the 
Philippines, i.e., that any armed attack against the Phil­
ippines would involve an attack against United States 
forces stationed there and against the United States and 
would be instantly repelled.^
As for the criminal jurisdiction arrangements, it 
would not be until 1965 that the changes would be made.
When it was so made in the 1965 revision, the change is al­
most identical to the criminal jurisdiction provisions 
of Article VII of the NATO SOFA. Again, the issue over 
criminal jurisdiction is discussed quite extensively 
elsewhere because it was one of the leading causes of irri­
tations between the United States and the Philippines be­
cause of the military bases agreement between these two 
countries. ^
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Also important to the establishment of harmonious 
relations between the two countries was the exploitation 
of natural resources, especially mineral resources, with­
in the bases by Filipinos. An Exchange of Notes dated 
at Manila on April 8, 1957, provided an interim arrange­
ment between the U.S. and the Philippines for the exploi­
tation of mineral resources without prejudice to the mili­
tary purpose for which the bases were being used. Such 
exploitation was authorized in accordance with principles, 
procedures, and conditions which gave full recognition 
both to the desire to foster economic development of 
the Philippines and to the need to ensure the security 
of the bases and the ability to accomplisy military opera­
tions and training. This interim arrangement was subse­
quently confirmed in an exchange of notes on August 24, 
1967.
Besides the areas already mentioned as being re­
linquished by the United States to the Philippines, the 
following areas were also relinquished: (1) United States
Naval radio transmitting facility at Bagobanty, Quezon 
City, effected by exchange of notes December 31, 1962 and 
January 11, 1963; (2) Olongapo and adjacent areas, effected
by exchange of notes signed at Manila on December 7, 1959;
(3) certain land areas in Camp John Hay, effected by ex­
change of notes signed at Manila. December 13, 1966;
(4) Bataan Pol Terminal at Kitang Point, effected by ex­
change of notes dated at Mainla on April 30, 1968; and
(5) Naval Station, Sangley Point, effected by exchange 
of notes signed at Manila on August 21 and 31, 1971.®
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The presence of these military bases on Philippine 
territory is considered by the Philippine Government as 
a sources of irritants between the two countries. First, 
the Filipinos believed that the circumstances under which 
the American bases were established easily enabled the 
Americans to obtain from the Philippines the best possi­
ble terms for their use. The almost complete economic 
and military dependence on the United States at the time 
of independence severely handicapped the Filipino leaders 
in negotiating with the Americans. As the Filipinos began 
to develop a measure of economic, military and political 
self-confidence, they began to question the arrangements 
on military bases. Second, the Filipinos still raise 
the question of facto extraterritoriality that they 
charge are given the Americans. Under the bases agree­
ment, the Philippine government has no jurisdiction over 
an American serviceman who commits an offense while in 
the performance of his military duty. The right to deter­
mine whether or not an erring soldier is considered on 
duty or not is reserved for the base commander. Also, 
even though an American serviceman is accused of commit­
ting an offense over which the Philippine government has 
jurisdiction, the American base authorities are allowed 
to keep custody of the serviceman. This resulted in many 
cases where accused serviceman were shipped out of the 
Philippines while facing criminal charges in Philippine 
courts. Third, the Filipinos charge that the U.S. guarantee 
to defend the Philippines in case of attack is subject to 
varying interpretations, depending on the mood of the U.S.
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Congress. The U.S. feels obligated to repel an attack on 
the Philippines only if the American bases on Philippine 
territory were directly attacked. The Filipinos feel that 
this congressional theory is an apparent contradition of 
explicit statements made by American presidents such as 
Eisenhower and Johnson that any attack on the Philippines 
would necessary involve an attack on U.S. forces and on 
the United States and would be instantly repelled. Fourth, 
statements about base contributions to Philippine economy 
are misleading because (1) actual inflows into Philippine 
income stream from base-spending is probably just a por­
tion of the total annual figure; (2) unusual dependence 
of trading and recreational facilities by regions surround­
ing military bases has led to severe local cr.ises, as for 
example, the collapse of the Angeles housing industry in 
the wake of the Vietnam war; and (4) a grave economic 
problem arises from the bases in the outflow of luxury 
consumer goods from the Post Commisary system into the 
national market, bypassing customs barriers.
If the bases are transferred to the custody of the 
Philippines, the Philippine Government has a program 
ready for developing both Clark and Subic bases into 
commercial-military complexes.9
Clark Air Base will be developed as a 
passenger/cargo air terminal and trans-ship­
ment point for both domestic and international 
traffic; a major aircraft manufacturing, repair ^ 
and maintenance facility; a center for other 
industrial activity and a site for corporate 
farming projects.
Subic will be developed as a major ship- 
repair service complex, an offshore supply base.
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particularly for oil exploration in the Phil­
ippines; an anchorage for laid-up tankers, and 
a site for related industries.
The official Philippine position on the American mi­
litary bases was stated by President Marcos on July 7, 
1975:10
We want to put an end to the practice of 
extra-territoriality in our country in keeping 
with our dignity as a sovereign Republic and in 
keeping with the developments of our times.
We want to assume control of all U.S. bases 
and put them to a productive economic, as well 
as military, use.
At the same time, we are willing to enter 
into new arrangements that would help the United 
States maintain an effective presence over the 
air and sea lanes of the Western Pacific.
On December 7, 1975, a joint communique issued on
the occasion of the visit of U.S. President Gerald Ford
to the Philippines, it was stated that : H
. . . the military bases used by the United 
States in the Philippines remain important 
in maintaining an effective United States 
presence in the Western Pacific . . . .
They ^arcos and Ford]? agreed that nego­
tiations on the subject of United States use 
of Philippine military bases should be conducted 
in the clear recognition of Philippine sovereignty. 
The two Presidents agreed that there should be 
an early review of the steps necessary to con­
clude the negotiations through the two panels 
already organized for that purpose.
Negotiations for re-examination of the bases began 
at Washington, D.C. on April 19, 1976. Sometime in June, 
the United States announced that it needed the military
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bases in the Philippines for the protection of its security.
In both the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War, the 
Americans realized the value of its bases in the Philip­
pines in the pursuit of an aggressive policy in South­
east Asia. As George Taylor puts it: ^ 2
Immediately following the outbreak of the Korean 
conflict, the United States increased its air 
and naval forces in the Philippines, and Clark 
Field became one of the great air commands of 
the western Pacific. So much was said about 
the strategic importance of the Philippines 
as the anchor of the island chain that it be­
came safer for Filipinos to put more pressure 
on the United States than they had before over 
such issues as the status of the military bases.
The situation and the bargaining position of 
the Philippines had changed. It was now clear 
that the United States wanted the bases for its 
own defense and could always be counted on to come 
to the rescue of the government in power at a time 
of economic crisis. When a strong power is in 
partnership with a weak one, the bargaining 
positions are not necessarily a direct reflection 
of their relative military and economic strength.
During the Vietnam war, especially in the year 1968,
at the height of United States ground action in Vietnam
. . . there were 1,712 visits by United States 
naval ships to Subic Bay and 895 by merchant 
ships. On an average day that year 10,000 
naval personnel stationed aboard ships of the 
Seventh Fleet were at Subic. By comparison, 
in 1965,there Were 1,372 ship visits to Subic.
In fact, all the major American military facilities in
the Philippines supported American military operations
in the Vietnam war.
Among other functions, Subic Bay provides 
logistical support for the carrier task force
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on the Yankee Station. San Miguel serves as 
communications link between Vietnam and the 
United States. Clark Air Base provides rear 
echelon support for airlift and fighter squa­
drons in Vietnam. So, too, did Mactan, until 
its airlift squadrons were reassigned to Clark. 
The main function of Sangley*s squadrons was 
the surveillance of the coastal waters of 
Southeast A s i a . 14
Military Assistance
Military assistance was an important factor in the 
buildup of the armed forces of the young Republic of 
the Philippines. The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group 
(JUSMAG) set up in that country was the first of such 
type of organization to be set up in Southeast Asia so 
that when other mutual defense assistance treaties were 
signed with countries in that region, it became the pro­
totype for similar bodies organized in other countries.
The JUSMAG administered a total amount of $169.3 million 
during the first ten years to support a wide range of 
projects. These included the training of jet pilots at 
Clark Air Base; the delivery of training jets, minesweepers, 
and ammunition; the improvement of airfields; and the 
construction of warehouses and training sites. The JUSMAG 
also contributed a considerable amount of advice and 
equipment when the Philippine Government was meeting the 
challenge of the Hukbalahaps, a communist-led organiza­
tion in the fifties. However, the JUSMAG has also been 
charged with meddling in domestic politics by helping 
Ramon Magsaysay's effort to became president of the Phil­
ippines.
During the 1960's and the early 1970*s, the Philippines 
received the average amount of $20 million a year from
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the United States. Actually during the fiscal year 1965 
through fiscal year 1969, the level of military assistance 
to the Philippines averaged $22.5 million annually. The 
largest amount received by the Philippines for this period 
was $27 million for fiscal year 1967. Two years later 
the amount appropriated for the program was less than 
$19 million. Total American grants during the period 
from 1946 to 1973 have totaled $709.7 million.
Military asssistance to the Philippines was first 
authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1946 when it passed 
an act "To provide military assistance to the Republic 
of the Philippines in establishing and maintaining nation­
al security and to form a basis for participation by that 
government in such defensive military operations as the 
future may require." Three years later under the 
Truman Doctrine, military assistance for the Philippines 
became part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program 
(MDAP) which has since then been redesignated as the 
Military Assistance Program (MAP)
Besides equipment, training, and other support pro­
vided the Philippines from appropriated MAP funds, their 
armed forces have alsc received delivery of numerous items 
from excess stocks at no cost to regular grant program 
except shipping charges and in some cases, necessary re­
conditioning. Some of these items include: spare parts 
for aircraft weapons and communications equipment; ammuni­
tion; T-33 aircraft and C-47 aircraft; patrol craft, light 
cargo ship, and various small boats and craft.
The overall objective of U.S. military assistance 
to the Philippines in providing advice and assistance to
223
the Armed Forces of the Philippines is justified as being 
necessary in order to assure protection of U.S. interests 
in the Philippines and to promote U.S. foreign policy ob­
jectives in the area as defined by the U.S. Department 
of State. Secretary of State Kissinger has also described 
U.S. security assistance policy as an effective instru­
ment for decades in maintaining the strength of the 
U.S. alliances, which have been, and are to Kissinger, 
the anchor of world peace and stability.
In the latest hearings on international security as­
sistance, the total figure appropriated by the United 
States for the Philippines for the period from 1955 to 
1973 was $322 million. This amount includes the military 
assistance program, foreign military sales, and the mil- 
iatary assistance training program. Under the military 
assistance training program, a total of 14,745 Filipinos 
were trained in the U.S. and the Philippines for the 
period during 1950 to 1973.
Mutual Defense
During the course of the partnership from 1947 to 
1975, the Philippines had asked for and received assuran­
ces from the United States that the latter would provide 
protection for Philippine security. In terms of domestic 
politics, it became something of a fashion to criticize 
American arrangements for the security of the Philippines 
as being inadequate or as an invitation to attack by other 
countries, especially because of the presence of U.S.
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military bases in the Philippines.
The Philippines acted in concert with the United
States during the Korean conflict by sending Philippine
combat troops to fight in Korea. The troops arrived in
Korea in September, 1950, with a total strength of 1,369
men. The actual number of Philippine soldiers, however,
varied continuously because of casualties, rotation, and
other factors. The actual number of troops during various
periods was as follows:
June 30, 1951 1,143
June 30, 1953 1,494
July 31, 1953 1,495
June 30, 1954 445
By June 17, 1955, all Filipino troops had gone home 
to the Philippines. The salaries of the troops were paid 
by the Philippine Government. Logistical support which 
was provided by the Eighth Army of the United States 
totaled $47,907,630.40.15
In the fall of 1964, the United States started dis­
cussions with the Philippines regarding the sending of a 
Philippine military contingent to South Vietnam. The dis­
cussions were first started with Philippine President 
Diosdado Macapagal and were carried over with President 
Marcos in late 1965 and 1966.15
Macapagal later on would privately confirm the per-
17suasions made upon him by Washington as follows:
President Johnson personally and through top 
advisors like the Secretary of State . . .
Defense and the American Ambassador . . . 
undertook steady persuasions as tactfully as 
they could to make my administration send a
2,000 men engineer contingent to Vietman. More
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out of conviction than their persuasion, I 
recommended to Congress in 1965 the dispatch 
of the contingent.
Macapagal's efforts were to no avail in the Phil­
ippine Congress because of the strong opposition led by 
Marcos, then Senate President. Despite the continued 
persuasion upon him by the United States, Macapagal de­
clined to certify the enactment of the bill to send a 
Philippine contingent to South Vietnam in the two special 
sessions of Congress after the regular session failed to 
enact the measure. It was suspected that Macapagal's 
refusal was based on his reaction to American policy:
It was not so much for my support of the project 
to send 2,000 men to Vietnam as on the basis of 
the general mutual cooperation between the two 
countries for the promotion of common objectives 
that I expected the Johnson administration to 
implement the terms of the Johnson-Macapagal com­
munique of October 6, 1964, which could assist my 
administration. The implementation turned out to 
be lukewarm as indicated by the fact that the
100,000 tons of rice committed to be shipped to 
the Philippines in 1965 did not arrive and, I
understand, was rerouted to Vietnam.^®
The original offer made to President Macapagal by 
the United States Government in order to induce him to
send a Philippine contingent to South Vietnam consisted
of the following
1. To equip PHILGAG ^[Fhilippine Civic Action Group, 
Vietnam/ in Vietnam on a loan basis and provide logistics 
support.
2. To pay overseas allowances, over and above the 
regular pay to be provided by the Philippine Government.
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3. To provide replacement costs for a replacement 
unit in the Philippines.
The Philippines was also offered the following, in 
addition to the above :
1. Two Swiftcraft over and above two committed ear­
lier. ,/Swiftcraft are river patrol craft about 50 feet 
in length_j7*
2. Accelerated funding in fiscal year 1966 of equip­
ment for three engineer construction battalions previous­
ly considered for later financing under the military 
assistance agreement.
3. M-14 rifles and M-60 machineguns for one battalion 
combat team to be funded in fiscal year 1966.
The additional equipment promised to the Philippine 
Government were to be funded by the Department of Defense 
from service funds as Vietnam-related costs and not from 
the military assistance program.
Because of Macapagal's intransigence, the United 
States Government made no further overtures upon him to 
send a Philippine unit to South Vietnam, probably prefer­
ring to wait it out until his successor, Ferdinand Marcos, 
was elected to the Philippine presidency.
Upon his election, Marcos made a turnabout and began 
to press for authorization from the Philippine Congress 
to appropriate funds to send a troop contingent unit to 
South Vietnam. Marcos disclaimed any pressures being 
brought to bear upon him by the American Government and 
emphasized in an address to the nation that the decision 
to ask Congress to appropriate funds for PHILCAG was not 
made
. . . for and in consideration of any additional
227
aid whether in dollars or any form from the 
United States. . . . Neither coercion, threats, 
blackmail, or dollars have dictated this judg­
ment. Now and in the future, only the national 
interest of the Philippines shall determine my 
decision.
In 1966, Marcos therefore adopted a "very high pub­
lic posture toward PHILCAG, supporting it strongly in 
major addresses and in pushing the necessary legislation 
through the Congress, linking this to Philippine nation­
al interests and formal requests for assistance from the 
Government of South Vietnam.
The American Government, however, also worked very 
hard in order to bring about the sending of a Philippine 
unit to South Vietnam. In fact, a Manila newspaper 
charged that
. . , the pressure on the Philippine government 
to send the military contingent to Viet-Nam is 
reminiscent of the drive to secure passage of 
the Bell Trade Act of 20 years ago. . . . The 
implication appears to be that no such aid can 
be expected if the condition is not fulfilled.
A Philippine legislator. Senate President Arturo 
Tolentino also denounced the "incredible pressures" 
applied upon the Filipino lawmakers. Tolentino remarked 
that while it was the government of South Vietnam that 
had requested Philippine help, it was the U.S. which re­
sorted to "intimidation" and other coercive measures to 
secure presidential support in the first instance.23 
American pressure was in fact subtly applied:
The Americans made a constant show of attention 
to the Philippines in early 1966. Vice President 
Humphrey came twice; Secretary of State Rusk and
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Ambassador Harriman came on the "peace offen­
sive" that Johnson had dispatched to all parts 
of the globe; General Lansdale came in from
Saigon to see his old friends, as did Congress­
man Zablocki from Washington.^4
Eventually, all these efforts paid off and Marcos 
sent a Philippine contingent to South Vietnam. American 
sources later on said that there were at least three 
factors that led to this action on the part of the 
Philippine Government. First, there was an active in­
terest on the part of the U.S. Government in bringing 
forces from other nations into the conflict in Vietnam.
On the basis of this interest, the U.S. Government ini­
tiated discussions with the Government of the Philippines, 
the Government of Thailand and the Government of Korea, 
and the Government of Australia, and the Government of 
New Zealand. Second, the Government of South Vietnam 
approached the Government of the Philippines directly 
and asked if they would make contribution. Third, it 
was believed that there was a considerable body of opinion 
in the Philippines itself which felt that such a contri­
bution should be made by the Government of the Philippines
in these circumstances.^5
As a result of this action, the Philippine Govern­
ment accepted officially the promise to equip the PHILCAG 
in Vietnam on a loan basis and provide a logistics support 
for it, as well as the offer to pay overseas allowances 
over and above the regular pay to be provided by the Phil- 
ipping Government. Actually, the Philippines practically 
received all the items promised by the U.S. Government 
except the offer to equip a replacement unit in the Phil-
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The Philippines also received $31.2 million in vet­
erans benefits and later in 1965, the U.S. House of 
Representatives voted to expand hospitalization and 
children's benefits for Philippine veterans of World 
War II. In 1966 it was also agreed that the Phil­
ippines and the United States would open discussions 
on the Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement.
Later in 1966, President Johnson, inspired by the 
idea that if Korea could send a 50,000 force to South 
Vietnam, the Philippines could possibly support a 
proportionally greater force instead of its tiny bat­
talion, instructed U.S. Ambassador Blair in the Phil­
ippines to work toward this end. However, in spite of
all U.S. efforts, the Philippines declined to increase
its force in South Vietnam.
The American reaction to this between 1966 and March 
1968 was their resentment at the smallness of the Phil­
ippine contingent. All in all, however, when everything 
it put into perspective by one writer;
Perhaps, the strongest card of the Fili­
pinos in bargaining with the Americans was their 
own weakness. They could do little actively for 
the United States, and in substantial measure, 
they thought that what they had been asked to do 
was not going to be terribly useful, and might 
be harmful. Nothing the United States could do 
would induce them to send 50,000 troops? they 
had their own very clear views of what was needed,
and knew they own limitations as well. Other
things being equal, their decision should have 
elicited more respect from Americans than the 
Thai decision, as it was openly, and less cyni­
cally, reached.
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Incidentally, in 1968, when the Philippines revived
its claim to Sabah, the Americans made clear, through
a spokesman of the State Department, that the United
States would not be involved in defending the Philippines
even "if her ally got her fingers burned over Sabah."
This statement angered one Filipino newsman to the point
that he wrote in the Manila Bulletin of July 24, 1968
that there was no reason why
. . . the Philippines must go on supporting 
America’s military adventure in Vietnam, when 
America cannot even be persuaded to support 
the Philippines in the first and most impor­
tant dispute t’ at confronts it and its nearest 
neighbors. . . . Washington evades every oppor­
tunity to express its support to its former 
colony.29
This generated a response from Philippine General
Yan who wrote that the Philippines had
unequivocally declared that it has no intention 
of resolving the Sabah dispute by fores. The 
relevance, therefore, of the RP-US Mutual Defense 
Treaty in relation to the Sabah dispute is hypo­
thetical.
Yan added that;
However, it must be pointed out that unlike 
in the case of SEATO, where the U.S. has 
officially limited its interpretation in 
case of external aggression in the Treaty 
Area to Communist aggression . . .  no such 
provision is present in the RP-US Mutual 
Defense Treaty.31
The Philippine position on the sending of a force 
to South Vietnam was based on part on a long-range 
assessment of the situation: an evaluation of the pres-
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sent and future configuration of forces in Southeast 
Asia. The Philippines did not merely wish to be in a 
position of supplying forces in order to secure con­
tinuation of American military economic aid programs: 
it also wished to influence the ongoing strategy of the 
war as much as possible and also to be able to partici­
pate in the peace settlement that would eventually take 
place.
In the Philippines, the important developments aris­
ing from the Mutual Defense Treaty were the establish­
ment of the Mutual Defense Board, the development of a 
contingency plan for the Philippines, and the holding 
of joint exercises between various units of the armed forces 
of the United States and the Philippines.
During the base negotiations of 1956, the Philippine 
Government proposed, and the U.S. Government agreed, that 
intergovernmental machinery should be established to 
carry out effectively the specified purposes and ob­
jectives of the security and defense agreements between 
the two countries. It was, therefore, agreed that the 
Mutual Defense Board should be established for the pur­
pose of providing continuing intergovernmental machinery 
for direct liaison and consultation between appropriate 
Philippine and U.S. authorities on military matters of 
mutual concern so as to develop and improve, through 
continuing military cooperation, the common defense of 
the two sovereign countries.
The Mutual Defense Board was first organized and 
had its first meeting on May 15, 1958. Thereafter, it
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has met monthly. The Board reports directly to the 
Council of Foreign Ministers which consist of the 
Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. 
Ambassador who acts in behalf of the'U.S. Secretary of 
State. In its annual meetings the Council of Foreign 
Ministers is in personal attendance. Copies of the 
minutes of the Board are distributed to all these offi­
cials as well as to the appropriate military members.
In 1959, the Board considered Communist China as 
the principal threat to the Philippines with possible 
assistance from internal dissident groups.
By reason of this threat and also in pursuit of 
treaty obligations between the U.S. and the Philippines, 
joint contingency plans for the defense of the Philippines 
have been drawn up. The plan has been described as a con­
tinuing operation.
The Jilutual Defense Board has authorized the estab­
lishment of a U.S. Air Force-Philippine Air Force Defense 
Syste. Officers of the U.S. Air Force serve as members 
of the air defense working group and consult on air de­
fense matters from time to time.
The U.S. Air Force has also supported joint training 
exercises in the Philippines. From February 1967 to 
August 9, 1969, alone, a total of 10 joint air defense 
exercises using simulated targets were used. From 
September 7, 1966 to August 27, 1969, wartime exercises 
totaled 124.
As for U.S. obligation to the Philippines in the 
event of foreign attack, it is interpreted to be restricted 
to armed attack under the terms of the mutual defense
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treaty. Such action to be taken in the event of armed 
attacked under the terms of the treaty was considered 
a mtter of the U.S. President's constitutional authority. 
Insofar as consultation with the U.S. Congress is con­
cerned, a statement made by U.S. Secretary of State 
Rogers on August 20, 1969 was referred to:
And I have said to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee that we fully understand 
the necessity for support in any military 
venture, both by Congress and the public.
If there is one thing that Vietnam has made 
clear it is that now we will, to the fullest 
extent of our ability, get the advice of 
Congress, consult with them along the way, 
and in any appropriate circumstances we will 
get their consent.
As for counterinsurgency efforts, the official U.S. 
Government position is that it does not support counter­
insurgency efforts as such in the Philippines. But it 
does have two programs which have a bearing on Philippine 
counterinsurgency efforts. One is the AID public safety 
program and the USMAG military assistance program. It is 
also U.S. policy that U.S. personnel are not authorized 
to participate in Philippine military operations of any 
kind.
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Organi­
zation. —  There is very little doubt that the Mutual 
Defense Treaty of 1951 made the SEATO commitment to the 
Philippines by the United States superflous as far as 
American security guarantees to that country were con-
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concerned. But even before the massive U.S. intervention 
in Vietnam, there was great importance attached to the 
Philippines in U.S. planning:
It is not generally understood that US poli­
cies in Southeast Asia today depend in great 
measure on a political and military partner­
ship with the Republic of the Philippines . .
. . The major concern of US policy is how to 
maintain and develop this peculiarly intimate, 
complex, and dynamic relationship. Without 
it the US position in Southeast Asia would be 
extremely difficult.
On March 6, 1974, another view of SEATO and the 
Philippines was made by Dr. George McT. Kahin in a hear­
ing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
when he said that in the Philippines the continuing exist­
ence of SEATO increases the possibility of the U.S. being 
drawn into military intervenion against insurgents. He 
explained this by saying that:
The same distortion of the SEATO treaty that 
permitted it to be used as authority for a 
presidentially-initiated military interven­
tion against insurgents in Vietnam could be
applied in the Philippines. 34
Dr. Kahin's objections to the continuation of SEATO 
with reference to the Philippines are based on a number 
of reasons:3^
While SEATO constitutes the sole basis 
for the American defense commitment to Thai­
land, in the Philippines this backing comes 
not only through SEATO but also through the 
antecedent bilateral. Mutual Defense Treaty 
signed in 1951. Through a series of execu­
tive actions, never submitted to the Senate 
for approval, this 1951 treaty has been re­
interpreted in a way that has committed the
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U.^. more heavily and with less flexibility 
than envisaged. In their combination, this 
Mutual Defense Treaty and U.S. obligations 
under SEATO, especially when perceived in 
the context of the islands major U.S. air 
and fleet bases, add up to a formidable 
American commitment.
The Philippines believed at the time it joined 
SEATO that its position in regional and world affairs 
would be strengthened by the alliance and hoped for 
further American military and economic aid and for pre­
ferential treatment. However, one Filipino statesman, 
after reading the 1959 Senate Hearings on US security 
commitments in the Philippines which he called the 
"Philippines' Pentagon Papers," concluded that "A Phil­
ippine foreign and security policy based in its present 
form would show all the symptoms of the congenital disease 
that proved so fatal in Bataan."3b
As for the United States, members of Congress were 
severely critical of the Philippine contribution as 
part of its SEATO commitments to the American war effort 
in South Vietnam. This subject is covered with some 
detail in the preceding section on the mutual defense 
treaty.
As far as the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty is concern, at the twentieth annual meeting of 
the SEATO Council of Ministers, which was held in New 
York on September 24, 1975, it was decided that the or­
ganization should le phased out over a two-year period.
The SEATO Secretary General was reported to have developed 
a plan which will permit the phase out to be conducted 
in an orderly and systematic manner. The plan is now
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being reviewed by representatives of the member nations.
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CHAPTER V I I I
THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE
In his perceptive study of the national interests 
of the United States in a changing world, Donald E. 
Nuechterlein attempts to draw a distinction between the 
terms national interest and public interest of that 
country. Nuechterlein views the public interest as the 
well-being of the American people and American enter­
prise within the territorial boundaries of the United 
States and national interest refers to the well-being of 
American citizens and American enterprise involved in 
international relations and affected by political forces 
beyond the administrative control of the United States 
government. The public interest is heavily influenced 
by the nature of the international environment in which 
the United States interacts, particularly when there is 
a threat of war, while the national interest is influenced 
by the degree of social stability and political unity pre­
vailing within the country at any given time. Nuechter­
lein then proceeds to discuss strategic interests as 
being derived from a clear perception of national in­
terests although they are only a second-order interests.
They are concerned with the political, economic 
and military means of protecting the nation 
against military dangers and are defined to
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a large degree by geography, the availability 
of scarce resources, military technology, and 
the limitation or damage which could be in­
flicted on American territory or that of an 
ally. Occasionally strategic interests tend 
to determine national interests, rather than 
the reverse, and in such cases confusion and 
overemphasis on military security often re­
sults.
The basic national interests of the United States 
are perceived by Nuechterléin to be three; defense, econo­
mic, and world order. Defense is the protection of the 
people, territory, and institutions of the United States 
against potential foreign dangers. Economic national in­
terest of the United States is the promotion of its inter­
national trade and investment, including protection of its 
private interests in foreign countries. The establishment 
of a peaceful international environment in which disputes 
between nations can be resolved without resort to war and 
in which collective security rather than unilateral action 
is employed to deter or cope with aggression represents 
the national interest of the United States in world order.
There are also what Nuechterlein calls transitory in­
terests; they are interests which are subject to change 
depending on the government's perception of their urgency 
at any given time and these are further divided into:
(1) survival interests, where the very existence of the 
nation is in peril; (2) vital interests, where probable 
serious harm could result to the security and well-being 
of the nation if strong measures, including the use of 
force, are not taken by the government; (3) major interests, 
where potential serious harm could come to the nation if no 
action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad; and
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(4) peripheral, or minor, interests, where little if any 
harm will result to the entire nation if a "wait and see' 
policy is adopted. Vital interests as conceived by Nuech­
terlein is practically the same as national interests 
since both seem to refer to "the protection of the coun­
try against probable dangers to its political survival 
and economic well-being and the promotion of a peaceful 
international environment.
In the case of the Philippines, Nuechterlein's con­
ceptual framework has some value in helping to chart its 
future problems and the course of its foreign policy.
The question of national objectives, the capability of 
the nation for achieving such objectives, and the imple­
mentation, or the actual expenditure of efforts and re­
sources in the pursuit of selected objectives, provide 
the framework for determing the course of future Philippine 
foreign policy.
Alliances and Special Relations. Alliances or the 
policy of alliances is believed to have been of some 
value to the United States. In the words of Robert E. 
Osgood:3
Not only have they /alliance^ been a major means 
of protecting American power; they have also been 
the most prominent instrumentality by which the 
nation has related itself to a vastly expanded 
role in the international area. In addition to 
being calculated instruments of deterrence, al­
liances have appealed to the American ideal of 
organizing order by means of collective institu­
tions. They have been the nearest thing to ("col­
lective security in a world of power politics.
They have been documentary evidence of America's
244
effort to organize the "free world" against 
"communist aggression." Thus, in hundreds 
of pronouncements, official and unofficial,
American spokesmen have hailed the forty- 
two allies of the United States as interde­
pendent links in a collective system of de­
terrence, which departs from old-fashioned 
alliances and provides a barrier against 
the anarchy of nationalism. . . . "The in­
tegrity of these alliances," says Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk, "is at the heart of the 
maintenance of peace, and if it should be 
discovered that the pledge of the United 
States is meaningless, the structure of 
peace would crumble, and we would be well 
on our way to a terrible catastrophe.
The alliances established by the United States at 
the end of World War II followed several doctrines as 
established by its policymakers. Foremost among these 
doctrines was the doctrine of containment. For twenty 
years, the concept of containment provided a coherent frame­
work for the East Asian policy of the United States:
Defense commitments, military bases, 
and U.S. forces deployed in the western 
Pacific formed the skeleton of the con­
tainment policy, but it was fleshed out 
with all the tools of modern diplomacy 
to restrict the power and influence of 
the adversaries of the United States and 
rapidly strengthen its allies. The pur­
pose of the policy was not only to deter 
the Chinese Communists and their allies 
from using military force to extend their 
dominion, but also to confine and weaken 
their political influence. American 
leaders believed that increases in Pe­
king's prestige and political and econo­
mic influence would facilitate its sup­
port of communist insurgents in Southeast 
Asia.4
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In short:
Although the methods by which the contain­
ment policy was carried out were many-sided and 
complex, its purpose was quite simply to prevent 
the expansion of territory in Asia under commu­
nist control. In a largely bipolar world it was 
assumed that seizures of power by communist par­
ties supported by China and the USSR would add 
to the strength of the Sino-Soviet bloc and ^
weaken the coalition headed by the United States.
In 1946, the principal inter-departmental organiza­
tion concerned with the coordination of foreign and mili­
tary policies was the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com­
mittee, otherwise known as SWNCC.^ It held its first 
meeting on December 19, 1944, and continued its work 
until 1948 when, upon the establishment of the National 
Security Council, its work was terminated. The files of 
the SWNCC contain some of the basic policies of the United 
States for those years when the principal enemy of the 
United States was perceived to be the USSR. For the Phil­
ippines, the policies formulated by the United States de­
termined the retention of military bases by the U.S. in 
the Philippines, the conclusion of the mutual defense 
treaty as part of the Japanese peacy settlement, and in 
later years, U.S. policy toward Indo-China led to the 
signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
In the early years of the Republic of the Philippines, its 
foreign policy was clearly to follow the lead of the United 
States in foreign affairs.
In the files of SWNCC, there is a memorandum prepared 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated March 27, 1946, and 
classified as "Top Secret" and numbered SWNCC 282. The
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document establishes that the basic purpose for maintain­
ing the armed forces of the United States is to provide 
for its security and to uphold and advance its national 
policies, foreign and domestic. The document then enu­
merates the major national policies which determine the 
military policy of the United States as follows:
a. Maintenance of the territorial integrity 
and security of the United States, its territo­
ries, possessions, leased areas and trust terri­
tories.
b. Advancing the political, economic and 
social well-being of the United States.
c. Maintenance of the territorial integri­
ty and the sovereignty or political independence 
of other American states, and regional collabo­
ration with them in the maintenance of interna­
tional peace and security in the Western Hemis­
phere.
d. Maintenance of the territorial integrity, 
security and, when it becomes effective, the po­
litical independence of the Philippine Islands.
e. Participation in and full support of 
the United Nations Organization.
f. Enforcement, in collaboration,with our 
Allies, of terms imposed upon the defeated ene­
my states.
g. Maintenance of the United States in the 
best possible relative position with respect
to potential enemy powers, ready when necessary 
to take military action abroad to maintain the 
security and integrity of the United States.^
As part of its general military policy in order to 
be prepared to take prompt and effective military action
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wherever necessary with the armed forces of the United 
States, it was recommended that the United States main­
tain the security of the United States, its territories, 
possessions, leased areas, trust territories and the 
Philippine Islands. Among the principal supporting mi­
litary policies was to develop and maintain a system 
of outlying bases, adequately equipped and defended and 
also to maintain liaison with and to support the develop­
ment of the armed forces of the Philippines with other
nations which contribute to the security of the United 
8
States.
In another document entitled "Policy Concerning Pro­
vision of United States Government Military Supplies for 
Post-War Armed Forces of Foreign Nations" dated March 21, 
1946, and classified also top secret as SWNCC 202/2, 
there is a statement about the authorization conferred 
upon the President of the United States to acquire and 
retain bases in the Philippines for the mutual protection 
of the Philippine Islands and the United States. The 
same document, therefore, concludes:
It can, therefore, be said that there is an 
obligation to aid the armed forces of the 
Philippines by making available to them United 
States military supplies not only for their 
security but also for the security of the 
United States. In addition, it is essential 
that measures be taken to insure peace and 
order in the Philippines following the grant­
ing of complete independence on July 4, 1946.
These citations from government documents of the 
United States indicate that policies had already formu­
lated for the defense of the security of the Philippines
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as part of the military policy of the United States.
There were also other considerations involved on poli­
tical and economic grounds. The United States wanted 
to make sure that the Philippines survived as a free 
nation and economically, it desired that the Philippines 
be able to maintain a viable republican government on a 
sound economic foundation.
This concern by the United States for the Philippines 
has been viewed in two different perspectives. One, such 
a relationship was based on imperialism and has been la­
belled "neo-colonialism." The other term used for a dif­
ferent view is "special relationship."
According to the first point of view,
Filipinos . . . tend to see themselves 
as members of a society, subject for over 
three centuries, which was the first among 
Asian societies to coalesce in a nationalist 
movement and, after a prolonged struggle, 
achieve independence. This independence 
was compromised, however, by arrangements 
accepted in the environment of uncertainty 
which attended the transfer of power after 
World II, or which were accepted under duress 
as the emergence of Communist China promised 
a hostile international environment.10
This lingering colonial complex was not only exter­
nal in its character, that is, superimposed by a dominant 
superpower, but it was in fact due to character of the 
Filipino himself. In the words of the late Senator Claro 
M. Recto, one of the most respected intellectuals among 
political leaders of his day:
Our peculiar situation has been heightened 
by the unique circumstances in which we attained
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our independence. The other liberated Asian 
nations have been spared the ambiguities un­
der which we labor? they faced issues that 
were clear-cut; blood and tears, exploita­
tion and subjugation, and centuries of enmity 
divided the Indonesians from the Dutch, the 
Indians and the Burmese from the British, 
the Vietnamese from the French; and their 
nationalist victories were not diluted by 
sentiments of gratitude, or by regrets, 
doubts, and apprehensions.
But an intensive and pervasive cul­
tural colonization, no less than an en­
lightened policy of gradually increasing 
autonomy, dissolved whatever hatreds and 
resentments were distilled in the Filipino- 
American war, and, by the time of the enact­
ment of the Jones Law, promising independence 
upon the establishment of a stable govern­
ment, an era of goodwill was firmly opened.
. . . The vicissitudes and triumphs of the 
common struggle against the Japanese Empire 
completed the extraordinary structure, and 
it was not at all strange or unexpected that, 
when our independence was finally proclaimed, 
it was not so much an act of separation, as 
one of "more perfect union."
This first interpretation of the relationship bet­
ween the Philippines and the United States is extremely 
critical of the security arrangements between the two 
countries, for it looks upon such arrangements merely as 
an excuse for the United States to continue to exercise 
control or surveillance upon a former colony in the pur­
suit of its own objectives of national interest. In the 
first twenty years of the existence of the Republic of 
the Philippines, this was not the popular nor the official 
view of such relations. In the late sixties and in the
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early seventies, this has increasingly been the popular 
view and is also reflected in official statements by 
leading statesmen of the Philippines, especially by its 
leader. President Ferdinand Marcos. The net result of 
this position has been called a policy of self-reliance.
A second interpretation of Philippine-American re­
lations is one labelled "special relationship." In one 
sense, this relationship connotes the emotional interplay 
between the two countries which stretches back over more 
than half a century —  a relationship which started with 
a degree of hostility in the conflict over the annexa­
tion of the Philippines by the United States but which 
gradually developed into one of mutual trust until it was 
finally cemented by the sharing of common hardships and 
sacrifices occasioned by World War II.
This special relationship in terms of geography, 
history, ideology, and economic assistance is evidenced 
in the military alliance which guarantees Philippine 
security buttressed by economic assistance. But with 
the years, American national interests in Southeast 
Asia (which includes the Philippines) have changed.
Although President Nixon made the following pledge:
. . . Our bilateral treaties with Japan, 
the Republic of China, the Philippines, and 
the Republic of Korea remain the touchstone 
of regional stability. Similarly, our mul- 
lateral security pacts —  ANZUS and SEATO —  
have made a valued contribution peace. They 
have been and will be honored.
He also expressed the hope
. . . that we can initiate a new era in Phil-
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ippine-American relations, not returning 
to the old special relationships because 
the winds of change have swept away these 
factors, but building a new relationship, 
a new relationship that will be based on 
mutual trust, on mutual respect, on mutual 
confidence, on mutual cooperation.^^
The "winds of change" did, indeed, sweep over Asia. 
The seventies brought about changing great power rela­
tions, a changing context for minor-power policies, 
changing military power relationships, changing economic 
power relationships, and changing moral-political rela­
tionships.
The result of these changes was the enunciation of
the Nixon Doctrine, which in 1969
. . . sought to induce allies of the United 
States to assume a larger share of the burden 
of providing for their own security and for 
the economic development of the developing 
nations. It proposed a partnership between 
Western Europe and Japan befitting their in­
creased economic power. It also sought to 
cross the barriers separating the United 
States from its principal adversaries, the 
Soviet Union and China, to reach agreements 
that would moderate past differences and 
open areas for cooperation. Its objective 
was to create and expand pressure groups 
within the societies on both sides that would 
have a vested interest in diminishing the 
risk of war and promoting constructive coopera­
tion.^^
The Nixon doctrine has been elaborated to mean that
so far as the Southeast Asian nations are concerned.
1, The United States will maintain its 
treaty commitments, but it is anticipated 
that Asian nations will be able to handle 
their own defense problems, perhaps with
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some outside material assistance but without 
outside manpower. Nuclear threats are another 
matter, and such threats will continue to be 
checked by counterpoised nuclear capacity.
2.As a Pacific power, the United States 
will not turn its back on nations of the 
Western Pacific and Asia; the countries of 
that region will not be denied a concerned 
and understanding ear in this Nation.
3. The United States will avoid the 
creation of situations in which there is 
such great dependence on us that, inevitably, 
we become enmeshed in what are essentially 
Asian problems and conflicts.
4. To the extent that material assis­
tance may be forthcoming from the United 
States, more emphasis will be placed on 
economic help and less on military assis­
tance .
5. The future role of the United States 
will continue to be significant in the af­
fairs of Asia. It will be enacted, however, 
largely in the economic realm and on the 
basis of multilateral cooperation.
6 . The United States will look with 
favor on multilateral political, economic, 
and security arrangements among the Asian 
nations and, where appropriate, will assist
in efforts which may be undertaken thereunder.
In effect, therefore, containment in its classic 
form is no longer a viable doctrine in that part of the 
world because (1) American withdrawal from South Viet­
nam has created a serious blow to American credibility 
in complying with its alliance commitment; (2) the Nixon 
doctrine with its ambiguities raises the idea that Asians 
must assume more responsibility for their own defense;
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(3) since containment policy in Southeast Asia was aimed 
at the People's Republic of China, the recent understand­
ings and relaxation of tensions between that country and 
the United States have certainly put that policy into 
disrepute and questionable utility; (4) the Asian nations 
themselves do not seem to agree that Peking is a threat 
to their security and such an agreement is an indispen­
sable condition for the success of policies modeled 
on European-type containment; (5) Asian nations perceive 
that the United States is unlikely to succeed in arousing 
a high level of fear among them about China unless Peking 
behaves in a manner more threatening to them collective­
ly and individually; (6) nationalism is a divisive force 
in Asia with which the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and the People's Republic will have to contend; 
and (7) the real problem of the United States is the po­
tential rise of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in 
Asia, other than containing Communism.
The reaction of the Philippines to the changed en­
vironment relative to relations with the U.S. was arti­
culated by President Marcos in summary form as f o l l o w s ; 17
1. The Mutual Defense Pact between the 
U.S. and the Philippines does not require the 
former to defend the latter against attack 
by other states. Rather American action de­
pends on the will of the United States Congress. 
Thus, the commitments of Presidents Eisenhower 
and Johnson are not binding, nor would those
of President Ford have any substance unless ex­
plicitly underwritten by Congressional legis­
lation.
2. Ironically, although American forces 
cannot be relied upon to defend the Philippines,
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the latter's forces would be required to de­
fend American forces if attacked in the Phil­
ippines.
3. The existence of American forces in 
the Philippines are a provocation to China 
and Vietnam, as well as to the Soviet Union.
It is the view of President Marcos, therefore, that 
security arrangements with the United States "are apparent­
ly dependent on the mood of the U.S. during any histori­
cal period." Because of this uncertainty, Marcos pointed 
out that:
The United States must understand we cannot 
wait until events overtake us. We reserve 
the right to make our own accommodations 
with the emerging realities in Asia. . . .
I do ask, with all the sincerity of trusted 
friends, whether the bases have not outlived 
their usefulness, whether they have not lived 
beyond their appointed task. I do ask whether 
our Mutual Defense Treaty in the light of Indo- 
China has not become a dead letter.
This statement marks a considerable departure in
the direction of Philippine foreign policy as observed
by George E . Taylor :
The Filipinos . . . went along With all the 
major developments of U.S. policy in Asia.
They accepted both economic and military aid, 
refused to recognize Communist China, allowed 
American forces to remain on Philippine soil, 
sent troops to fight in Korea, sponsored the 
Manila Charter, joined SEATO, spoke up for 
democratic ideals and hopes at Bandung, and 
in general stood firmly by their former guardian 
and present ally.
As for U.S. military bases, Philippine Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo recently pointed out
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the negative aspects of U.S. military bases:
In the world emerging in Asia, U.S. bases 
have these negative effects on the new Phil­
ippine foreign policy. First, they tend to 
retard our hopes for accomodations with the 
communist powers in Asia. Second, they di­
minish our credibility with our Southeast 
Asian neighbors as well as with many non- 
aligned countries, with whom we are trying 
to forge new and stronger links. 20
Besides the changing context of Philippine-American 
"special relations" in terms of U.S. national interests 
and policies which resulted in U.S. military withdrawal 
from South Vietnam, the Sino-American rapprochement, and 
the emergence of Japan as a regional power, there were other 
factors which affected that special relations. First, 
there was the termination of the Laurel-Langley Agrément 
of 1955, superseding the Bell Trade Act of 1946, on July 
3, 1974. With it ended the whole system of preferential 
trade as well as the parity clause in the Philippine Cons­
titution which permitted Americans to invest in the Phil­
ippines on terms equal to Filipino citizens but denied 
other foreign investors. This meant that there would be 
no more charges of neo-colonial impositions by the United 
States upon the Philippines and a movement towards a more 
normal third-country relationship.
Recent events have shown Philippine accomodation 
to what it refers to as the emerging realities of the 
world environment. Diplomatic relations have been estab­
lished between the People's Republic of China and more re­
cently, on June 1, 1976, diplomatic relations were estab­
lished with the Soviet Union.
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In terms of alliance theory, what does this all add 
up to considering this background of special relations 
between the United States and the Philippines? What are 
the prospects of the alliance between these two countries? 
What are the alternatives open to the Philippines?
Prospects of the Alliance. The general considera­
tions involving U.S. policy of containment has already 
been discussed as it affects the alliance between the 
Philippines and the United States. Perhaps the second 
theoretical consideration that is involved at this point 
is the theory of balance of power.
In Asia, containment is actually a reaffirmation of 
the strategic principle that no single continental power 
was to be permitted to conquer or dominate the nation­
state. The theoretical formulation of this idea is best 
stated uy Hans Morgenthau who concluded that
. . . underlying the confusions, reversals of 
policy, and moralistic generalities of our 
Asiatic policy since McKinley, one can detect 
a consistency chat reflects, however vaguely, 
the permanent interest of the United States 
in Asia. And this interest is again the main­
tenance of the balance of power. . . . However 
unsure the United States has been in its Asia­
tic policy, it has always assumed that the do­
mination of China by another nation would lead 
to so great an accumulation of power as to 
threaten the security of the United States .21
This balance or pattern of power, the central fea­
ture of which was the conflict between the Sino-Soviet 
bloc and the American alliance system, apparently existed 
in Asia and the Pacific in the 1950's. But there are
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signs that this pattern of power is disintegrating in the 
seventies. Instead of a bipolar pattern, there are signs 
that there may be a multi-power pattern that will emerge 
with four powers dominating the Asian scene: the United 
States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, 
and Japan. The development of this multi-power arrange­
ment in Asia and the Pacific may well result in a dimi­
nished community of interest among the partners of the 
American alliances in the Pacific. In the opinion of 
Hedley Bull, this means the decay of the American alliance 
system in the Pacific.
Not only has there been a change in the power pattern 
in Asia, but tremendous advances in war technology such 
as nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
and mobile forces have created shifts in military think­
ing that most certainly will affect the status of the 
American-Philippine alliance.
For the United States, the potential use of nuclear 
weapons for an all-out war may have created untenable 
demands from commitments undertaken in the defense of 
its allies threatened by nuclear destruction. For nations 
allied to the United States there continually exists the 
threat of nuclear destruction simply because they are 
allies of the U.S. The small nations, particularly, have 
reason to think that while their alliance with the United 
States has some advantages, there exists at least one dis­
advantage: that such a relationship will involve them in 
nuclear conflicts not of their own making. Since small 
nations have relatively little power to influence changes 
in the international environment, they become helpless
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pawns in the conflicts generated by gre^k powers. Henry 
Kissinger eloquently makes a case for the impact of nuclear 
weapons upon alliances:
Nowhere are the dilemmas of the nuclear age 
more apparent than in the attempt to construct 
a system of alliances against Soviet aggression.
It reveals once more the problem of establishing 
a relationship between a policy of deterrence 
and the strategy we are prepared to implement, 
between the temptation to pose a maximum threat 
and the tendency to recoil before it. In our 
alliance policy, these problems are compounded 
by the vulnerability of our allies and the sense 
of impotence produced because they are either 
junior partners in the atomic race or excluded 
from it altogether. Moreover, we have never 
been clear about the strategy behind our alliance 
policy —  whether we mean to defend our allies 
against invasion or whether we rely on an over­
all strategy superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet 
bloc to defeat aggression. To us this choice 
may represent a strategic option; to our allies
it appears as a matter of life and death. 22
Deterrence is another concept inextricably involved 
with alliances. Generally, deterrence is defined as sim­
ply persuading one's opponent that the costs and/or risks
of a given course of action he might take outweight its
benefits.
The chief purpose of the over-all alliance structure 
set up by the United States since the end of World War II 
was to surround the Soviet periphery with a system of al­
liances so that an attack upon any part of it will always 
confront the aggressor with an alignment of powers which 
would make him hesitate to strike. The concept of de­
terrence, however, has some weaknesses which thereby 
undermine the alliance system. Again, as Kissinger points
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out.
As long as our strategic doctrine threatens 
to transform every war into an all-out war, 
our allies will not only be reluctant to 
make a military effort of their own; they 
will also seek in most issues likely to 
be in dispute, to keep us from running 
major risks ourselves.23
Moreover, as Kissinger emphasizes, the acid test of an 
alliance is its ability to achieve agreement on two re­
lated problems —  whether a given challenge represents 
aggression, and, if so, what form resistance should take.
Linked to alliance systems is the existence of over­
seas bases to deter aggression. Bases, however, also 
have the disadvantage of high vulnerability as pointed 
out by Albert Wohlstettei in "The Delicate Balance of Ter­
ror." 24
But perhaps the most crucial factor that should be 
taken into consideration insofar as the alliance between 
the Philippines and the United States is concerned is 
the gradual change in the opinion involving the strategic 
importance of the Philippines. The acquisition of the 
Philippines provided the United States with a commercial 
and military avenue to the Orient. At the conclusion of 
World War II, Dwight Eisenhower asserted that anyone can 
see the importance of the Philippines as a Pacific air 
center?^ In March, 1949, General Douglas McArthur stated
that I
Now the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon 
lake and our line of defense runs through the 
chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia.
It starts from the Philippines and continues 
through the Ryukyus archipelago, which includes
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its broad main bastion. Then it bends back 
through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain
to Alaska.26
Lately, however, the views about the strategic use­
fulness of the Philippines to the United States are being 
challenged. An Asian scholar, Bernard K. Gordon, recom­
mends t h a t : 27
. . . an unsentimental approach to U.S.-Phil­
ippine relations, despite the many historic 
and friendly ties between the two countries, 
would require that full weight be given to 
the deteriorating politico-economic environ­
ment in the Philippines as well as the rela­
tive non-involvement of the Philippines in 
wider Asian affairs. Logic based on these 
considerations leads in one direction for 
U.S. policy: it suggests that there is not 
wholly persuasive evidence on which to base 
the belief that the U.S. will continue auto­
matically to regard the security of the Phil­
ippines as a vital U.S. national interest.
As for U.S. military bases in the Philippines, they 
were regarded as high-priority candidates for reduction 
or elimination and relatively poor prospects in either 
use or size in a Rand study.
There is also the view that in defending Philippine 
interests in Southeast Asia, the United States might get 
embroiled in larger conflicts, especially in the light 
of its commitments. Besides this consideration, the fol­
lowing reasons have been advanced as to why the United 
States should withdraw from its Philippine bases before 
it may be required to do so:
First, is the nature of our commitment 
to the Filipinos themselves, especially under 
Nixon Doctrine modifications. We are not com-
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committed to operating bases in the Philippines 
until 1991; we merely have the right to do so.
Second, if the Philippines develops the 
capability to defend itselt against conven­
tional attack, as is our stated objective, 
then U.S. forces would have no local defense 
responsibilities. Consequently our own stra­
tegic concerns could dictate the positioning 
of U.S. combat forces in the Pacific, and we 
would be free to effect a strategically sound 
and economical consolidation into an interior 
position.
Third, U.S.-Philippine relations are 
reaching a crucial period; and the volatile 
political situation there, coupled with the 
lack of bases that could be considered abso­
lutely vital to our Pacific presence might 
simply make it in our best interests to 
leave.29
There is one other important aspect of U.S. policy 
which has a crucial impact upon the existing alliance 
between the United States and the Philippines. This is 
the U.S. policy of detente with the USSR and the People's 
Republic of China. Began early in the Administration of 
President Nixon, this series of diplomatic initiatives 
called detentehas led to major shifts in the posture of 
the United States toward the nations of the communist 
world. Meaning literally, as a relaxation of tensions, 
detent has brought about a thawing of relations with main­
land China, with some of the European satellite countries, 
and most particularly with the Soviet Union.
The policy of detente has been articulated in a num­
ber of policy statements. On April 10, 1975, President
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Gerald Ford mentioned détente during an address before a 
joint session of Congress:
The United States and the Soviet Union share 
an interest in lessening tensions and building 
a more stable relationship. During this process 
we have never had any illusions.
We know that we are dealing with a nation 
that reflects different principles and is our 
competitor in many parts of the globe. Through 
a combination of firmness and flexibility, the 
United States in recent years laid the basis of 
a more reliable relationship founded on mutual 
interest and mutual restraint. But we cannot 
expect the Soviet Union to show restraint in 
the face of the United States' weakness or 
irresolution. As long as I am President Ameri­
ca will maintain its strength, its alliances . 
and its principles as a prerequisite to a more 
peaceful planet. As long as I am President, we 
will not permit detente to become a license to 
fish in troubled waters. Detente must be and 
I trust will be a two-way relationship.^®
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified on Septem­
ber 19, 1974, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela­
tions on U.S. relations with Communist countries. His tes­
timony included the following words about detente:
Deténte is admittedly far from a modern 
equivalent to the kind of stable peace that 
characterized most of the 19th century. But 
it is a long step away from the bitter and 
aggressive spirit that has characterized so 
much of the post-war period.
In the light of the U.S. policy of détente, the Phil­
ippines has also undertaken steps in order to establish 
friendly relations with Communist countries, particularly 
Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China.
On June 9, 1975, the Philippines and the People's
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Republic of China decided upon mutual recognition and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. In a joint commu­
nique issued on that day, the two governments declared 
that the difference between the economic, political, and 
social systems between the two countries should not cons­
titute an obstacle to peaceful coexistence and the estab­
lishment of peaceful and friendly relations in accordance 
with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non­
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, 
and mutual benefit. The two governments also agreed to 
settle all disputes by peaceful means on the basis of
the preceding principles without resorting to the use or
32
threat of force.
In the same communique, the two governments agreed 
that all foreign aggression and subversion and all attempts 
by any country to control any other country or to inter­
fere in its internal affairs are to be condemned. They 
stated their opposition to any attempt by any country 
or group of countries to establish hegemony or create 
spheres of influence in any part of the world.
As a result of the establishment of diplomatic rela­
tions between the two countries, the Philippine government 
announced the termination of all existing official rela­
tions between the Philippines and Taiwan.
More recently, the Philippines established diplomatic 
relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on June 2, 1976. Both governments affirmed that the 
relations between the USSR and the Philippines shall be
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based on the principles of peaceful coexistence: 
mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.
In a joint Soviet-Philippine statement, it was also 
announced that the two countries signed a trade agreement 
that would provide a framework for the expansion of trade 
between the two countries on an equitable and mutually 
beneficial basis. The two countries also pronounced 
themselves in favor of initiating scientific and techni­
cal cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of the 
Philippines, and. in this connection expressed their in­
tention to promote exchanges of scientists and postgraduate
students, and to widen contacts between research organi-
34
zations and institutions of the two countries.
The two countries also emphasized the importance of 
cultural exchanges in promoting mutual understanding and 
friendship between the peoples of the two countries and 
agreed to encourage further the development of contacts 
in the fields of culture, education and sports.
Both the Soviet Union and the Philippines, in the 
joint statement, attached great importance to the strengthen­
ing of peace and stability in Asia and declared the deter­
mination of each of them to facilitate in every possible 
way the further relaxation of tensions in the region and 
the creation of conditions for making Asia a continent of 
peace, freedom, and constructive international coopera­
tion.
In the joint statement the two countries pronounced
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themselves in favor of bringing about general and complete 
disarmament, covering nuclear as well as conventional wea­
pons. They also denounced imperialism and colonialism in 
all their forms and manifestations.
The Philippines was the last nation in the Far East 
to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
In the light of these developments discussed above, 
what are the alternatives left to the Philippines?
Alternatives to Alliance. —  The Philippines might 
exercise the option to continue its alliance relation­
ship with the United States. The United States still 
considers the Philippines important as an ally. On June 
24, 1975, Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib 
declared that:
In security matters, the Philippines has 
traditionally been one of our closest and most 
important treaty allies in East Asia. The de­
fense commitments and mutual security interests 
of both countries are formally embodied in long­
standing agreements. We have military bases in 
the Philippines, the existence of which is im­
portant both for Philippine defense and for ^5
broader security interests of the United States.
In the negotiations now going on in Washington, D.C. over 
U.S. military bases in the Philippines, the view has been 
expressed that the United States intends to retain the 
bases in that country.
In the hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related 
Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 before a 
subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the 
United States Senate, Lt. Gen. H. M. Fish, Director of
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the Defense Security Assistance Agency, testified that 
the United States has an important military interest in 
the Philippines because of its strategic l o c a t i o n . I n  
the same hearings, the Honorable Carlyle E. Maw, Under 
Secretary of State for Security Assistance and the Hon­
orable Daniel K. Inouye, chairman of the subcommittee on 
approoriations had the following colloquy
PHILIPPINE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Senator INOUYE: According to the press
reports, the President of the Philippines is 
suggesting that his country is to take full 
control of the bases we have at Clark and the 
Pacific Bay.
What will happen to the grant and ma­
terial assistance programs?
Mr. MAW, Negotiations are about to be­
gin. As you know, we have enjoyed very im­
portant bases in the Philippines, but they 
are not tied together with the military as­
sistance and development programs as a quid 
pro quo. The entire relationship is now, of 
course, under study with regard to the bases.
Senator INOUYE. Has the United States 
received formal communication of the proposal 
of the President of the Philippines?
Mr. MAW. No. I think that all of this 
is in the newspapers.
In the same hearings mentioned above, there is also 
the following table which appears as part of the appendix 
to the hearings:^®
TRANSFERS OF U.S. RESOURCES TO
Philippines 
(In Thousands of Dollars)
FY 1974 
• Actual
FY 1975 
Estimated
FY 1976 
Proposed
Militarv Assistance (Sub-total)
f ^  O U
26.814
, /Ü O
31.002 58.177
Military Assistance Program 15,981 21,000 20,350
MAAG's Mission & Military Groups:
Military Department Support 1,113 1,002 927
Excess Defense Articles 1,120 2,000 19,500
Foreign Military Credit Sales 8,600 7,000 17,400
Economic Assistance (Sub<-total) 60,542 56,276 45.739
Agency for International Development
Food Production and Nutrition 21,464 39,171 20,700
Population Planning and Health 21,194 5,615 14,700
Education & Human Resources
Development 274 50 100
Security Supporting Assistance 544 157 -
Public Law 480 16,714 10,927 10,129
International Narcotics Control 352 356 110
Other Assistance (Sub-total) 2,883 2,487 2.597
Peace Corps 2,543 .2,115 2,183
Mutual Education & Cultural 340 372 414
to
cn
-o
Exchange
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The most cursory reading of the table on page 265 
will show that there is a substantial increase in the total 
amount representing the value of all U.S. resources trans­
ferred to the Philippines during the period from 1974 to 
1976. The total amount proposed for the fiscal year 1976, 
in terms of all U.S. resources transferred to the Phil­
ippines, is $106,513,000, compared to a total amount of 
$90,230,000 for the fiscal year 1974.
The same table shows a consistent increase in the 
total amount appropriated for military assistance. For 
the fiscal year 1976, the total amount proposed for military 
assistance to the Philippines by the United States, is 
$58,177,000 compared to a total amount of only $26,814,000 
for the fiscal year 1974.
On the other hand, there appears to be a decline in 
the amounts designated for economic assistance to the Phil­
ippines by the United States. The total amount proposed 
for the fiscal year 1976 is $45,739,000 compared to a total 
amount of $60,542,000 actually appropriated for the fiscal 
year 1974. Perhaps the most dramatic decrease in appropria­
tions designated for a specific purpose is the one for 
international narcotis control. For the fiscal year 1954, 
the amount of $352,000 was actually appropriated for that 
item, while for the fiscal year 1976, only the amount of 
$110,000 is proposed to be appropriated.
Appropriations for the Peace Corps have also been 
trimmed by Congress as it appears in the preceding table, 
while the amount appropriated for mutual education and cul­
tural exchange has been substantially increased for 1976.
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Justification for the 1977 development assistance 
program for the Philippines in AID's proposed fiscal year 
1977 budget, was premised by Arthur Z. Gardiner, Assis­
tant Administrator, Bureau for Asia, Agency for Interna­
tional Development, among other things, on the follow­
ing :
Primarily because of inflation, real 
wages in the Philippines have decreased 
steadily since 1970; today the purchasing 
power of the wage earner is about 65% of 
what it was in 1970. Seventy percent of 
all Filipinos live in the countryside.
Although they account for 50% of total 
employment, they produce only one-third 
of the net domestic product. While the 
World Bank figures show an average per 
capita income of around $270, real per 
capita income of much of the rural popu­
lation is substantially below this figure.
In recent years, the government has become 
increasingly aware of the disparity bet­
ween urban and rural well-being and has 
channelled more and more effort into narrow­
ing it. Our aid has attempted to support 
this policy
Gardiner also pointed out in his statement that 
agricultural production has not kept pace with the high 
2.9% population growth rate and the Philippines has had 
to import rice, its major food crop, in all but three of 
the last seventy-five years. It is not surprising, there­
fore, that:
Largely as a reflection of imbalances in do­
mestic food crops, deficiencies in distribu­
tion, and the poverty accompanying low per 
capita agricultural productivity, daily con­
sumption averages only 1.673 calories against 
the recommended minimum of 2.260 calories.^®
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With the continued assistance of the United States 
the Philippines may hope to alleviate the effects of the 
foregoing problems —  problems which the Philippines 
has been trying to cope with for a long time. The other 
serious problems that the Philippines may have to con­
tend with, if it decides to forego the status quo and 
seek other alternatives, are domestic insurgencies oc­
casioned by uprisings of Communist groups like the 
Hukbalahaps and other similar organizations and the 
Muslim separatist movement in Southern Philippines.
These are the internal or domestic conditions that 
the Philippines will have to contend with if it decides 
to go it alone in a policy of self-reliance. Or the 
Philippines may opt for membership in the Asian collective 
security system proposed by Brezhnev in a speech to the 
June 1969 international Conference of Communist and 
Workers' Parties. As further elucidated by Kosygin on 
March 14, 1972, on the occasion of the visit of the prime 
minister of Afghanistan, Abdul Zahir, to Moscow, the pro­
posal meant:
Measures taken by Asian states to ensure col­
lective security in that area would contribute 
to the consolidation of peace in Asia. A sys­
tem of collective security in Asia could be 
based on such principles as renunciation of 
the use of force in the settlement of issues 
in disputes between states, peaceful coexis­
tence of states with different social systems, 
and the development of mutually advantageous 
cooperation, that is principles which fully 
comply with the United Nations Charter and 
are in no way directed against any state.
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Kosygin's idea of collective security was further
elaborated upon by Brezhnev about six days later with
a slightly more detailed statement of principles:
Collective security in Asia, as we see it,
• should be based on the principles of renun­
ciation of the use of force in relations bet­
ween states, respect for sovereignty and in­
violability of borders, non-interference in 
internal affairs, the broad development of 
economic and other cooperation, on the basis 
of complete equality of rights and mutual 
benefits.42
Despite Soviet advocacy and efforts to suggest a 
growing tide of support for the collective security 
proposal, there appears to be no Asian government that 
has shown willingness to endorse it. One writer has 
suggested that in fact there does not appear to be much 
of a future in Southeast Asia for Soviet-style "collective
4 .0
security."
Another alternative for the Philippines would be 
to place reliance upon the ASEAN for future security 
protection. ASEAN is a five-member Association of South- 
East Asian Nations, founded in 1967 by Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Since its 
organization, ASEAN has achieved a limited amount of 
economic cooperation among the members and bilateral 
military arrangements among the members to combat the 
Communist insurgencies and upgrade their armed forces.
ASEAN's major diplomatic initiative is the Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration of November 1971 calling for the 
neutralization of Southeast Asia as a "zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner
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of interference by outside powers"— the neutrality to be 
recognized by the great powers.
As conceived by Malaysia the neutraliza­
tion of all of Southeast Asia, including Indo­
china, would be an arrangement under which the 
great powers (PRC, USSR, USA, perhaps Japan) 
would follow policies of noninterference in 
the affairs of the region and the regional 
states would refuse to involve themselves in 
the rivalries and conflicts of the great powers. 
Within the neutralized zone the Southeast Asian 
states would devise mechanisms for the peace­
ful accommodationof regional conflict so as to 
exclude external intervention, while on the 
global level the great powers would offer 
guarantees against the involvement of South­
east Asia in the international power struggle. 
Ultimately the exclusion of foreign politcal- 
military influence in Southeast Asia would re­
quire termination of military agreements with 
external powers and the adoption of an equi­
distant political stance towards the great 
powers expressed collectively on vital matters 
of security.44
Insofar as the major powers are concerned, they 
have reacted cautiously toward neutralization and none 
appears ready to take the lead in securing its imple­
mentation. In relation to the United States, neutraliza­
tion as viewed within the overall perspective of the 
Nixon Doctrine, it appeard that:
. . . before the U.S. treaty structure could 
be replaced by neutralizations, progress must 
be made toward stabilizing the balance of for­
ces in Indochina, containment of the guerrilla 
threat throughout the region, and successful 
normalization of relations between the non- 
Communist countries of Southeast Asia and 
China and the Soviet Union (and probably also
North Vietnam).45
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For the Philippines, neutralization as an alterna­
tive policy must come to grips with its need for conti­
nued U.S. economic assistance and private investment and 
concern over the Communist insurgency in Luzon and the 
Muslim rebellion in Mindanao and Sulu:
The most pressing security problem in the 
Philippines is the Moro insurgency. In central 
Mindanao, Zamboanga, and the Sulu Archipelago, 
the Marcos government is faced with what seems 
to be an irreconcilable challenge. As Manila 
is forced to utilize more and more of its mil­
itary assets in meeting the secessionist threat 
in the south, the United States as its resupplier 
becomes increasingly important. Already one 
discerns an effort on Manila's part to use the 
American desire for the Philippine link in its 
off-shore strategic stance as a lever for US 
aid.
Or the Philippines may choose the alternative of 
non-alignment which has been used to describe the foreign 
policy of a state which tries to preserve its independence 
and secure its internal stability without adhering to 
a military bloc or relying upon armed intervention, at 
need and by prior agreement, of one of the major military 
powers. For a region, the test of non-alignment would 
require the withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases, 
the total exclusion bloc military pacts, and dependence 
upon purely regional security arrangements.
There are some reasons why the Philippines may 
consider non-alignment as a policy: continuing areas 
of disagreement with the U.S. over the exact status 
of bases; the continuing controversy over jurisdiction 
over American troops stationed in the islands; the new
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diplomatic and trade relations with Russia and the People's 
Republic of China; and a large measure of agreement with 
the non-aligned powers in the United Nations.
When all of this has been considered by the Philip­
pines, it might also consider the recent tendency of the 
People's Republic of China to consolidate its friendly 
relations with the United States. Alastair Buchan writes 
that there are indications that China would be unhappy at 
the prospect of total American withdrawal from the west­
ern P a c i f i c .48 Buchan also asserts that:
There is, moreover, some evidence to suggest 
that China would not wish to see a complete abro­
gation of American responsibilities in the area 
from her fear of the added freedom of action it 
would give to the Soviet Union, Japan and India.
. . . Indeed as far as the fourth area of Asia,
the Pacific region, is concerned one can say
that the continuation of the American alliances 
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and
even in the short run Taiwan is almost a con­
dition of good Sino-American relations, since 
Peking still has residual fears of an irreden­
tist and nuclear Japan, or of increased Soviet 
manoeuvring in relation to the smaller powers.49
The Philippines man they look to the example of
China as it ponders what alternatives are open to it
in lieu of an alliance with the United States. The status
quo might still be the best alternative open to the Phil­
ippines .
275
NOTES
CHAPTER VIII
1. Donald E. Nuechterlein, United States National In­
terests in a Changing World (Lexinton, Kentucky: The Uni­
versity Press of Kentucky, 1973), p. 7.
2. Ibid.. p. 14.
3. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign 
Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 1-2.
4. Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), 
p. 9.
5. Ibid.
6. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1946, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Press, 1972), p. 1160, hereinafter referred to
as Foreign Relations, 1946.
7. Ibid.. p. 1161.
8. Ibid.. p. 1163.
9. Ibid.. p. 1153.
10. Frank H. Golay, "Introduction: Restless Partners," 
in The United States and the Philippines, published by the 
American Assembly (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc.,1966), pp. 2-3.
11. Claro M. Recto, "Our Lingering Colonial Complex,"
276
from Renato Constantino, ed., Recto Reader (Manila: Recto 
Memorial Foundation, 1965), pp. 8-10; excerpt reprinted 
in Roger M. Smith, ed., Southeast Asia: Documents of Poli­
tical Development and Change (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1974), pp. 525-526.
12.U. S. Department of State, U.S. Foreign Policy 
for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace (Washing­
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 87.
13. Perspective on Asia: The New U.S. Doctrine and 
Southeast Asia, Report of Senator Mike Mansfield to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1969), p. 6.
14. Clough, op. cit., p. 2.
15. Mansfield Report, op. cit. pp. 3-4.
16. David P. Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsi­
dered, ' World Politics, XIX (April, 1967), pp. 361-377.
17. Jerry Mark Silverman, "The Domino Theory: Alter­
natives to a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," Asian Survey
XV (November, 1975), pp. 920-921.
18. Ibid., p. 921.
19. George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United 
States: Problems of Partnership (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publisher, 1964), p. 11.
20. Philippine News. July 10-16, 1975.
21. Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National In­
terest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), p. 5' 
see note No. 64 of Chapter IV.
22. Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy, p. 237.
23. Ibid., p. 246.
277
24. Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of 
Terror," Foreign Affairs. (January, 1959), pp. 240- 
249.
25. New York Times. May 5, 1946, p. 25.
26. New York Times, March 2, 1949.
27. Bernard K. Gordon, "Selective Noninvolvement in 
Southeast Asia: U.S. Security Policy in the Seventies," 
(McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, 1970, 
Paper-RAC-P-59), p. 22.
28. Angus M. Fraser, "The Political Viability of the
US Base System in Asia After a Vietnam Settlement,"
(Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1970, 
Research Paper P-605), p. 15. This is what Fraser said: 
"The Philippines must be seen as essentially unstable 
over the near future. In assessing the viability of US 
bases in Asia, the bases in the Philippines should be re­
garded as high-priority candidates for reduction or eli­
mination and relatively poor prospects for expansion in 
either use or size. Tradition and utility would predict
a longer life for naval facilities, but this, too, ulti­
mately would depend on Philippine agreement with the 
United States over the nature and imminence of an external 
threat."
29. James H. Webb, Jr., Micronesia and U.S. Pacific 
Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980s (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1974), pp. 54-55.
30. Quoted in Congressional Digest, L (October, 1975), 
p. 227.
31. Ibid.
32. FBIS Reports.
33. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diploma- 
tic Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lies and the Republic of the Philippines. Supplement to 
Issue No. 24 (2700), 1976, p. 12.
27#
34. Joint Soviet-Philippine Statement, Moscow News. 
Supplement to Issue No. 24 (2700), 1976, p. 11.
35. Statement of the Hon. Philip C. Habib, Assistant 
Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, De­
partment of State, in Human Rights in South Korea and the 
Philippines, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interna­
tional Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Washington/D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1975), p. 312.
36. Statement of Lt. Gen. H. M. Fish, USAF, in
Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations.
Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1975), p. 1225.
37. Ibid., p. 1245.
38. Ibid., p. 1477.
39. Statement of Arthur Z. Gardiner, Jr., Assistant 
Administrator, Bureau for Asia, Agency for International 
Development, in Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 1977. Hearings before a Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representa­
tives, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1976), ppp 18-19.
40. Ibid.
41. Quoted in Geoffrey Jukes and Ian Clark, "The 
Soviets and Asian Collective Security, 1969-74," in Soviet 
Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World, 
ed. by Roger E . Kanet and Donna Bahry (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1975), pp. 145-146.
42. Ibid., p. 146.
43. Harold C. Hinton, Three and A Half Powers (Bloom­
ington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 272.
279
44. Donald E. Weatherbee, "Collective Defense, Neu­
tralization, and the Balance of Power: Contending Security 
Policies in Southeast Asia," Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl­
vania, Strategic Studies Institute, September 12, 1975,
p. 21.
45. Robert D. Shuey and Larry A. Niksch, "The Role
of SEATO in U.S. Foreign Policy," in U.S. Commitment to
SEATO, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Senate, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess on S. Res. 174 (Washington, 
D.C.V Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 83.
45. Weatherbee, op. cit., p. 23.
47. See J. W. Burfeoh, ed., Nonalianment (New York:
James H. Heineman, Inc., 1966).
48. Alastair Buchan, The End of the Postwar Era: A 
New Balance of Power (New York: Saturday Review Press, 
1974), p. 181.
49. Ibid., p. 286.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
In the short space accorded to this study of an 
alliance, it is not possible to bring in all the material 
that has been accumulated in order to show the evolution, 
operation, and future prospects of an alliance between a 
small power and a superpower —  the Philippines and the 
United States.
The nature of that alliance is replete with historic, 
geographic, ideological, and economic overtones and under­
tones. By reason of that alliance, the United States has 
committed itself to the defense of the Philippines if the 
latter is attacked by external forces of whatever origin, 
and until the formal demise of the SEATO, the United States 
shall join with the Philippines and several other countries 
in mutual defense against external attack and internal sub­
version. The alliance which informally started in 1947 
with the conclusion of the Military Bases Agreement and 
more formally with the Treaty of Mutual Defense in 1951 
and the 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty has 
survived several tempestuous years in which the alliance 
relationship has been less than harmonious.
On the basis of that relationship, the Philippines 
had steadfastly linked its foreign policy with the United 
States;
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It accepted both economic and military aid, 
refused to recognize Communist China, allowed 
American forces to remain on Philippine soil, 
sent troops to fight in Korea, sponsored the 
Pacific Charter, promoted SEATO, spoke up for 
democratic ideals and hopes at Bandung, and 
in general stood firmly by its former guardian 
and ally.
In spite of that closeness with which that alliance 
was characterized in the external relations of both 
countries, the internal relations were full of discord 
and friction. The existence of military bases on Phil­
ippine territory, or on any territory whatsoever of foreign 
troops, would have caused irritations; but in the case 
of the relations between the Philippines and the United 
States, the failure of the United States to come to terms 
with rational Philippine demands for respect for its in­
dependence resulted in the creation of bad feeling on 
both sides. Not all of this is the fault of the Phil­
ippines. The testimony of one of America's most res­
pected diplomats, Charles "Chip" Bohlen who had served 
as U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines is worth repeating 
here ;
One of the sharper contrasts in my new 
job was the fact that the greatest obstacle 
to better relations were not in the foreign 
government but in Washington. My main occu­
pation in Manila was dealing with problems 
arising from three important bases, Clark 
Field for the Air Force and Subic Bay and 
Sangley Point for the Navy. My negotiations 
on the bases and other questions were entire­
ly with the Foreign Minister, Felixberto 
Serrano. I attempted to extract from the 
United States government, over the opposi­
tion of some members of Congress and the
282
Pentagon, a change in the bases agreement 
of 1946. Under the arrangement, crimes 
committed by American servicemen off, as 
well as on, base were tried by the United 
States military courts, not by the Phil­
ippine courts. I strived constantly to 
persuade the Pentagon of the long-term 
desirability of giving the Filipinos the 
same jurisdiction over crimes on their 
land that other countries where we had 
bases enjoyed. I did not get very far, 
however. There seemed to be an almost 
hysterical fear, particularly in Congress, 
of letting Americans be tried by systems 
of justice not in conformity with ours.
I have often wondered whether servicemen 
felt the same way because a Philippine 
court would probably hand down much lighter 
sentences than American military tribunals.^
It has hurt many Filipinos to feel that on the eve
of its independence, for example
. . . American policy appeared to empha­
size not the rehabilitation of the Phil­
ippine economy so as to strengthen the 
foundations of an important ally in South­
east Asia, but rather the protection and 
promotion of American strategic and eco­
nomic interests.3
The Americans led by Ambassador Paul V. McNutt, "seemed
to be more interested in securing parity rights for the
Americans and ensuring American control of the greatest
possible number of military bases." There is no question
that in the minds of many Filipinos:
. . . that they are involved with Ameri­
cans in an unequal partnership. Although 
it may be true that a genuine partnership 
can exist only between equals, it is never­
theless possible to establish a relation­
ship between unequals that does not require
283
mendicant subservience as the inevitable 
complement of overwhelming power. The un­
equal partnership becomes tolerable to Fi­
lipinos only if a deliberate emphasis on 
partnership serves to redress —  and ob­
scure —  the basic inequality.4
Basic to ell this weakness in the alliance relation­
ship is the psychological feeling of lack of mutual res­
pect between the two partners —  a feeling that is per­
haps understood better by the Filipino and less by the
American partner. For the Filipino, the explicit state­
ments of commitments to come to the aid of the Philippines 
by the United States in case of war or aggression have a 
historic as well as psychological foundation of long­
standing relations rooted in adversity and war. In fact, 
it has been stressed over and over again that
The essential ingredient in such a relation­
ship is mutual respect, which has nothing to 
do with the arrogance of the strong or the 
insolence of the weak, but with the honest 
recognition of the true interests of each 
and of the various ways in which these in­
terests fall together and c o i n c i d e .5
Former Philippine Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez,there­
fore, argues in the same vein that:
Only the deliberate cultivation of the in­
terests common to both peoples can keep 
Philippine-American friendship alive and 
strong. The condition for the cultivation 
of such common interests is the determina­
tion of both peoples to observe the rule 
of mutual respect . . .  in their relations 
with each other. It is easy to establish 
mutual respect between nations equal in 
power and influence; between a great na­
tion and a small one a feeling of consi­
deration is needed to redress the balance
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and to create fbe condition necessary for
mutual respect.^
In the joint communique issued at Manila on December 
7, 1975, on the occasion of the visit of President and 
Mrs. Gerald R. Ford of the United States at the invita­
tion of President and Mrs. Ferdinand E, Marcos of the 
Philippines, the two Presidents welcomed the opportunity 
to renew the bonds of friendship between the two nations 
and to review the status of their alliance in the light 
of changing circumstances in the Pacific region.^ Both 
countries affirmed that sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and political independence of all states are 
fundamental principles which both countries scrupulously 
respect.
They also cônfirmed the mutual respect for the dig­
nity of each nation which characterizes their friend­
ship as well as the alliance between the two countries.
The presidents of both countries agreed that in the 
field of economic and commercial relations, it was timely 
to conclude a new agreement on trade, investment, and 
related matters.
They also declared that in the field of security 
cooperation, that the alliance between the United States 
and the Philippines is not directed against any country, 
but is intended to preserve the independence and promote 
the welfare of their two peoples, while at the same time 
contributing to peace and progress to all.
Both presidents also agreed that the Treaty of Mu­
tual Defense of August 30, 1951, enhanced the defense 
of both countries, strengthened the security of the Paci-
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fie region and contributed to the maintenance of world 
peace. The joint communique also stressed the agreement 
of both presidents that the military bases used by the 
United States in the Philippines remain important in 
maintaining an effective United States presence in the 
Western Pacific in the support of these mutual objectives.
In the light of negotiations now being conducted 
by both countries on the subject of United States use 
of Philippine military bases, both presidents agreed 
that they should be conducted in the clear recognition 
of Philippine sovereignty.
President Marcos pointed out that he wanted to at­
tain self-reliance for the Philippines and that it was 
his policy not to allow introduction of foreign ground 
troops into the Philippine s for its defense except as 
a last resort. President Ford expressed support for 
these policies and indicated that the United States in­
tended to continue to provide assistance to the Phil­
ippines within the framework of available resources.
The communique ends on the note of reaffirmation 
to their commitment to continue close association on all 
matters of mutual concern and that the ties between the 
Philippines and the United States remain strong and mu­
tually beneficial.
This study has tried to show the evolution, course, 
and future of the alliance between the United States 
and the Philippines within the framework of an alliance 
between a small power and a great power. Such an alliance 
was necessitated by history, economics, geography, and 
ideology, as well as the rendition of economic and mili-
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tary assistance by the superpower to the small power.
In the alliance between the United States and the 
Philippines, the superpower made impositions by virtue 
of its role as a leader in international affairs, a role 
that was indicated by the rise of Soviet Russia as a 
global power with a doctrinal mission of expanding Com­
munist ideology all over the world. Such a role was 
determined by its leaders and policymakers. In docu­
ment after document we see how the United States fos­
tered the policy of containment and its complementary 
policy of alliances in order to prevent the expansion 
of Communist ideology. Such a policy of containment 
and alliances impelled the inclusion of the Philippines 
in the plans of the United States in the establishment 
of military bases around the periphery of the Soviet 
empire in order to deter Communist expansion through 
force or subversion.
The relations between the United States and the 
Philippines were defined by formal treaties and agree­
ments which in the course of the life of the alliance 
the Philippines considered onerous and burdensome. Not 
only during the operations of the alliance, but during 
the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the agree­
ments the Philippines formidably interposed arguments 
intended to protect Philippine sovereignty and indepen­
dence. It was not only vital to the Philippines that 
its territorial integrity be secured by formal treaties 
of alliance, but that psychologically its status and pres­
tige as a free, independent nation should be respected 
at all times.
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Diplomacy and public revelations of its positions 
in the negotiations between the two countries were the 
most potent weapons in the arsenal of the small power 
in order to secure advantages from the superpower. The 
governmental machinery before martial law which allowed 
members of the legislative body to participate in dis­
cussions involving foreign policy crystallized many of 
the issues surrounding diplomatic relations between the 
United States and the Philippines. After martial law, 
the location and centralization of power on one man has 
allowed the ease and rapidity of conducting diplomacy 
between the two nations. Whether this will eventually 
mean the better machinery, only time will tell.
The value of this study is that investigations of 
the foreign relations between nations, especially bet­
ween the United States and the Philippines is greatly 
facilitated by the availability of documentary material 
which otherwise has been classified either secret, top 
secret, or confidential. The availability of these ma­
terials to the industrious researcher has always been 
considered invaluable in investigations of which this 
study is one, but that very few researchers consider 
the time well spent.
In the end, because this investigation is made up 
to a large extent of research material, the words of 
George E. Taylor display a perceptiveness and sensitivity 
as to how the Philippines and the United States should 
conducts themselves toward one another and are therefore 
quoted because of their striking relevance to the study:
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The partnership between Americans and Filipinos 
is confirmed by written commitments, but its 
character and effectiveness depend on the quality 
of human relationships. The present and pros­
pective military arrangements between the two 
governments, whether open or confidential, are 
of little significance to the discussion of 
mutual security. The really important ques­
tions concern the values, attitudes, and pur­
poses of the Philippine and American govern­
ments and people. If these change, then every­
thing else changes. The most heavily armed 
bases in the world are useless if they are sur­
rounded by hostile population. The most power­
ful of allies is a liability if it cannot be 
trusted to fulfill its obligations. A dis­
cussion of mutual security, therefore, is 
really about mutual understanding and 
confidence. That is why it is essential 
to raise questions that bring to the fore, 
thé political, intellectual, and social 
trends of the two societies. There is no 
security unless there are mutual interests.®
Observations in Search of a Conceptual Framework. —  
The alliance between the United States and the Philippines 
evolved by;reason of à long historic relationship between 
the two countries. The historic relationship and the per­
ceptions by the United States of its role as a power in 
the Pacific region compelled th?*- country to exercise 
dominant power initiatives in the formulation, negotiation, 
and conclusion of agreements that were based on overriding 
considerations of national interests and national objectives. 
If the national interests and objectives of the Philippines
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were ever considered by the United States, they were either 
ignored or blithely swept aside because of the dominant 
power's need for the fulfillment of its own policy objectives 
in its role as a power in the Southeast area. This investi­
gation, however, shows how valiantly the Philippines tried 
to protect its national integrity and utilized diplomacy 
with great skill when negotiating with the great power.
When we consider the motivations that theoretically 
compel a small power to enter into an alliance with a great 
power like security, prestige, domestic stability, economic 
aid and military assistance, and ideology, we find that we 
have to strain our resources to indicate that these were 
concrete considerations that played a powerful role in the 
construction of an alliance between the Philippines in the 
United States, By this, it is meant that they were consi­
derations that were consciously pursued by the Philippines 
in its relationship with the United States. On the other 
hand, these considerations appear to have been pursued in 
one way or another by the Philippines in dealing with the 
more powerful partner, the United States. Security and 
domestic stability were major considerations in the estab­
lishment of the alliance. Economic aid and military assistance
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were inevitable because of the destruction and devastation 
visited upon the Philippines as a result of World War II. 
Ideology was a powerful motivation in the alliance because 
the Philippines was a democratic experiment of the United 
States in the Far East. When the Philippines linked its 
foreign policy to the United States, it was not only because 
the security of the Philippines could not be divorced from 
that of the United States, but because to some extent the 
democratic experiment had resulted in the extension of the 
American frontier to the Far East in the Philippine model. 
Prestige was sought by the Philippines as a reason for the 
alliance, because as stated by President Roxas, other nations 
would even pay for any kind of relationship v»ith the United 
States. However, Philippine prestige suffered by reason 
of the alliance because Asian nations and other great powers 
like Soviet Russia looked at this relationship simply as 
an example of American imperialism or neo-colonialism.
Also when dealing with the United States, the Philippines 
felt its prestige challenged in many ways by the patronizing 
attitude of U.S. negotiators or officials. The record 
shows that the Philippines was actually successful in many 
instances of protecting its prestige in the eyes of the
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United States and that of other nations.
By reason of its geographic location, the Philippines 
will still figure prominently in U.S. strategic thinking 
and policies. Whether it will be beneficial for the Phil­
ippines to move away from its alignment with the United 
States, is a question that the elites or the leaders of 
that country will have to consider in the light of two 
major considerations. If the United States needs its 
bases in the Philippines in order to maintain its military 
and strategic posture in the Pacific, then the U.S. will 
be amenable towards continuing as well as increasing its 
military assistance to the Philippines for the indefinite 
future. On the other hand, if by reason of its relation­
ship the Philippines constantly faces the threat of aggres­
sion or attack because of the presence of U.S. military 
bases in Philippine territory, then the Philippines will 
have to take a very strong assessment of its position in 
the light of its shattering experience of World War II.
The Philippines cannot afford to be another battleground 
when the elephants of the world start not only their fighting 
but also their lovemaking. Because when elephants fight 
or make love., the grass suffers.
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Appendix "A"
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
PERTAINING TO THE UNITED STATES MILITARY 
AND NAVAL BASE SYSTEM IN THE PHIL­
IPPINES TO BE USED AS A BASIS 
FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS 
AND STAFF STUDIES
1. The principle is agreed that the fullest and 
closest military cooperation will be observed between the 
U.S. and the Philippine Government and the military plans 
of the U S. and the Philippine Government for the Philip­
pine area will be closely integrated in order to ensure 
the full and mutual protection of the U.S. and the Phil­
ippines.
2. The military forces of the U.S. will be accorded 
free access to, and the movement between, ports, U.S. 
bases, and U.S. installations in Philippines, by land, sea, 
and air.
3. Military and Naval aircraft of the U.S. will be 
allowed to operate without restriction into and from U.S. 
bases and over surrounding territory. U.S. forces will 
be allowed to enter and depart from the Philippines, in­
cluding territorial waters, at will.
4. The U.S. will have the right to import free of 
duty, materiel, equipment, and supplies requisite to the 
improvement, maintenance, operation, and defense of U.S. 
bases.
5. The U.S. will have the right to maintain such per­
sonnel as may be requisite for the operations and defense 
of bases and facilities.
5. Pending development of the detailed plan, the U.S. 
will retain all sites which were held by the U.S. Army as 
military reservations on 7 December 1941 and by the U.S. 
Navy except at Cavite and will be accorded rights to sites
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in the localities shown on the attached Appendix.
7. The U S. will have the right to retain, or to ex­
change for sites listed in paragraph 6 above, those sites 
wherein are located bases, installations, or facilities 
which have been or may be developed in the course of the 
present war, to acquire additional sites and to acquire 
such sites in the future as may be required by changes in 
the means and methods of warfare, including the development 
of new weapons. The U.S. will have the right to acquire 
sites and install, maintain and operate thereon, the re­
quired communication and navigation facilities and radar 
installations.
8. The U.S. will retain U.S. military cemeteries and 
sites of historical significance to the U.S. in the Phil­
ippines.
9. Consideration will be given to Filipino participa­
tion in certain U.S. bases and vice versa as indicated by 
the military situation.
10. No nation other than the U.S. or the Philippines 
is to be permitted to establish or make use of any bases 
in the Philippines without the prior agreement of both 
the U.S. and Philippine Governments.
Agreed to May 14, 1945
Harry Truman 
SdergiqJ Osmena
[^ne^
AREAS IN THE PHILIPPINES IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES 
MAY DESIRE THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH BASES, AS 
SUBMITTED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT
Designation Location Designation Location
Del Carmen Luzon San Jose Mindoro
Tarlac Luzon Surigao Mindanao
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San Marceline 
Laoag
Tuguegarao 
San Miguel Bay 
Aparri 
Polillo
Sorsogon
Puerto Princesa 
Balabac Island 
Coron Bay
Luzon Del Monte (Cagayan) 
Luzon Daluagan (Impasugong) 
Luzon Dipolog 
Luzon Davao 
Luzon Sarangani Island 
Luzon Tawi Tawi
Luzon Siminul Island
Palawan Leyte Gulf 
Palawan Guimaras Strait 
Palaway Mactan
Mindanao 
Mindanao 
Mindanao 
Mindanao 
Mindanao 
Sulu Archi­
pelago 
Sulu Archi­
pelago 
Leyte-Samar 
Panay-Negros 
Cebu
Attached also was a list entitled "Areas in the Philippines 
in which the United States May Desire the Right to Establish 
Bases, as Submitted by the Navy Department." These areas 
are the following:
Tutu Bay (Jolo)
Tawi Tawi 
Balabac Island
Leyte-Samar (Leyte Gulf area)
Guimaras Strait-Iloilo Strait Area 
Mactan Island (off Cebu)
Coron Bay 
Subic Bay (Luzon)
Sarangani Island (Mindanao)
Sorsogon (Luzon
San Miguel Bay (Luzon)
Polillo (Luzon)
Aparri (Luzon)
Puerto Princesa (Palaway)
Appendix "B"
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
CONCERNING MILITARY BASES.
Signed at Manila, March 14, 1947.
Note: The-Agreement was concurred in by the Senate, S.R. 
NOo 29, March 26, 1947, The Philippine Instrument of ratifica­
tion was signed by the President, January 21, 1948. It entered 
into force, March 26, 1947.
Reference : This Agreement is also published in I DFA TS 
No. 2, p. 144; 43 UNTS 271 and TIAS 1775.
W h e r e a s , the war in the Pacific has confirmed the 
mutuality of interest of the Republic of the Philippines 
and of the United States of America in matters relating 
to the defense of their respective territories and that 
mutuality of interest demands that the Governments of 
the two countries take the necessary measures to promote 
their mutual security and to defend their territories 
and areas;
WHEREAS, the Governments of the Republic of the 
Philippines and of the United States of America are 
desirous of cooperating in the common defense of their 
two countries through arrangements consonant with the 
procedures and objectives of the United Nations, and 
particularly through a grant to the United States of 
America by the Republic of the Philippines in the exer­
cise of its title and sovereignty, of the use, free of 
rent, in furtherance of the mutual interest of both 
countries, of certain lands of the public domain;
WHEREAS, the Government of the Republic, of the 
Philippines has requested United States assistance in 
providing for the defense of the Philippines and in 
developing for such defense effective Philippine armed 
forces ;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this request the Government 
of the United States of America has,.,in view of its 
interest in the welfare of the Philippines, indicated 
its intention of dispatching a military mission to the 
Philippines and of extending to her appropriate assist­
ance in the development of the Philippine defense forces;
WHEREAS, a Joint Resolution of the Congress of the 
United States of America of June 29, 1944, authorized 
the President of the United States of America to acquire 
bases for the mutual protection of the Philippines and 
of the United States of America; and
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WHEREAS, Joint Resolution No« 4 of the Congress of 
the Philippines, approved July 28, 1945, authorized the 
President of the Philippines to negotiate with the Pres­
ident of the United States of America for the estab­
lishment of bases provided for in the Joint Resolution of 
the Congress of the United States of America of June 
29, 1944, with a view to insuring the territorial integ­
rity of the Philippines, the mutual protection of the 
Philippines and the United States of America, and the 
maintenance of peace in the Pacific;
THEREFORE, the Governments of the Republic of the 
Philippines and of the United States of America agree 
upon the following terms for the delimitation, estab­
lishment, maintenance and operation of military bases 
in the Philippines:
Article I 
GRANT OF BASES
1. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
(hereinafter referred to as the Philippines) grants to 
the Government of the United States of America (herein­
after refered to as the United States) the right to. 
retain the use of the bases in the Philippines listed
in Annex A attached hereto,
2. The Philippines agrees to permit the United 
States, upon notice to the Philippines, to use such 
of those bases listed in Annex B as the United States 
determines to be required by military necessity,
3. The Philippines agrees to enter into negotia­
tions with the United States at the letter’s request, 
to permit the United States to expand such bases, to 
exchange such bases for other bases, to acquire addi­
tional bases, or relinquish rights to bases, as any of 
such exigencies may be required by military necessity,
4» A narrative description of the boundaries of 
the bases to which this Agreement relates is given in 
Annex A and Annex B. An exact description of the bases 
listed in Annex A, with metes and bounds, in conformity 
with the narrative descriptions, will be agreed upon 
between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments 
as soon as possible. With respect to any of the bases list­
ed in Annex B, an exact description with metes and bounds, 
in conformity with the narrative description of such bases, 
will be agreed upon if and when such bases are acquired by 
the United States,
328 
Article XI 
MUTUAL COOPERATION
1. It is mutually agreed that the armed forces of. 
the Philippines may serve on United States bases and 
that the armed forces of the United States may serve 
on Philippine military establishments whenever such 
conditions appear beneficial.as mutually determined by 
the armed forces of both countries.
2. Joint outlined plans for the development of 
military bases in the Philippines may be prepared by 
military authorities of the two Governments.
3. In the interest of international security any 
bases listed Annexes A and B may be made available to 
the Security Council of the United Nations on its call 
by prior mutual agreement between the Philippines and 
the United States.
Article III 
DESCRIPTION OF RIGHTS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States 
shall have the rights, power and authority within the 
bases which are necessary for the establishment, use, 
operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the 
control thereof and all the rights, power and author­
ity within the limits of territorial waters and air 
space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases 
which are necessary to provide access to them, or 
appropriate for their control.
2. Such rights, power and authority shall include, 
inter alia, the right, power and authority:
(a) to construct (including dredging and filr» 
ling), operate, maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison 
and control the bases;
(b) to improve and deepen the harbors, channels,
entrances and anchorages, and to construct or main­
tain necessary roads and bridges affording access 
to the bases;
(c) to control (including the right to prohibit)
in so far as may be required for the efficient
operation and safety of the bases, and within the 
limits of military necessity, anchorages, moorings, 
landings, takeoffs, movements and operation of 
ships and water-borne craft, aircraft and other 
vehicles on water, in the air or on land compri­
sing or in the vicinity of the bases;
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(d) the right to acquire, as may be agreed 
between the two Governments, such rights of way, 
and to construct thereon, as may be required for 
military purposes, wire and radio communications 
facilities, including submarine and subterranean 
cables, pipe lines and spur tracks from railroads 
to bases, and the right, as may be agreed upon 
between the two Governments to construct the 
necessary facilities;
Cg ) to construct, install, maintain, and employ 
on any base any type of facilities, weapons, subs­
tance, device, vessel or vehicle on or under the 
ground, in the air or on or under the water that 
may be requisite or appropriate, including meteo­
rological system, aerial and water navigation 
lights, radio and radar apparatus and electronic 
devices, of any desired power, type of emission 
and frequency,
3, In the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, 
power and authority, the United States agrees that the 
powers granted to it will not be used unreasonably or, 
unless required by military necessity determined by the 
two Governments, so as to interfere with the necessary 
rights of navigation, aviation, communication, or land 
travel within the territories of the Philippines. In 
the practical application outside the bases of the rights, 
power and authority granted in this Article there shall be 
as the occasion requires, consultation between the two 
Governments.
Artlcla IV
SHIPPING AbTD NAVIGATION
1. It io mutually agreed that United States public 
vessels operated by or for the War or Navy Departments, 
the Coast Guard or the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the 
military forces of the United States, military and naval 
aircraft and Government-owned vehicles, including armor, 
shall be accorded free access to and movement between 
ports and United States bases throughout the Philippines, 
including territorial waters, by land, air and sea. This 
right shall include freedom from compulsory pilotage and 
all toll charges. If, however, a pilot is taken, pilot­
age shall be paid for at appropriate rates. In connection 
with entrance into Philippine ports by United States public 
vessels appropriate notification under normal conditions 
shall be made to the Philippine authorities.
330
2. Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels 
and aircraft placed or established in the bases and 
territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity 
of such bases shall conform to the system in use in the 
Philippines. The position, characteristics and any al­
terations in the lights or other aids shall be commu­
nicated in advance to the appropriate authorities of 
the Philippines.
3..Philippine commercial vessels may use the bases 
on the same terms and conditions as United States com­
mercial vessels.
4. It is understood that a base is not a part of 
the territory of the United States for the purpose of 
coastwise shipping laws so as to exclude Philippine 
vessels from trade between the United States and the 
bases.
Article V
EXEMPTION FROM CUSTOMS AND OTHER DUTIES
No import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty 
or impost shall be charged on material, equipment, sup­
plies or goods, including food stores and clothing, for 
exclusive use in the construction, maintenance, opera­
tion or defense of the bases, consigned to, or destined 
for, the United States authorities and certified by them 
to be for such purposes.
Article VI 
MANEUVER AND OTHER AREAS
The United States shall, subject to previous agree­
ment with the Philippines, have the right to use land 
and coastal sea areas of appropriate size and location for 
periodic maneuvers, for additional staging areas, bombing 
and gunnery ranges, and for such intermediate airfields as 
may be required for safe and efficient air operations. 
Operations in such areas shall be carried on with due 
regard and safeguards for the public safety.
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Article VII 
USE OF PUBLIC SERVICES
It is mutually agreed that the United States may 
employ and use for United States military forces any 
and all public .utilities, other services and facilities, 
airfields',;:ports, harbors, roads, highways, railroads, 
bridges, viaducts, canals, lakes, rivers and streams 
in the Philippines under conditions no less favorable 
than.those that may be applicable from time to time to 
the military forces of the Philippines*
Article VIII 
HEALTH MEASURES OUTSIDE BASES
It is mutually agreed that the United States may 
construct, subject to agreement by the appropriate 
Philippine authorities, veils, water catchment areas or 
dams to insure an ample supply of water for all base 
operations and personnel. The United States shall, like­
wise have the right, in cooperation with the appropriate 
authorities of the Philippines, to take such steps as 
may be mutually agreed upon to be necessary to improve 
health and sanitation in areas contiguous to the bases, 
including the right, under such conditions as may be 
mutually agreed upon, to enter and inspect any privately 
owned property* The United States shall pay just compen­
sation for any injury to persons or damage to property 
that may result from action taken in connection with this 
Article*
Article IX 
SURVEYS
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall 
have the right, after appropriate notification has been 
given to the Philippines, to make topographic, hydro- 
graphic, and coast and geodetic surveys and aerial-photo­
graphs in any part of the Philippines and waters adjacent 
thereto* Copies with title and triangulation data of any 
surveys or photomaps made of the Philippines shall be 
furnished to the Philippines;
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Articl» X 
CEMETERIES AND HISTORICAL SITES
Î; The United States shall have.the right to retain 
and maintain such United States military cemeteries and 
siich sites of historical significance to the United 
States as may be agreed upon by the two Governments* All 
rights, power and authority in relation to bases granted 
under this Agreement shall be applicable, in so far as 
appropriate, to the cemeteries and sites mentioned in 
this Article.
2. Furthermore, it is recognized that there are 
certain cemeteries and historical sites in the Philippines 
revered in the memory of the People of the Philippines and 
of the United States, and it is therefore fitting that the 
maintenance and improvement of such memorials be the com­
mon concern of the two countries.
Article XZ
IMMIGRATION
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States 
shall have the right to bring into the Philippines 
members of the United States military forces and the 
United States nationals employed by. or under, a contract 
with the United States together with their families, and 
technical personnel of ptber nationalities (not being 
persons excluded by the laws pf the Philippines) in con­
nection with the construction, maintenance, or operation 
of Che bases. The United States shall make suitable ar­
rangements so that such persons may be readily identified 
and their status established when necessary by the Philip­
pine authorities. Such persons, other than members of the 
United States armed forces in uniform, shall present their 
travel documents to the appropriate Philippine authorities 
for visas, it being understood that no objection will be 
made to their travel to the Philippines as non-immigrants.
2. If the status of any person within the Philipp.ijnes 
and admitted thereto under the foregoing paragraph shall 
be altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such 
admission, the United States shall notify the Philippines 
and shall, if such person be required to leave the Philip:^ 
pines by the latter Government, be responsible for providing
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him with a passage from the Philippines within a 
reasonable time, and shall in the meantime prevent 
his becoming a public responsibility of the Philip­
pines#
Article XII 
INTERNAL REVENUE TAX EXEMPTION
la No member of the United States armed forces, 
except Filipino citizens, serving in the Philippines 
in connection with the bases and residing in the 
Philippines by reason only Of such service, or his 
dependents, shall be liable to pay income tax in the 
Philippines except in respect of income derived from 
Philippine sources.
2. No national of the United States serving in or 
employed in the Philippines in connection with the 
construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the 
bases and residing in the Philippines by reason only
of such employment, or his spouse and minor children and 
dependent parents of either spouse, shall be liable to 
pay income tax in the Philippines except in respect of 
income derived from Philippine sources or sources' other 
than the United States sources.
3. No person referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 of this 
Article shall be liable to pay to the Government or local 
authorities of the Philippines any poll or residence tax, 
or any import or export duty, or any other tax on personal 
property imported for his own use; provided that privately 
owned vehicles shall be subject to payment of the fol­
lowing only: when certified as being used for military 
purposes by appropriate United States authorities, the 
normal license plate fee; otherwise,, the normal license 
plate and registration fees.
4. No national of the United States, or corporation 
organized under the laws of the United States, resident 
in the United State?, shall be liable to pay income tax 
in the Philippines in respect of any profits derived 
under a contract made in the United States with the 
Government of the United States in connection with the 
construction, maintenance, operation and defense of the 
bases, or any tax in the nature of a license in respect 
of any service or work for the United States in connect­
ion with the construction, maintenance, operation and 
defense of the bases.
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Article XIIX 
JURISDICTION^
1. The Philippines consents that the United States 
shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the 
following offenses;
(a) Any offense committed by any person within 
any base except where the offender and offended 
parties are both Philippine citizens (not members 
of the armed forces of the United States on active 
duty) or the offense is against the security of 
the Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by 
any member of the armed forces of the United States 
in which the offended party is also a member of the 
armed forces of the United States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by 
any member of the armed forces of the United States 
against the security of the United States.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise 
jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside 
the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United 
States.
3. Whenever for special reasons the United States
may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it 
in-paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding 
the offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (pro­
secuting attorney) of the city or province in which the 
offense has been committed within ten days after his 
arrest, and in such a case the Philippines shall exercise 
jurisdiction.
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may 
desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in 
paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting 
attorney) of the city or province where the offense has 
been committed shall so notify the officer holding the 
offender in custody within ten days after his arrest,
and in such a case the United States shall be free to
^Amended by an Agreement dated August 10, 1965.
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exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under 
paragraph 2 of this Article is committed by any member 
of the armed forces of the United States
(a) while engaged in the actual performance 
of a specific military duty, or
(b) during a period of national emergency 
declared by either Government and the fiscal 
(prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evi­
dence, he shall immediately notify the officer 
holding the offender in custody that the United 
States is free to exercise jurisdiction» In the 
event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds 
that the offense was not committed in the actual 
performance of a specific military duty, the
offender*s commanding officer shall have the 
right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary 
of Justice within ten days from the receipt of the 
decision of the fiscal and the decision of the 
Secretary of Justice shall be final.
5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises 
jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial 
and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay
to the commanding officer of the nearest base, who 
shall acknowledge in writing that such accused has been 
delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent 
court of the Philippines and that he will be held ready 
to appear and will be produced before said court when 
required by it. The commanding officer shall be fur­
nished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy 
of the information against the accused upon the filing 
of the original in the competent court®
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it 
is mutually agreed that in time of war the United 
States shall have the right to exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over any offenses which may be committed 
by members of the armed forces of the United States 
in the Philippines,
7. The United States igrees that it will not
grant asylum in any of the bases to any person fleeing 
from the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should 
any such person be found in any base, he will be surren­
dered on demand to the competent authorities of the 
Philippines.
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8 a  In every case in which jurisdiction over an 
offense is exercised by the United States, the offended 
party may institute a separate civil action against the 
offender in the proper court of the Philippines to 
enforce the civil liability which under the laws of 
the Philippines may arise from the offensco
Article XIV 
ARREST AND. SERVICE OF PROCESS
l e  No arrest shall be made and no process, civil 
or criminal, shall be served within any base except 
with the permission of the commanding officer of such 
bci. cj but should the commanding officer refuse to grant 
such permission he shall (except in cases of arrest 
where the United,States has jurisdiction under Article 
XIII) forthwith take the necessary steps to arrest the 
person charged and surrender him to the appropriate 
authorities of the Philippines or to serve such process, 
as the case may be, and to provide the attendance of the 
server of such process before the appropriate court in 
the Philippines or procure such server to make the 
necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such ser­
vice as the case may require.
2. In cases where the service courts of the United 
States have jurisdiction under Article XIII, the 
appropriate authorities of the Philippines will, on 
request, give reciprocal facilities as regards the 
service of process and the arrest and surrender of 
alleged offenders.
Article XV 
SECURITY LEGISLATION
The Philippines agrees to take such steps as may from 
time to time be agreed to be necessary with a view to the 
enactment of legislation to insure the adequate security 
and protection of the United States bases, equipment 
and other property and the operations of the United 
States under this Agreement, and the punishment of 
persons who may contravene such legislation. It is 
mutually agreed that appropriate authorities of the
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two Governments will also consult from time to time 
in order to insure that laws and regulations of the 
Philippines and of the United States in relation to 
such matters shall, so far as may be possible, be 
uniform in character.
Article XVI .
POSTAL FACILITIES
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall 
have the right to establish and maintain United States 
post offices in the bases for the exclusive use of the 
United States armed forces^ and civilian personnel who 
are nationals of the United States and employed in 
connection with the construction, maintenance, and 
operation of the bases, and the families of such 
persons, for domestic use between United States post 
offices in the bases and between such post offices and 
other United States post offices. The United States 
shall have the right to regulate and control within 
the bases all communications within, to and from such 
bases.
Article XVII 
REMOVAL OF IMPROVEMENTS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States 
shall have the right to remove or dispose of any or 
all removable improvements, equipment or facilities 
located at or on any base and paid for with funds of tb# 
United States. No export tax shall be charged on any 
material or equipment so removed from the Philippines,
2, All buildings and structures which are erected 
by the United States in the bases shall be the property 
of the United States and may be removed by it before 
the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier re­
linquishment of the base on which the structures are 
situated. There shall be no obligation on the part of 
the Philippines or of the United States to rebuild or 
repair any destruction or damage inflicted from any 
cause whatsoever on any of the said buildings or
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structures owned or used by the United States in the 
bases* The United States is not obligated to turn over 
the bases to the Philippines at the expiration of this 
Agreement of the earlier relinquishment of any bases in 
the condition in which they were at the time of their 
occupation, nor is the Philippines obliged to make any 
compensation to the United States for the improvements 
made in the bases or for the buildings or structures 
left thereon, all of which shall become the property of 
the Philippines upon the termination of the Agreement 
or the earlier relinquishment by the United States of 
the bases where the structures have been built.
Article XVIII 
SALES AND SERVICES WITHIN THE BASES
1, It is mutually agreed that the United States shall 
have the right to establish on bases, free of all licenses; 
fees; sales, excise or other taxes, or imposts; Government 
agencies, including concessions, such as sales commissaries 
and post exchanges, messes and social clubs, for the exclu­
sive use of the United States military forces and author­
ized civilian personnel and their facilities. The merchan­
dise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies shall 
be free of all taxes, duties and inspection.by the Philip­
pine authoritieso Administrative measures shall be taken
by the appropriate authorities of the United States to 
prevent the resale of goods.which are sold under the pro­
visions of this Article to persons not entitled to buy 
goods at such agencies and, generally, to prevent abuse 
of the privileges granted under this Article. There shall 
be cooperation between such authorities and the Philippines 
to this end.
2. Except as may be provided in any other agreements, 
no person shall habitually render any professional services 
in a base except to or for the United States or to or for 
the persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph. No busi­
ness shall be established in a base, it being understood 
that the Government agencies mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph shall not be regarded as businesses for the pur­
poses of this Article.
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two Governments will also consult from time to time 
in order to insure chat lavs and regulations of the 
Philippines and of the United States in relation to 
such matters shall, so far aa may be possible, be
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Article XVI 
POSTAL FACILITIES
It is lEutually agreed that the United States shall 
have the right to establish and maintain United States 
post offices in the bases for the exclusive use of the 
United States armed forces, and civilian personnel who 
are nationals of the United States and employed in 
connection with the construction, maintenance, and 
operation cf the bases, and the families of such 
persons, fcr domestic use between United States post 
offices in the bases and between such post offices and 
other United States post offices. The United States 
shall have the right to regulate and control within 
the bases ill communications within, to and from such 
bases.
Article XVII
REMOVAL OF IMPROVEMENTS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States 
shall have the right to remove or dispose of any or 
all remove"le improvements, equipment or facilities 
located at or on any base and paid far with funds of tb# 
United Star as. No export tax shall be charged on any 
material or equipment so removed from the Philippines,
2. All buildings and structures which are erected 
by the United States in the bases shall be the property 
of the United States and may be removed by it before 
the expira ion of this Agreement or the earlier re­
linquishment of the brsc on which the structures are 
situated. There shall be no obligation on the part of 
the Philip -ines or of the United States to rebuild or 
repair any destruction or damage inflicted from any 
cause whatsoever on any of the said buildings or
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Article XIX 
COl^MERCIAL CONCERNS
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall 
have the right, with the consent of the Philippines, tp 
grant to commercial concerns owned or controlled by the 
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States such 
rights to the use of any base or facility retained or ac­
quired by the United States as may be deemed appropriate 
by both Governments to insure the development and main­
tenance for defense purposes of such bases and facilities.
Article XX 
MILITARY OR NAVAL POLICE
It is mutually agreed that there shall be close 
cooperation on a reciprocal basis between the military 
and naval police forces of the United States and the 
police forces of the Philippines for the purpose of 
preserving order and discipline among United States 
military and naval personnel.
Article XXI 
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
lo It is mutually agreed that the United States 
shall retain the right to occupy temporary quarters 
and installations now existing outside the bases men­
tioned in Annex A and Annex B, for such reasonable time, 
not exceeding two years, as may be necessary to develop 
adequate facilities within the bases for the United 
States armed forces. If‘circumstances require an ex­
tension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual 
agreement of the two Governments; but such extension 
shall .not apply to the existing temporary quarters arid 
installations within the limits of the City of Manila 
and shall in no case exceed a period of three years,
2, Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding 
paragraph, the Port of Manila reservation with boundaries 
as of 1941 will be available for use to the United States 
armed forces until such time as other arrangements can
be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of 
the two Governments,
3, The terms of this Agreement pertaining to bases 
shall be applicable to ' temporary quarters and instal­
lations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article while
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they are so occupied by the arned forces of the United 
States; provided, that offenses committed within the 
temporary quarters and installations located within the 
present limits of the City of Manila shall not be consi­
dered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed 
by the Provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, 
except that the election not to exercise the jurisdiction 
reserved to the Philippines shall be made by the Secretary 
of Justiceo It is agreed that the United States shall have 
full use and full control' of all these quarters and 
installations while they are occupied by the armed 
forces of the United. States, including the exercise of 
such measures as may be necessary to police said 
quarters for the security of the personnel and pro­
perty therein*
Article XXII 
COrn)EHl?ATIOH OR EXPROPRIATION
1* Whenever it is necessary to acquire by condem­
nation or expropriation proceedings real property 
belonging to any private persons, associations or corpo­
rations located an bases named in Annex A and Annex B in 
order to carry out the purposes of this Agreement, the 
Philippines will institute and prosecute such condemna­
tion or expropriation proceedings in accordance with 
.the laws of the Philippines* The United States agrees to 
reimburse the Philippines for all the reasonable expenses, 
damages and costs thereby incurred, including the value 
of the property as determined by the Court* In addition, 
subject to the mutual agreement of the two Governments, 
the United States will reimburse the Philippines for the 
reasonable costs of transportation and removal of any 
occupants displaced or ejected by reason of the condem­
nation or expropriation*
2o Prior to the completion of such condemnation or 
expropriation proceedings, in cases of military necessity 
the United States shall have the right to take posses­
sion of such property required for military purposes as 
soon os the legal requisites for obtaining possession 
have been fulfilled,
3» The properties acquired under this Article shall 
be turned over to the Philippines upon the expiration of 
this Agreement, or the earlier relinquishment of su'cn 
properties, under such terms and conditions as may be 
agreed upon by the two Governments*
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Article XXIII
CIVIL l i a b i l i t y :
tor the purpose of promoting and maintaining 
friendly relations by the prompt settlement of meri­
torious claims, the United States shall pay just and 
reasonable compensation, when accepted by claimants 
in full satisfaction and in final settlement* for 
claims, including claims of insured but excluding 
claims of subrogees, or account of damage to or lose 
or destruction of private property, both real and 
personal, or personal injury or death of inhabitants 
of the Philippines, when such damage, loss, destruction 
or injury is caused by the armed forces of the United 
States, or individual members thereof, including 
military or civilian employees thereof, or otherwise 
incident to non-combat activities of such forces; pro­
vided that no claim shall be considered unless presented 
within one year after the occurrence of the accident or 
incident out of which such claim arises «
Article XXIV 
MINERAL RESOURCES
All minerals (including oil), and antiquities and 
all rights relating thereto and to treasure trove, under, 
upon, or connected with the land and water comprised in 
the bases or otherwise used or occupied by the United 
States by virtue of this Agreement, are reserved to the 
Government and inhabitants of the Philippines; but no 
rights so reserved shall be transferred to third parties, 
or exercised within the bases, without the consent of 
the United States. The United States shall negotiate 
with the proper Philippine authorities for the quarrying 
of rock and gravel necessary for construction work on 
the bases.
Article XXV
GRANT OF BASES TO A THIRD POWER
1, The Philippines agrees that it shall not grant 
without prior consent of the United States, any bases
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or any rights, power, o r ’authority whatsoever, in or 
relating to bases, to any third power*
2* It is further agreed that the United States 
shall not, without the consent of the Philippines, 
assign, or underlet, or part with the possession of 
the whole or any part of any base, or of any right, 
power or authority granted by this Agreement, to any 
third power*
Article XXVI
DEFINITION OF BASES
For the purposes of this Agreement, bases are those 
areas named In Annex A and Annex B and such additional 
areas as may be acquired for military purposes pursuant 
to the terms of this Agreement.
Article XXVII 
VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall 
have the right to recruit^citizens of the Philippines for 
voluntary enlistment into the. United States armed forces 
for a fixed term of years, and to train them and to 
exercise the same degree of control and discipline over 
them as is exercised in the case of other members of the 
United States armed forces* The number of such enlistment's 
to be accepted by the armed forces of the United States 
may from time to time be limited by agreement between the 
two Governments.
Article XXVIII 
UNITED STATES RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall 
have the right to enroll and train all eligible United 
States citizens residing in the Philippines in the 
Reserve organizations of the armed forces of the United 
States, which include the Officers Reserve Corps and the 
Enlisted Reserve Corps, except that prior consent of the 
Philippines shall be obtained in the case of such persons 
who are employed by the Philippines or any Municipal or 
Provincial Government thereof*
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Article XXIX 
TERM OF AGREEMENT
The present Agreement shall enter into force upon 
its acceptance by the two Governments and shall remain 
in force for a period of ninety-nine years subject .to 
extension thereafter as agreed by the two Governments.
Signed in Manila, Philippines, in duplicate this 
fourteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and forty- 
seven.
On behalf of the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines:
MANUEL ROXAS 
President of the Philippines
On behalf of the Government of the 
United States of America:
PAUL V. MCNUTT 
Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the United States 
of America to the Republic of the Philippines,
ANNEX A
Clark Field Air Base., Pampanga,
Fort Stotsenberg, Pampanga.
Mariveles Military Reservation, POL Terminal and 
Training Area, Bataan.
Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center, Baguio.
Army Communication System with the deletion of all 
stations in the Port of Manila Area.
United States Armed Forces Cemetery No, 2, San Francisco 
del Monte, Rizal.
Angeles General Depot, Pampanga,
Leyte-Samar Naval Base including shore installations and 
air bases,
Subic Bay, Northwest Shore Naval Base, Zambales Province, 
and the existing Naval reservation at Olongapo and 
the existing Baguio Naval Reservation.
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Tawi Tawi Naval Anchorage and small adjacent land areaso 
Canacao«-Sangley Point Navy Base, Cavite Province,
Bagobantay Transmitter Area, Quezon City, and associated 
radio receiving and control sites, Manila Area, 
Tarunpitao Point (Loran Master Transmitter■ Station), Palawan, 
Talampulan Island, Coast Guard No, 354 (Loran)", Palawan,
Naule Point (Loran Station), Zambales,
Castillejos, Coast Guard No, 356, Zambales,
ANNEX B
Mactan Island Army and Navy Air Base,
Florida Blanca Air Base, Pampanga,
Aircraft Service Warning Net,
Camp Wallace, San Fernando, La Union,
Puerto Princesa Army and Navy Air Base, including Navy 
Section Base and Air Warning Sites, Palawan,
Tawi Tawi Naval Base, Sulu Archipelago,
Aparri Naval Air Base,
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APPENDIX "C"
AGREEMENT BETI-JEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC- 
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO THE PHILIPPINES. Signed at Manila, March 21, 1947.
Notez The Agreement entered into force, March 
21, 1947.
Reference'. This Agreement is also published in 
I DFA TS No. 2, p. 161 and 45 ÜNTS, p. 47.
Considering the desire of the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines to obtain assistance in 
the training and development of its armed forces and 
the procurement of equipment and supplies therefor 
during the period immediately following the independence 
of the Philippines, considering the Agreement between 
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States 
of America concerning military bases, signed March 14, 
1947, and in view of the mutual interest of the two 
Governments in matters of common defense, the President 
of the United States of America has authorized the ren­
dering of military assistance to the Republic of the 
Philippines towards establishing and maintaining na­
tional security and towards forming a basis for partici­
pation by that Government in such defensive military 
operations as the future may require, and to attain 
these ends the Governments of the Republic of the Philip­
pines and the United States of America have agreed as 
follows:
T itl e I 
PURPOSE AND DURATION
Ar t i c l e l. -- Subject to mutual agreements, the- 
Government of the United States of America will furnish 
military assistance to the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines in the training and development of 
armed forces and in the performance of other services 
essential to the fulfillment of those obligations which 
may devolve upon the Republic of the Philippines under 
its international agreements including commitments as­
sumed under the United Nations and to the maintenance 
of the peace and security of the Philippines, as pro­
vided in Title II, Article 6, hereof.
346
Ar t i c l e  2» —  This Agreement shall continue for a 
period of five years from July 4, 1946 unless previously 
terminated or extended as.hereinafter provided.
A r t i c l e 3. -- if the Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines should desire that this Agreement be 
extended beyond the stipulated period, it shall make a 
written proposal to that effect at least one year before 
the expiration of this Agreement.
Ar t i c l e 4. -- This agreement may be terminated 
before the expiration of the period of five years pres­
cribed in Article 2, or before the expiration of an 
extension authorized in Article 3, by either Government, 
subject to three months' written notice to the other 
Government.
Article 5. —  it is agreed on the part of the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines that title 
to all arms, vessels, aircraft, equipment and supplies, 
expendable items excepted, that are furnished under this 
Agreement on a non-reimbursable basis shall remain in 
the United States of America,
TITLE II 
.GENERAL
Ar t i c l e  6. —  Tor the purposes of this Agreement 
the military assistance authorized in Article 1 hereof 
is defined as the furnishing of arms, ammunition, equip­
ment and supplies; certain aircraft and naval vessels, 
and instruction and training assistance by the Army 
and Navy of the United States and shall include the 
following:
(a) Establishing in the Philippines of a United 
States Military Advisory Group composed of ran Army 
group, e Navy group and an Air group to assist and 
advise the Republic of the Philippines on military and 
naval matters;
(b) Furnishing from United States sources equipment 
and technical supplies for training, operations and cer­
tain maintenance of Philippine armed forces of such 
strength and composition as mutually agreed upon;
(c) Facilitating the procurement by the Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines of a military reserve 
of United States equipment and supplies, in such amounts 
as may be subsequently agreed upon;
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(d) Making available selected facilities of United 
States Array and Navy training establishments to provide 
training for key personnel of the Philippine armed forces, 
under the conditions hereinafter described*
TITLE III 
MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
ARTICLE 7o The Military Advisory Group shall cori- 
eist of such number of United States military personnel 
as may be agreed upon by the Governments of the Republic 
of the Philippines and the United States of America*
A r t i c l e 8* —  The functions of the Military Advisory 
Group shall be to provide such advice and assistance to 
the Republic of the Philippines- as has been authorized 
by the Congress of the United States of America and as is 
necessary to accomplish the purposes set forth in Article 
1 of this Agreement*
A r t i c l e 9* —  Each member of the Military Advisory 
Group shall* continue as a member of the branch of the armed 
forces of the United States to which he belongs and serve 
with that group in the rank, grade or rating he holds in 
the armed forces of thé United States and shall wear the 
uniform thereof, as provided in current regulations. 
Officers and enlisted men so detailed are authorized to 
accept from the Government of the Republic of the Philip­
pines offices and such pay and emoluments thereunto apper­
taining as may be offered by that Government and approved 
by the appropriate authorities of the United States, such 
compensation to be accepted by the United States Government 
for remittance to the individual if in the opinion of the 
appropriate authorities of the United States such course 
appears desirable*
Ar t i c l e lOi -- Members of the Military Advisory 
Group shall serve under the direction of the authorities 
of the United States of America,
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A r t i c l e ll, —  a u  members of the Group shall be 
on active duty and shall be paid regularly authorized 
pay and allowances by the Government of the United 
States of America, plus a special allowance to com­
pensate for increased costs of living. This special 
allowance shall be based upon a scale agreed upon by 
the Governments.of the Republic of the Philippines 
and the United States of America and shall be revised 
periodically. The Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines shall reimburse the Government of the 
United States of America for the special allowances 
provided for in this Article. The special allowance 
shall be applicable for the entire period each member 
of the group resides in the Philippines on duty with 
the Group, except as specified elsewhere in this. Agree­
ment.
Article 12. -- The Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines agrees to extend to the Military Advi­
sory Group the same exemptions and privileges granted 
by Article V, XII and XVIII of the Agreement Between, 
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States 
of America Concerning Military Bases, signed March 14, 
1947.
A r t i c l e 13. -- Except as may be otherwise sub­
sequently agreed by the two Governments, the expense 
of the cost of transportation of each member of the 
Military Advisory Group, his dependents, household 
effects, and belongings to and from the Philippines 
shall be borne by the Government of the United States 
of America to the extent authorized by law. Members of the 
Group shall be entitled to compensation for expenses 
incurred in travel in the Republic of the Philippines 
on official business of the Group and such expenses 
shall be reimbursed to the Government of the United 
States of America by the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines except for expenses of travel by 
the transportation facilities of the Group.
Article 14. -- The Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines shall provide, and defray the cost of, 
suitable living quarters for personnel of the Military 
Advisory Group and their families and suitable buildings 
and office space for use in the conduct of the official 
business of the Military Advisory Group. All living
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and office quarters shall conform to the standards 
prescribed by the United States military services for 
similar quarters. Official supplies and equipment of 
American manufacture required by the Group shall be 
furnished by the Government of the United States of 
Americh which shall be reimbursed for the cost thereof 
by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 
Official supplies and equipment of other than American 
manufacture shall be provided without cost by the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, The cost 
of all services required by the Group, including com­
pensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, 
laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, 
shall be borne by the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines,
Ar t i c l e i s . —  A11 communications between the 
Military Advisory Group and the Republic of the Philip­
pines involving matters of policy shall be through the 
Ambassador of the United States of America to the 
Philippines or the Charge d'Affaires.
A r t i c l e -- The provisions of Articles XIII
and XXI of the Agreement of March 14, 1947 between the 
Republic, of the Philippines and the United States of' 
America Concerning Military Bases are applicable to 
the Military Advisory Group, it being agreed that the 
Headquarters of the Military Advisory Group will be 
considered a temporary installation under the provisions 
of^Article XXI of the Agreement aforementioned.
(h) The Chief of the Military Advisory Group, and not 
to exceed six (6) other senior members of the group to 
be designated by him, will be accorded diplomatic im­
munity,
TITLE IV 
LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE
Article 17. —  The decision as to what supplies, 
services, facilities, equipment and naval vessels are 
necessary for military assistance shall be made by 
agreement between the appropriate authorities of the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
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ARTICLE 18 —  Certain initial equipment, supplies 
and maintenance items shall be furnished gratuitously 
by the United States in accordance with detailed ar­
rangements to be mutually agreed upon. Additional 
equipment and supplies other than those surplus to the 
needs of the United States required in the furtherance 
of military assistance shall be furnished by the United 
States subject to reimbursement by the Republic of the 
Philippines on terms to be mutually.agreed upon. All 
items of arms, munitions, equipment and supplies origi­
nating from sources other than those surplus to the 
needs of the United States shall be furnished only when 
the requisite funds have been specifically appropriated 
by the Congress of the United States.
Article 19. —  The Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines agrees that it will not relinquish 
physical possession or pass the title to any and all 
arms, munitions, equipment? supplies, naval vessels 
and aircraft furnished under this Agreement without the 
specific consent of the Government of the United States.
Article 20, —  Military equipment, supplies and 
naval vessels necessary in connection with the carrying 
out of the full program of military assistance to the 
Republic of the Philippines shall be provided from 
Philippines and United States sources in so far as 
practicable and the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines shall procure arms, ammunitions, military 
equipment and naval vessels from governments or agencies 
other than the United States of America only on the basis 
of mutual agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines and the Government of the United States 
of America. The Government of the Republic of the Philip­
pines shall procure United States military equipment, 
supplies and naval vessels only as mutually agreed upon.
TITLE V 
TRAINING ASSISTANCE
Article 21, —  a s  part of the program of military 
assistance the Government of the Republic of the Philip­
pines shall be permitted to send selected students to 
designated technical and service school of the ground, 
naval and air services of the United States. Such students
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shall be subject to the same regulations as are United 
States students and may be returned to the Philippines, 
without substitution, for violation of such regulations, 
Numbers of students and detailed arrangements shall be 
mutually agreed upon and shall bg kept at a minimum for 
essential requirements « All Philippine requests for 
military training of Filipino personnel shall be made 
to the Government of the United States through the 
Military Advisory Group.
Title VI 
SECURITY
Article 2 2 , —  Disclosures and exchanges of clas­
sified military equipment and information of any se­
curity classification to or between the Government of 
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of 
the United States of America will be with the mutual 
understanding that the equipment and information will 
be safeguarded in accordance with the requirements of 
the(military security classification established there­
on by the originating Government and that no redis­
closure by the recipient Government of such equipment 
and information to their governments or unauthorized 
personnel will be made without specific approval of the 
originating Government.
Article 23. —  So long as this Agreement, or any 
extension thereof, is in effect the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines shall not engage or accept 
the services of any personnel of any Government other 
than the United States of America for duties of any 
nature connected with the Philippine armed forces, 
except by mutual agreement between the Government of 
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of 
the United States of America,
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Ti t l e v u
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned, duly author­
ized thereto, have signed this Agreement in duplicate, 
in the City of Manila, this twenty-first day of March, 
1947.
For the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesî
MANUEL ROXAS 
President of the Philippines
For the Government of the United States of America;
PAUL V. MCNUTT 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the 
United States of America to the Republic of the Philippines
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APPENDIX" D"
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETV/EEN THE 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
The Parties of this Treaty
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and prin­
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations and their 
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all govern­
ments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace 
in the Pacific area.
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relation­
ship which brought their two peoples together in a 
common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side* 
by-side against imperialist aggression during the last 
war.
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their 
sense of unity and their common determination to defend 
themselves against external armed attack, so that no 
potential aggressor could be under the illusion that 
either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts 
for'-collective defense for the preservation of peace and 
security pending the development of a more comprehensive 
system of regional security in the Pacific area.
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument 
shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense 
altering or diminishing any existing agreements or under­
standings between the Republic of the Philippines and the 
United States of America.
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Have agreed a.e follows :
A R T I C L E  I* The parties undertake, as set forth in 
the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any inter­
national disputes in which they may be involved by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security and justice are not endangered and 
to refrain in their international relation from the 
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations.
A R T I C L E  I I , In order more effectively to achieve 
the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately 
and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain 
and develop their individual and collective capacity to 
resist armed attack,
A R T I C L E  III. The Parties, through their Foreign 
Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from 
time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty 
and whenever in the opinion of either of them the ter­
ritorial integrity, political independence or security 
of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed 
attack in the Pacific.
A R T I C L E  IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed 
attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common dangers 
in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as 
a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council of the United Nations,\ Such measures 
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to restore and maintain interna­
tional peace and security.
A R T I C L E  V. For the purpose of A R T I C L E  IV, an armed 
attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an 
armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of 
the Parties, or on the island territories under its 
jurisdiction in the Pacific ocean, its armed forces, 
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
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A R T I C L E  VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall 
not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights 
and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the 
United Nations or the responsibility of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
A R T I C L E  VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of 
America in accordance with their respective constitu­
tional processes and will come into force when instru­
ments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by 
them at Manila.
A R T I C L E  VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force 
indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year 
after notice has been given to the other party.
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipoten­
tiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day 
of August, 1951.
.For the Republic of the Philippines;
(SGD.) CARLOS P. ROMULO 
(SGD.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE 
(SGD.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO 
(SGD.) DIOSDADO. MACAPAGAL
For the United States of America:
(SGD.) DEAN ACHESON 
(SGD.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES 
(SGD.) TOM CONNALLY 
(SGD.) ALEXANDER WILEY
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APPENDIX "E"
SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY AND PROTOCOL 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS 
Signed at Manila September 8, 1954
Treaty and protocol signed at Manila September 8, 1954;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States 
of America February 1, 1955;
Ratified by the President of the United States of 
America February 4, 1955;
Ratification of the United States of America deposited 
with the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines February 19, 1955;
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of 
America March 2, 1955;
Entered into force February 19, 1955.
The Parties to this Treaty,
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the 
Parties,
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and 
principles set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations and their desire to live in peace with all 
peoples and all governments.
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and 
declaring that they will earnestly strive by every 
peaceful means to promote self-government and to 
secure the independence of all countries whose 
peoples desire it and are able to undertake its res­
ponsibilities.
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and 
freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law, and to pro­
mote the economic well-being and development of all 
peoples in the treaty area.
Intending to declare publicly and formally 
their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor 
will appreciate that the Parties stand together in 
the area, and
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Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for 
collective defense for the preservation of peace and 
security,
Therefore agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Char­
ter of the United Nations, to settle any international 
disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and 
security and justice are not endangered, and to re­
frain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.
ARTICLE II
In order more effectively to achieve the ob­
jectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and 
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self- 
help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed 
attack and to prevent and counter subversive activi­
ties directed from without against their territorial 
and political stability.
ARTICLE III
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free 
institutions and to cooperate with one another in 
the further development of economic measures, inclu­
ding technical assistance, designed both to promote 
economic progress and social well-being and to fur­
ther the individual and colleltive efforts of govern­
ments toward these ends.
ARTICLE IV
1. Each Party recotnizes that aggression by 
means of armed attack in the treaty area against 
any of the Parties or against any State or terri­
tory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may 
hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace 
and safety, and agrees that it will in that event 
act to meet the common danger in accordance with 
its constitutional processes. Measures taken un­
der this paragraph shall be immediately reported
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to the Security Council of the United Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the 
inviolability or the integrity of the territory or
the sovereignty or political independence of any Party 
in the treaty area or of any other State or territory 
to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article 
from time to time apply is threatened in any way other 
chan by armed attack or is affected or threatened ;by 
any fact or situation which might endanger the peace 
of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately 
in order to agree on the measures which should be 
taken for the common defense.
3. It is understood that no action on the terri­
tory of any State designated by unanimous agreement 
under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory 
so designated shall be taken except at the invitation 
or with the consent of the government concerned.
ARTICLE V
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which 
each of them shall be represented, to consider matters 
concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The 
Council shall provide for consultation with regard to 
military and any other planning as the situation ob­
taining in the treaty area may from time to time re­
quire. The Council shall be so organized as to be 
able to meet at any time.
ARTICLE VI
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and 
obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter 
of the United Nations or the responsibility of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Each Party declares that none 
of the international engagements now in force bet­
ween it and any other of the Parties or any third 
party is in conflict with the provisions of this 
Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any inter­
national engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
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ARTICLE VII
Any other State in a position to further the 
objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the area may, by unanimous agreement 
of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. 
Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty 
by depositing its instrument of accession with the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall 
inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each 
such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE VIII
As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is 
the general area of Southeast Asia, including also 
the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and 
the general area of the Southwest Pacific not inclu­
ding the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes 
north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agree­
ment, amend this Article to include within the treaty 
area the territory of any State acceding to this 
Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise 
to change the treaty area.
ARTICLE IX
1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 
Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by 
that government to the other signatories.
2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provi­
sions carried out by the Parties in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes. The ins­
truments of ratification shall be deposited as soon 
as possible with the Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other 
signatories of such deposit.
3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the 
States which have ratified it as soon as the instru­
ments of ratification of a majority of the signatories 
shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect 
with respect to each other State on the date of the 
deposit of its instrument of ratification.
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ARTICLE X
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, 
but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after 
its notice of denunciation has been given to the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which 
shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of 
the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
ARTICLE XI
The English text of this Treaty is binding on 
the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to 
the French text thereof and have so notified the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the 
French text shall be equally authentic and binding 
on the Parties.
UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The United States of America in executing the 
present Treaty does so with the understanding that its 
recognition of the effect of aggression and armed at­
tack and its agreement with reference thereto in Arti­
cle IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression 
but affirms that in the event of other aggression or 
armed attack it will consult under the provisions of 
Article IV, paragraph 2.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipoten­
tiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September,
1954.
FOR AUSTRALIA:
R. G. Casey. 
FOR FRANCE:
G. La Chambre 
FOR NEW ZEALAND: 
Clifton Webb
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FOR PAKISTAN;
Signed for transmission to my Government for its 
consideration and action in accordance with the 
Constitution of Pakistan.
Zafrulla Khan
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF. THE PHILIPPINES;
Carlos P. Garcia 
Francisco A. Pclgad.
Tomas L. Cabi3i 
Lorenzo M. Ta'na-'r%
Cornelio T. Villareal
FOR THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND;
Wan Waithayakon
Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND;
Reading
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
John Foster Dulles 
H, Alexander Smith 
Michael J. Mansfield
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PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE 
DEFENSE TREATY
Designation of States and Territory as to which provisions
of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable
The Parties to theSoutheast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article 
IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the 
free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of 
Vietnam.
The Parties further agree that the above mentioned 
states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the 
economic measures contemplated by Article III.
This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously 
with the coming into force of the Treaty.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries 
have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.
FOR AUSTRALIA: R. G. Casey
FOR FRANCE: G. La Chambre
FOR NEW ZEALAND: Clifton Webb
FOR PAKISTAN: Signed for transmission to my Govern­
ment for its consideration and action 
in accordance with the Constitution of 
Pakistan.
Zafrulla Khan
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:
Carlos P. Garcia 
Francisco A. Delgado 
Tomas L. Cabili 
Lorenzo M. Tanada 
Cornelio T. Villareal
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APPENDIX "F"
CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN RELATIONS
May 1, 1898 - America's Asiatic Fleet under Commodore 
George Dewey defeats the Spanish naval force in 
the Battle of Manila Bay.
June 12, 1898 - General Emilio Aguinaldo proclaims 
independence of the Philippines.
August 13. 1898 - American troops under General Wesley 
Merritt occupy Manila after a ceremonial battle 
with the Spanish garrison.
December 10, 1898 - Signing of the Treaty of Paris, under 
which Spain ceded the Philippines to the United 
States.
December 21. 1898 - President William McKinley proclaims 
his policy of "Benevolent Assimilation" of the 
Philippines.
January 18, 1899 - The Schurman Commission is established 
to extend American occupation throughout the Archipe­
lago.
February 4, 1899 - Start of the Philippine-American War.
March 23, 1901 - Capture of General Emilio Aguinaldo in 
Palanan, Isabela.
July 4, 1901 - Establishment of civil government in the
Philippines, with William Howard Taft as first civil 
governor.
October 16, 1907 - Inauguration of the Philippine Assembly.
August 26. 1916 - Enactment of the Jones Law by the U.S. 
Congress. It provided that as soon as a stable 
government could be established, independence would 
be granted. Passage of the Jones Law makes the govern­
ment of the Philippine practically autonomous.
October 5. 1921 - Leonard Wood becomes governor-general 
His opposition toward independence provoked the 
Cabinet Crisis of 1923, when Filipino members of the 
cabinet and the Council of State resigned en masse.
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January 13, 1932 - Passage of the. H are-ïî au'ss-Cut ting 3ill by 
the U.S; Congress, which would grant independence 
to the Philippines after a 10-year transition period. 
The Philippine Legislature rejected the Act because 
of objectionable e.conoœic features. Moreover, the 
Filipino leaders felt that the retention of 1 U.S. 
military and naval bases after independence would 
nullify Philippine sovereignty.
March 24, 1934 -
the Tydings-;
es tablishmen
the granting
tran sition.
November 15. 1935
the Philippi
and Sergio 0
December 8. 1941
Quezon as President
installations in Baguio, Davao and Clark Field, 
starting the Pacific War.
May 6, 1942 - Fil-American forces surrender, in Corregidor. 
to the Japanese Imperial Army,
November 3, 1943 - Sen. Millard Tydings introduces Joint 
Resolution 93 which authorizes 'the U.Si President 
with the President of the Philippine Commonwealth 
"to withhold or to acquire and to retain bases, 
appurtenances and incidental rights, in addition 
to those stipulated in the Independence Act..."
October 20. 1944 - General Douglas MacArthur fulfills
his promise to return when he and President Sergio 
Osmena Sr. land in Leyte with U.S. liberating forces.
October 23, 1944 - The Commonwealth Government headed by 
President Osmena is restored at Tacloban, Leyte.
May 24, 1945 - President Osmena signs an agreement with 
U.S. President Harry S. Truman permitting the 
retention or future location of American military 
and naval bases in 19 provinces in the Philippines.
July 28, 1945 - President Osmena approves Joint Resolution 
No. 4 passed by the Philippine Congress, which auJthor- 
izcs the President of the Philippines to negotiate 
with the President of the United States on the estab­
lishment of American bases in the Philippines.
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April 30. 1946 - President Harry S. Truman signs the 
Philippine Rehabilitation Act*
June 26, 1946.- President Truman approves the Philippine 
Military Assistance Act, which authorizes the train­
ing of Philippine military and naval personnel, the 
maintenance of equipment and the transfer of supplies.
July 3, 1946 - The U.5. Congress passes the Philippine
Property Act of 1946, which affirmed the Philippine 
Independence Act of 1934. It provided that on the 
proclamation of Philippine independence, all U.S. 
government property in the Philippines, except for 
bases and consular or diplomatic establishments, 
were to be transferred to the Philippine government.
July 4, 1946 - President Truman issues a proclamation 
recognizing Philippine independence* Inauguration 
of Manuel A., Roxas and Elpidio Quirino as President 
and Vice-President of the Philippines* Implementation 
of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, which provided 
for a 28-year framework for bilateral trade until 
July 3, 1974.
August 8, 1946 - The Philippines signs exclusive purr
chasing agreements of abaca, copra and coconut oil 
with the U.S. government. The agreements were ter­
minated on December 3, 1946.
■(C
September 11. 1946 - A surplus agreement was signed by
President Roxas and the Central Field Commissioner 
of the Foreign Liquidation Commission authorizing 
the Philippine President to accept, administer, 
sell and dispose of surplus property acquired from 
the United States.
October 22. 1946 - Effectivitv of the Treaty of General 
Relations,
March 12, 1947 - Signing of Military Assistance Agreement, 
which provides for an integrated training of Philip­
pine forces with the advice of the Joint United 
States Military Advisory Group. This agreement was 
renewed in March 1950 to extend to July 4, 1953, and 
again in June 1953 to extend indefinitely, subject 
to the provisions of later U.S* mutual defense acts.
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March 14. 1947 - President Roxas and Ambassador Paul V. 
McNutt sign the Military Bases Agreement, to be 
effective for 99 years. Its 29 articles dealt with 
both Philippines and UiS. rights and obligations, 
including sites for the bases,
November 15. 1930 - Signing of the Quirino-Foster Memo­
randum of Agreement to implement the recommendations 
of the Bell Mission. (Upon request of President 
Quirino, President Truman sent an Economic Survey 
Mission under Daniel Bell to examine and survey all 
aspects of the Philippine economy.)
August 30. 1951 - Presidents Quirino and Truman sign 
the Treaty of Mutual Defense, which recognizes 
that an armed attack against one would be dange­
rous to the other’s peace and security.
June 23. 1954 - The two governments, through an exchange 
of notes between U.S. Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles and General Carlos P. Romulo, agrees, pursuant 
to the provisions of the Philippine-US Mutual Defense 
Treaty, to form a consultative council.
September 6. 1955 - Signing of the Laurel-Langley Agree­
ment by the Philippine and American governments', 
following its conclusion by Senator Jose P. Laurel 
and James M. Langley on December 15, 1954. It goes 
into effect on January 1, 1956.
July 3, 1956 - President Ramon Magsaysay and U.S. Vice- 
President Richard M. Nixon discuss in Manila the 
need to strengthen military bases in the Philippines 
in order to bolster the common defense.
May 15, 1958 - The two governments agree to establish a
Philippine-U.S. Military Defense Board and to assign 
a Philippine military liaison officer to the staff 
of the base commander in major U.S. military bases 
in the Philippines.
June 20. 1958 - Presidents Carlos P. Garcia and Dwight 
D. Eisenhower is.^ue a joint statement on mutual 
military and economic matters. The communique 
clarifies military arrangements through SEATO and 
the Mutual Defense Treaty, to mean that any armed 
attack against the Philippines also involves an 
attack against U.S. forces stationed here.
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October 1959 - U»S. Ambassador to Manila Charles E. Bohlen 
and Foreign Secretary Felixberto M. Serrano sign a 
Memorandum of Agreement calling for mutual consulta­
tions on long-range missile sites, and shortening 
base leaseholds from 99 years to 25 years with renewal 
options.
December 7. 1959 - U.S, Charge d ’Affaires George M, Abbott 
sends a note to Foreign Secretary Serrano confirming 
acceptance by the U.S. government of the relinquish­
ment of the community of Olongapo and certain areas 
adjacent to it, which.are located within the U.S.
Naval Base at Subic Bay.
August 30, 1962 - The U ,S , Congress passes Public Law
.87-616, authorizing the appropriation of $73 million 
for the payment of unpaid balance of awards made by 
the Philippine War Damage Commission under Title I 
of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946.
October 24. 1964 -/Preliminary negotiations to revise all 
existing treaties and agreements between the United 
States and the Philippines. Carlos P. Romulo and US 
Ambassador Henry Byroade lay down the guidelines for 
the negotiations, which would center mainly on the 
military bases and mutual defense pact, the military 
assistance pact, and possibly the Laurel-Langley 
Agreement,
March 16. 1965 - The Philippines and the US agree to
establish in Baguio a strategic American communica­
tion center intended to link directly the Philip­
pines with American bases and military installations 
in the East and in the Pacific.
May 21. 1965 - Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mauro Mendez- 
and U.S. Ambassador William McCormick Blair reach 
virtual agreement on the question of jurisdiction 
in the. P.I.-U.S. military bases agreement. After 
the jurisdiction question Mendez was expected to 
tackle problems affecting the administration of U.S. 
bas1.8, including the question of immigration, customs 
and uses of bases.
December 17. 196 7 - An 11-day exploratory talk held in 
Baguio City from Nov. 21 to Dec, 1, 1967, between 
representatives of the Philippines and United States 
government reach agreement or concepts to govern 
RP-US economic relations after 1974. One area where
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a meeting of minds was reached was on the question 
of parity. The Philippine panel emphasized that 
the government is committed to the non-extension 
of parity rights after 1974, It referred to the 
statement of President Marcos-, that replies arising 
from parity are "co-terminous" with the Laurel 
Langley Agreement. The US panel made it clear 
that the US will not seek the extension of parity,
August 31, 1971 - The U.S. closes Sangley Point Naval
Air Station Bay and turns it over to the Philippine 
Government. Coast Guard-operated LORAN stations 
in the Philippines were likewise turned to the 
Philippine Coast Guard.
November 21. 1972 - The Agency for International Devel­
opment (AID) grants $3.2 million to assist the 
Philippine government in the building of 1,000 
three-room, typhoon-resistant schools by July 1974,
August 21. 1972 - The Philippines and the United States 
agree by an exchange of notes to amend the 1972. 
Public Law 480 agreement. The amendment covers the 
sale of 100,000 metric tons of rice valued at 
$14,775 thereby increasing the commodity loan for 
CY 1972 to $42,623,000.
February 17. 1973 - The Philippine government asks the 
government of the United States to relinquish a 
portion of the American naval station at San 
Antonio, Zambales, for use in the government's rural 
electrification program'.
February 23. 1973 - The Philippine government asks the 
U.S. to advance its implementation of the General­
ized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) to enable Philip­
pine products to enter the United States mainland 
duty-free or under lower preferential tariff rates. 
The GSP is a scheme whereby exports of poor coun­
tries like the Philippines are given preferential 
duties (e.g. zero customs duty but up to a certain 
quota or volume of exports or lower customs duty) 
by importing rich countries.
May 16» 1973 - The Philippines officially asks the United 
States to re-negotiate the entire range of their 
relations in one sitting. Among the outstanding 
treaties between the two countries are the Military 
Base Agreement» the Mutual Defense Pact» the Military 
Assistance Pact, and the Laurel-Langley Agreement. 
Discussion on extradition between the two countries 
may precede the package negotiation.
August 22. 1973 - The United States government grants the 
Philippines a ?4.2 million concessional loan for the 
development of the Tiwi geothermal facility in Tiwi, 
Albay, as a source of electric power,
April 4, 19.74 - An agreement covering an annual US $2 
million outlay to support the US veterans medical 
care program in the Philippines was signed by Foreign 
Affairs Secretary Carlos P. Romulo and US Ambassador 
William H. Sullivan.
May 24. 1974 - President Marcos and Ambassador Sullivan
sign an agreement providing $15 million for the initial 
phase of waterworks development programs. The loan 
will provide funding to cover the foreign exchange 
requirements and a portion of the Philippines’ cur­
rency needs,
July 5-13. 1974 - A panel of Filipino and American dele­
gations meet to initiate talks on an agreement that 
would govern economic ties between the Philippines 
and the United States in the post Laurel-Langley 
era. The discussions on the drafts submitted by both 
governments of a proposed, bilateral agreement which 
would replace the Laurel-Langley that expired last 
July 3, 1974 centered on close, continuous economic 
relations. The panels also affirmed that the mutually 
satisfying economic relations between the two coun­
tries will continue to function in a productive and 
harmonious manner until a new framework for this 
relationship is concluded,
August 10. 1974 - A temporary agreement in the form of an 
'■'•.change of notes to improve and expand the airline 
passenger and cargo services between thejPhilippines 
and the U.S, was signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary 
Carlos P. Romulo and US Ambassador Sullivan. The 
pact provided fc- a two-phase expansion of Philip­
pine Airlines D C -10 services to daily flights by April 
1975, and for parallel expansion of B-747 services by 
Pan American Airways and Northwest Airlines to 4 
flights weekly each.
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APPENDIX "G"
OFFICIAL VISITS TO THE PHILIPPINES AND TO
THE UNITED STATES
August 1949, President Elpidio Quirino visited Washington
February 1950, President Elpidio Quirino again visited 
Washington
July 1956, Vice President Richard Mo Nixon visited Manila
June 1958, President Carlos P« Garcig visited the United 
States
June 1960, President Dwight D, Eisenhower visited Manila
October 1964, President Diosdado Macapagal visited 
Washington
September 1966, President Ferdinand E* Marcos visited 
Washington
October 1966, President Lyndon B, Johnson visited Manila
July 1969, President Richard Mo Nixon visited Manila
December 1969, Vice President Spiro To Agnew visited Manila 
December, 1975, President Gerald Ford visited Manila.
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